Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

127. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Riyadh, February 15, 1975, 3:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary Kissinger’s Visit to Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

• Prince Fahd, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior
• His Excellency Mohammed Masud, Acting Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
• Secretary Henry A. Kissinger
• Under Secretary Charles Robinson
• Ambassador James Akins
• Assistant Secretary Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., NEA
• Mr. Isa Sabbagh, Interpreter

Prince Fahd: We are following your efforts and hope they will be crowned with success.

Secretary Kissinger: It is more difficult every month.

Prince Fahd: That is true. It often happens that the difficulties increase, but this often means relief is at hand. When matters reach their ultimate depth, they can only go up. It is my belief that the Arab-Israeli problem is one of the most difficult.

Secretary Kissinger: Will Your Highness be present when I meet the King?

Prince Fahd: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I will give His Majesty a detailed explanation of our efforts but I want to say one thing now. We must conduct our policy in difficult circumstances and under great domestic difficulties. Your Highness is aware of the attacks on us. Your Highness is also aware of the complicated situation in the Middle East. Israel’s interest is to complicate matters further. But we have no interest in dividing the Arab world.

Prince Fahd: That goes without saying.

Secretary Kissinger: I began 15 months ago because I was convinced that American relations with the Arab world must be improved. I wanted America’s oldest Arab friends to be proud of American actions and not have to apologize for them.

We are prepared to make the same effort for Syria as we are for Egypt. Your Highness knows that the Syrian problem is more complicated, but our intention is to help in the same way. I know this must be of concern to Saudi Arabia.

Prince Fahd: True. We feel that what has been achieved since October 1973 in U.S.-Arab relations is substantial. And in the proper perspective, the improvement has been great compared with the absence of good relations with the U.S. in the Arab world in the previous period. This has enabled your friends to speak up and to give the U.S. credit for what it is doing. This is consonant with His Majesty’s desire to see us move along this path.

Secretary Kissinger: His Majesty always encouraged us.

Prince Fahd: True. His Majesty’s policy has not been confined to U.S.-Saudi relations, but he has wanted an improvement in U.S. relations with all the Arabs.

Secretary Kissinger: That has been our impression. His Majesty has used his influence to that end.

I think Your Highness understands English perfectly. You have an unfair advantage. You can reflect on your replies.

Prince Fahd: My English is limited and confined to personal matters. One must hear some things in one’s own language to be sure he understands.

Secretary Kissinger: That is true. I never negotiate in a foreign language.

Prince Fahd: That way your replies are as you want them.

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely.

Prince Fahd: It is my belief that Israel should be made to realize that these are the most opportune circumstances for peace. This is so because the Arab side is closer and closer to the conviction that a peaceful settlement is the best solution. If matters drag on, the Arabs will come to believe that the only solution is to increase their armaments. This will be dangerous.

I feel the Soviets may not want the solution we want.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets want no solution.

Prince Fahd: That is because they benefit from the situation. Hence pro-Soviet elements seek to distort your efforts, which we hope will succeed.

Secretary Kissinger: If our friends continue to support us, we are closer than ever to the next stage; it should be in the next few weeks.

Prince Fahd: I am confident His Majesty will be one of your strongest supporters in the belief that you will realize the rights of the Arabs.

Secretary Kissinger: His Majesty is always a source of inspiration and encouragement. I look forward to my discussion with him.

As Chairman of our Bilateral Commission, may I discuss a bilateral question? Perhaps we could also discuss security problems in the area.

Prince Fahd: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I have brought Under Secretary Robinson with me, who has just joined our Department, because I believe we must strengthen our economic relations in major projects. I want to implement the principles I expressed when Your Highness came to the U.S. in accordance with the wishes of Saudi Arabia. Mr. Robinson is prepared to talk to Your Highness or your designee and give impetus to the Joint Commission.

Prince Fahd: I will see him tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: He has ideas about agricultural development and the use of by-products of the petroleum industry for fertilizer production that I think might be of interest. He also has ideas about long-term Saudi Arabian investment abroad. We have always discussed these matters in a multilateral framework and have not discussed them enough bilaterally. Historically our relationship has been bilateral.

Prince Fahd: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: What is Your Highness’ view of how the Joint Commission is performing?

Prince Fahd: It is doing well and achieving things. Your Ambassador signed an agreement a few days ago.

Secretary Kissinger: How is the military commission going?

Prince Fahd: It seems to be doing okay but perhaps needs a shot in the arm. Time is of the essence.

Secretary Kissinger: We could send a senior military person for a visit to speed things up. We could even send the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Prince Fahd: This would be a very good thing in my view because it would expedite carrying things out.

Secretary Kissinger: This is what I thought.

One way to give you more advanced aircraft would be to send them with pilots to Dhahran to train Saudi pilots and then turn the aircraft over.

