Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

150. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 24, 1975, 9–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Ambassador Akins

STATE PARTICIPANTS

• Deputy Assistant Secretary Sidney Sober
• Ambassador James E. Akins
• Mr. Richard Aherne NEA/ARP

DEFENSE PARTICIPANTS

• The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. William P. Clements, Jr.
• Military Assistant, RADM Kenneth M. Carr
• Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Mr. Robert Ellsworth
• Director Defense Security Assistance Agency, LTG Howard M. Fish
• Deputy Assistant Secretary (NEASA), Mr. James H. Noyes
• Director, NESA Region, MG Gordon Sumner, Jr.
• Country Director, Saudi Arabia, Colonel William Fifer

(S) Ambassador Akins began by outlining Saudi concerns over recent trends in SAG–USG relations, in particular as represented by news media coverage they perceive as unfavorable. Senator Kennedy’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia and his proposed amendment which would stop all arms shipments to Persian Gulf states for six months raised concern. The Ambassador inquired as to the chance of the amendment passing. Mr. Clements replied that it is difficult to predict, with the present mood of Congress anything is possible. LTG Fish commented that of Senators Clark, Case, Javits, Humphrey, and McGovern who were present in Committee when the amendment was presented, only Senator Clark clearly supported the amendment. Mr. Sober stated Department of State planned to provide Senator Humphrey with their views on the amendment and would use Mr. Sisco’s recent statement before the House as the basis for a policy statement on Arms to the Persian Gulf. Mr. Clements asked for a copy of that Statement; MG Sumner agreed to provide from ISA files.

(S) Israeli Overflights of Tabuk. Ambassador Akins reported SAG concern about IDF overflights of Tabuk; that a protest had been passed to the GOI without any encouraging response. This was paralleled by statements passed to the SAG by visiting Congressmen that Israel planned to occupy portions of northwest Saudi Arabia. Again this was passed to the GOI who denied the report, only to have Israeli news media carry on the following day articles that Israel planned to occupy both sides of the Gulf of Aqaba.

(S) USG Security Assistance to SAG. Ambassador Akins stated his 15 June meeting with Prince Sultan was to have been a philosophical review of our programs. BG Ahmann (who the Ambassador feels is an outstanding officer) feels the Saudis don’t use their equipment properly and that their primary requirement is training. However, at the highest levels in SAG, the primary concern is equipment and they constantly compare their inventory with that of surrounding Arab states, in particular with Jordan. They reject our observations that the effectiveness of the JAA results from sound training programs. Part of the problem in the 15 June meeting was the fact that Prince Fahd had just come from a SAG Council of Ministers meeting to discuss the planned execution of the late King Faisal’s assassin during which a heated exchange had occurred. Fahd was in a bad mood and took out all his frustrations by criticizing problems in SAG–USG relations, stating that we are betraying him by not being more responsive.

(S) Loan of a MICV. Mr. Clements asked why the SAG seemed so concerned about getting a MICV prototype over to Saudi Arabia for demonstration purposes. Ambassador Akins stated the SAG had now backed off and accepted our counter proposal that the SAG send a team to CONUS in the Fall to observe a demonstration of the MICV here. MG Sumner pointed out that the Soviet BMP had stirred up a lot of interest after the October War and in addition commercial representatives (like FMC) may be whetting their appetites. LTG Fish agreed and cited offers made by Mr. Mallot of FMC to make deliveries in 40 months on a direct commercial sale compared to 48 months the USG quoted, but doubted that FMC could do any better in the long run in view of problems with sub-contractors and delivery of materials like aluminum. LTG Fish suggested an alternative solution might be to authorize FMC’s Italian licensee, Oto Melara, to produce APCs for the SAG. DSAA and State will look into this possibility.

