Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976

88. Memorandum of Conversation¹ ²

Ankara, May 23, 1975, 09:45 a.m.–noon.

SUBJECT:

• Restricted CENTO Ministerial Session

PARTICIPANTS:

• Mr. Umit Haluk Bayulken, Secretary General of CENTO
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (and Delegation)
• Dr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran (and Delegation)
• Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs of Pakistan (and Delegation)
• Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (and Delegation)
• Rt., Hon, Roy Hattersley, M.P., Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom (and Delegation)

SUBJECT:

• Restricted CENTO Ministerial Session

Caglayangil (Chairman): The topic of this meeting is a review of the international situation. I would like to hear your views, Mr. Khalatbary.

Khalatbary: The main subject of my remarks is what is happening to Iran. Last year in February we had severe border clashes with Iraq, after which Iraq went to the Security Council. The Security Council appointed Mr. Weekmann of Mexico. His report had the usual result: The Security Council asked both parties to discuss bilaterally and find a solution. Iraq and Iran had a meeting in Istanbul, and in October I met the Iraqi Foreign Minister in New York. We couldn’t get anywhere. Then the Iraqi Foreign Minister died, and for some time they had no Foreign Minister. Then there was another meeting, with the new Iraqi Foreign Minister, in Istanbul.

A surprise came in the OPEC meeting in Algiers in March when the Shah and the Vice President of Iraq agreed that the land borders would be the borders corresponding to the Protocols of 1913 and 1914 with the Ottoman Empire, but for the border on the Shatt-al-Arab, Iraq agreed to the international border on the thalweg. Then there was a third disposition that Iraq insisted on, the closing of the land border to what they called subversive elements. The Foreign Minister of Iraq came to Iran, with the Algerian Foreign Minister’s good offices, and there was another meeting in Algiers. The borders are now delineated; the closure of the border is now done. There are 95,000 refugees now in Iran. Iraq has agreed to keep the borders open for those who want to go back. A great number are going back. We think it’s a matter of time, for them to feel there is no danger for them if they go back to Iraq. There will be a treaty to be signed to recognize what has been agreed. When relations become normal again, there will be the possibility to develop our relations in different fields with Iraq.

We feel this will be in the interests of peace and security in the region. The main danger, as you know, was Iraq was going more and more to the left, if I may say, with close ties to the Communist Party in Iraq and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had facilities in the Persian Gulf in Iraq, mainly at Umm Qasr. We hope that with these new relations, this influence will diminish, but we are sure they will not give up so easily, and internal difficulties may arise in Iraq. But their main problem now is the difficulties with Syria over the waters of the Euphrates.

Of course what the Soviet Union is looking for is not only Iraq and the Persian Gulf but influence on Europe and the West and especially Japan, who are dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf area, not only from Iraq. It would be a very severe blow to the West the Soviet Union could get control or at least control over the transport of oil.

I would like to say a word about the Indian Ocean and India and the armaments of India and the close relations of India to the Soviet Union. A treaty exists not only between the Soviet Union and India but between the Soviet Union and Iraq. I could say a word also about the close contacts between Iran and India.

When we think of Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia after Tito, this gives us a picture that is not very rosy of our region and neighboring countries and the potential future dangers we can see.

In Southeast Asia, we feel that China could have a greater role than the Soviet Union. At least we hope so, because China is not a naval power while the Soviet Union is. So if the Chinese were a power of greater influence, it would be perhaps a lesser threat than if the Soviet Union had influence in the region.

In our neighborhood, we were very much concerned at the death of King Faisal. But we are happy that the evolution has been smooth and we hope the new leadership in Saudi Arabia will be able to continue a line of policy that will not present any danger for the littoral states of the Persian Gulf.

Caglayangil: Thank you. I’d like to request your views on this topic, Mr. Aziz Ahmed.

Aziz Ahmed: CENTO is very lucky to have as Secretary General a man of the abilities of Mr. Baluyken, especially when our region is having difficulties as serious as we face now.

I’d like to say a few words about the nature of the threat we face and CENTO’s response.

During the last 20 years of its existence, I regret to say that CENTO members have not been able to agree on the nature of the threat, not to mention the military means to protect against it. Since the 1971 CENTO meeting, Pakistan has not only been attacked by arms supplied by the Soviet Union, but dismembered, and CENTO did not so much as raise an eyebrow. Quite obviously it was a Soviet-inspired and Soviet-armed attack. It is our view that but for the Soviet support, connivance, and active involvement, it would not have happened. If one looks for evidence, one only has to look at the 1971 Treaty. It’s quite obviously a military alliance; it says “in the event of an attack or threat of attack—not “aggression:”—the two parties shall immediately enter into consultation to remove such a threat to take effective measures to remove such threat.” I don’t know if the Soviet Union could have put its support for India in stronger terms. India was planning an attack on East Pakistan and the Treaty warned China off.