Prince Fahd: This is a practical idea. Responsible people would see the physical presence of the aircraft which would have great practical effect.

Secretary Kissinger: We will send a mission to discuss this and other ideas with His Majesty and Your Highness.

Prince Fahd: Good.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to your neighbor, Somalia, we will show your [less than 1 line not declassified] Soviet missile installations there.

We have ships in this area more frequently now—primarily against the Soviets. In the peninsula and Arab world, we consider the Kingdom’s enemies to be our enemies. We are prepared to coordinate our measures, especially with respect to Iraq and South Yemen.

Prince Fahd: We know the Soviets are providing sophisticated weapons to Iraq. In Yemen, the Soviets have an interest in bases in addition to what they have in Somalia.

Prince Fahd: For these reasons Saudi Arabia feels it should have the most sophisticated weapons possible—anti-tank, anti-aircraft, etc., in particular.

Secretary Kissinger: We are selling TOW’s.

Prince Fahd: As you realize, because of the great geographical expanse of Saudi Arabia, we should concentrate on a sophisticated aircraft and air defense system. The major factor is training personnel. As I said to you in Washington, we want to see these things done the fastest in Saudi Arabia.

Secretary Kissinger: Are these things going right?

Ambassador Akins: Yes.

Prince Fahd: The problems we see are Somalia, Iraq and South Yemen. We are surprised that Somalia is rushing into a venture not in its interest, since Somalia is part of the Arab family and none of its members is urging this.

Secretary Kissinger: We are prepared to cooperate with the Kingdom in reducing Iraqi influence.

Prince Fahd: Excellent. I find this strange. The Somalia Foreign Minister was here a month ago and told me that Somalia was seeking to distance itself from the Soviets. Then one week ago they executed ten Muslim holy men.

Secretary Kissinger: We will show you the photographs.

Prince Fahd: That will be helpful. When the Somalia Foreign Minister was here, I said that I know you have economic problems. If you seek to distance yourself from the Soviets, we are prepared to help you economically. But if you follow a path that is of no use to Somalia and the Arab world, we cannot help. I told the Foreign Minister to heed the lesson of Egypt and the Sudan. Why start from the point that Egypt is trying to get out of?

Secretary Kissinger: That was a good point.

With respect to Eritrea and Ethiopia, we would welcome Saudi Arabia’s help. There are no American interests in Ethiopia per se, but we don’t want Eritrea taken over by Chinese influence internally and by the Soviets from outside.

Prince Fahd: That is true. I also think that Ethiopia should be asked to use other than military methods.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. We think some of the Ethiopian leaders are crazy and immature.

Prince Fahd: True. Some Ethiopian leaders came to Jidda to see His Majesty, who said we don’t care about what kind of Government you have; we will help if you follow a moderate policy toward Eritrea. If Ethiopia does not do so, it will leave the door open to the Communist Chinese and Eastern Europeans.

Secretary Kissinger: That is our concern.

Prince Fahd: In Ethiopian minds, the need for a Red Sea outlet looms large. But with reason, Eritrea could be autonomous and Ethiopia could have its outlet.

Secretary Kissinger: If Saudi Arabia exercises a moderating influence with Eritrea, we will work with Ethiopia to encourage moderation.

Prince Fahd: Very good. Nimeiri has suggested discussions between the two sides in Sudan.

Secretary Kissinger: We support such steps.

Prince Fahd: Because of the geographical proximity to Saudi Arabia, we are anxious to see an amicable solution. We fear that a Qaddafi will fight the flames of that conflict.

Secretary Kissinger: That is our view.

Is enough being done about South Yemen?

Prince Fahd: You mean now?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes—are we cooperating enough?

Prince Fahd: Yes. So far as I can see, things are moving well. We are trying to convince South Yemen that cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf is better for them than with the Communists. It is always better to have these side talks than confrontation. We want no more problems in our area. South Yemen gets no benefit from being close to the Communist world.

Secretary Kissinger: Not at all.

Prince Fahd: The Communists have used South Yemen to make problems for North Yemen, Oman and the Gulf. South Yemen is being used for purposes that are neither in their or our interests. We are trying to make them understand that if they leave the Communist camp and return to the Arab fold, this will be infinitely better for them.

Secretary Kissinger: We will cooperate in ways Your Highness thinks useful.

Prince Fahd: Our method of operating under His Majesty is a quiet one, but we do not lose sight of the goal. We know Dr. Kissinger and find ourselves absorbing these traits from him. He knows that quiet actions speak for themselves. We can only achieve results this way.

(The meeting adjourned at this point for the Secretary’s audience with King Faisal.)

1. Summary: Kissinger met with Prince Fahd to discuss the Joint Commissions; the Soviet base at Berbera, Somalia; and South Yemen.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820123–0938. Secret; Nodis. No record of the conversation between King Faisal and Kissinger has been found.