(S) Minelaying Equipment. Ambassador Akins wondered why the SAG keeps raising the seemingly minor issue of mine laying equipment? MG Sumner observed that it may result from comparison with Soviet equipment in the inventories of the Egyptian and Syrian armies, plus SAG concerns over protecting their vast oil installations. LTG Fish stated we had sent information to USMTM to be delivered to MODA in response to their request; that part of the problem is unwillingness of the SAG to believe that we do not have some exotic secret devices hidden away in our arsenal, and the other part of the problem is their unwillingness to accept our doctrine that the best minelayer is a shovel backed up with detailed survey and recording which requires proper training. He suggested that perhaps the USMTM Army Section needs to educate the MODA staff along these lines. Mr. Clements suggested we consider offering to the SAG to have the COE supervise laying any minefields they require, at the same time pointing out all the many problems SAG would face from Bedouins and livestock wandering into such fields and the like; that this would put the ball in their court and should stop any further discussion. Colonel Fifer pointed out the SAG has half its infantry stationed in Jordan and Syria and probably wants its own capability to lay mines in any potential battlefields and would not accept COE involvement.

(S) New SAG “Urgent List”. Ambassador Akins stated he would like the USG to be responsive where it could be, but not to equivocate if the answer is “no.” For example, he assumed that the reply on REDEYE would be a categorical no. Mr. Sober replied that this would have to be reviewed. In light of our recent agreement to provide REDEYE to Jordan, we could not reject the SAG request out of hand. Mr. Clements observed that the SAG is testing us; they are aware of our assistance to Jordan and want to see what we will do for them. Mr. Clements felt we should let the SAG have REDEYE; we can’t put them in a position of paying for weapons for Jordan that we deny to them. He felt the same about the request for flamethrowers, Dragon and LAW. LTG Fish commented that flame weapons are not normally sold to foreign countries. On M–60 tanks, LTG Fish pointed out that deliveries would be impossible before 1980. Mr. Sober pointed out that all these new requests would have to be reviewed at the highest levels in light of the reassessment of our Middle East policy, and that the feeling was that there should be no new major deals announced during the reassessment.

(S) TOW. Mr. Sober stated Mr. Sisco is concerned that diversion from US Army units may cause severe criticism from Congress. LTG Fish stated the quantities involved would not create any problems. MG Sumner pointed out here was another case where SAG could compare with Jordan as they already have 36 launchers and are to receive an additional 40 on an expedited basis in September. Mr. Clements stressed that expedited shipment to Saudi Arabia will be symbolic of our good intentions. Mr. Sober agreed to take the matter up with Mr. Sisco, but again reiterated the general hold up because of the reassessment.

(S) Advanced Fighter. Mr. Sober commented that the proposed advanced fighter briefing was being held up for the same reassessment reasons. Mr. Clements pointed out that it is only a briefing; that the Israelis have already had detailed briefings on advanced fighters; that the USG has already made the commitment to provide the SAG with an advanced fighter; he and General Brown had told the Saudis during the April trip that they should go for the F–16, thus he did not understand why all the requirements for briefings. Colonel Fifer pointed out they may be considering alternate sources of supply like the British and French, and the RSAF staff may need detailed information on which to base a comparison. The Lightnings are due to be phased out around 1980, thus the SAG does not have much time to make a basic decision and begin negotiations if they are to have an operational replacement by 1980. Mr. Clements stressed that we should move out rapidly on any items where we can be responsive such as with TOW and providing the advanced fighter briefing; that it should not seem that every response has to be extracted out of us under pressure.

(S) Agent Fee Problem. Ambassador Akins commented that Prince Sultan has stated his policy, both in an official statement made public by the SAG and in his letters to USG officials. LTG Fish described the very real problem faced with expiration of Peace Hawk III on 15 August and production of the follow-on 60 F–5s for which the SAG signed a LOA in January this year. Both were subject to the Agent agreement between Northrop and Khashoggi. Northrop has already paid him $6 million in advance on Peace Hawk IV out of a potential fee of between $23 and $25 million, and there could be $4.5 million in Peace Hawk III Extension. Mr. Ellsworth commented that Khashoggi may have already made commitments in anticipation of receiving these fees, so he may have to fight. LTG Fish explained the status of the various contracts; that Peace Hawk III Extension needs to be resolved promptly in light of the 15 August expiration of Peace Hawk III; that it should be sent to Congress for review, but the more serious issue to be resolved is Northrop’s liability to pay Khashoggi agent fees. The LOA for Peace Hawk IV for the 60 additional aircraft was accepted and signed by the SAG in January, but Northrop had not yet contracted with the USAF and could not until the fee problem is resolved. The Peace Hawk V LOA is being developed by the USAF and Northrop but fits into the same general agent fee problem for Northrop.

(S) Mr. Ellsworth brought up the request from Sultan to SECDEF for documents on the alleged payment of bribes to the two Saudi Air Force generals. Northrop has also been asked to provide documents and they may have some in company files. Northrop would like USG advice. Mr. Clements said it would be best for Northrop to decide what files they should provide Sultan, and that they should have them delivered personally to Prince Sultan who could decide what he wanted to do with them. Mr. Sober observed that the USG should stay clear of the Northrop response to Sultan and not be a party to their action. Mr. Clements thought BG Ahmann should present the USG position to Prince Sultan. Mr. Sober suggested using the mechanism of the Joint Security Commission to handle this problem and at the same time to discuss the current Saudi complaints and urgent list. LTG Fish summarized the understanding of the meeting that five actions were required: 1. Preparation of a reply from SECDEF to Sultan’s letter (which could be a very short reply followed up by the documents later); 2. Presentation of the USG position on agent fees to Prince Sultan; 3. Presentation of the latest Peace Hawk V proposal to SAG; 4. Response to the latest SAG list of requests; and 5. Presentation of the follow-on advance fighter briefing.

(S) Aid to YAR. Ambassador Akins stated he considered this problem marginal compared to our other problems with SAG, and obviously the SAG is ambivalent about building up the YAR armed forces. Mr. Clements and Mr. Sober both agreed that the USG had done its best to get SAG moving and now would just have to wait. Perhaps Ambassador Scotes could persuade the YARG to send a delegation to Riyadh to press their own case.

(S) Public Housing Construction. Mr. Clements stated that both the President and SECSTATE had agreed to the COE providing assistance to SAG in this area. Ambassador Akins commented that it was a matter of extreme importance to the SAG. (Note: This action is being staffed within DoD to sort out the procedural requirements to implement the project.)

(S) Soviet Presence in Somalia. Ambassador Akins asked what the USG response would be to the SAG Foreign Ministry inquiry about USG willingness to sell Somalia arms that SAG would pay for as an alternative to Soviet arms. Mr. Clements stated that we do want to get the Soviets out of Somalia if possible and that it was recognized that the SAG was in the best position to pressure Somalia. Mr. Sober stated the problem was under review in State’s African Bureau and he would check into it again. Mr. Noyes commented that sale of equipment could entail stationing a MAAG there eventually. Mr. Clements said DoD would give the SAG inquiry very serious consideration and we would prepare an initial position before Ambassador Akins goes out to Riyadh.

(S) Command and Control. Ambassador Akins stated he would accept any arrangement DoD decided upon for command and control of the various DoD elements in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Clements inquired whether bringing the SANG Program Manager’s office under Chief, USMTM would bother Prince Abdulla. The Ambassador said Abdulla probably would prefer to keep them separate, but he could be convinced to accept any arrangement we desired if explained that it was necessary within USG organization.

(S) Mr. Clements concluded by discussing the timing of the visit to Saudi Arabia. It was agreed that any trip should await Mr. Clements’ return from his trip to Europe to give him an opportunity to review the status with BG Ahmann on 14 July, and that perhaps we should aim towards meeting with the Saudis around 19 July. Ambassador Akins urged that a message be sent promptly to Embassy Jidda reporting our plan.

1. Summary: Akins and NEA representatives met with Clements, Ellsworth, and other Department of Defense officials to review the status of several active programs in Saudi Arabia.

   Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–78–0038, Saudi Arabia, 1975, 320.2–333. Secret. Drafted by Fifer; approved by Ellsworth. The meeting was held in Clements’ office at the Pentagon.