The United States was unable to assist because the debate in the US was over even a minor policy tilt. Because of the influence of the India lobby. I was not in the government but I was appalled by it. We and the United States had not one but four security agreements.

In light of our experience, particularly in the 1970’s, of the techniques the Communist powers have developed to extend their influence in the non-Communist world—not a direct attack, but indirect, attack by proxy—I would like to suggest: Is it sufficient for this organization, which is concerned to protect the security of this region, to concern itself only with a direct attack? The reason for this paralysis is the view taken over the years that CENTO is concerned only with a direct attack, and an indirect attack has not even been discussed. In light of our own bitter experience, we think it would be useful to discuss it. Because a direct attack has not come and is not likely to come. We think this is a matter that should receive the attention of this distinguished body.

The U.S. delegation in the past, Mr. Sisco and Mr. Sober, said that CENTO couldn’t possibly be concerned about a dispute between India and Pakistan. But we feel India could just say, “We’ve been patient with you for twenty years; now just get out,” or Afghanistan could just impose its claims—and CENTO would do nothing. We have no complaint about our bilateral relations with the United States, and we are very grateful for the assistance we have received, especially by this Administration, but we want to know if CENTO is concerned with this kind of attack of Communist proxies. Geography makes it impossible for the Soviet Union to attack Pakistan directly.

If the answer is no, we might well ask whether it is wise for us to wave this CENTO red flag before the Soviet Union. Because CENTO is clearly a red flag for the Soviet Union. If we weren’t in CENTO, we would still earn the hostility of the Soviet Union because of our alliance with the US, but in recent years it’s been more related to our membership in CENTO. We shall remain in the alliance, but is it right—are we adding to Soviet hostility and danger by being members? We’re not going to leave, but we think this is a relevant question to put to you. Because we think the threat to this region will increase, not diminish. And it won’t be a direct attack. Turkey is in NATO and Iran will soon be in a position to take care of itself, so that leaves only Pakistan.

Caglayangil: I’d like to request your views on this subject, Mr. Hattersley.

Hattersley: I’d like to offer a few thoughts on topics on which we are especially concerned in the United Kingdom; on which we want to take our CENTO colleagues into our confidence, though the relationship to CENTO may be indirect.

I want to say our permanent and secure membership in the EEC is virtually assured, as certain as anything can be in democracies where votes have to be counted, in the referendum in 13 days’ time. We don’t see the EEC as something we withdraw into either economically or politically; it has become more outward-looking, partly as a result of the influence of my Government. We see our relations with the United States as more in terms of cooperation than competition. When British membership becomes secure and permanent, we will work to develop this. My Prime Minister has tried to pioneer, at the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference at Kingston, a new approach to the buying and selling of commodities. On the same day I briefed it to my EEC colleagues. So in our other alliances and relationships we continue with the same enthusiasm and permanency as in the EEC membership.

Now I would like to turn to the NATO summit coming up in less than two weeks time. That summit is for a reaffirmation of common purpose, similar to what we do here. Another issue to be discussed at the NATO summit is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and it’s prospects. When they meet, they will reaffirm that detente is not an alternative to defense. These are two parallel elements. We all have difficulty explaining to our public opinions why it’s necessary, especially to the young generation which has never experienced the worst days of the Cold War. To put it crudely, some say, since President Ford and Dr. Kissinger and Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Callaghan have such success in Moscow and such good relations with the Soviet Union, why do we need defense?

My Government expects this round [of CSCE] will be completed and will end with a Summit during this summer. It is our hope and wish and anticipation. But we know that success that is celebrated should be genuine, not bogus. We are prepared for progress on confidence-building measures, Basket III on human and professional rights, but it must be real or else it will only encourage those who think the danger is over. To have a speedy and successful conclusion, it must be genuine.

On issues related to CENTO, let me say my Government welcomes without reservation the agreement between Iran and Iraq, which is one of the most important developments in recent years. Much credit is due to Iran. Because of the degree of dependency of Iraq on the Soviet Union, it will take some time to see a marked reduction in Soviet arms, but this is an important start.

Another important agreement was between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which put an end to the border dispute with Abu Dhabi. Britain labored long and hard for it. Saudi Arabia is important and has an important contribution to make. Despite our withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, my Government is still providing certain forms of assistance, notably in Oman. We agreed not to subject this to cuts in our defense review. Iranian and Jordanian help has been important in Oman, but there has been no visible slackening of the rebels’ will to fight. A military solution may not be possible, especially while the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen continues to give help to the rebels. We’re hoping Saudi Arabia can influence the PDRY to be more moderate.

I hope we, in all our alliance relationships and commonwealth, can contribute.

Caglayangil: I would like your views on this topic, Dr. Kissinger.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, gentlemen. First, let me express my regret for having missed the closed session, at which the Secretary General gave, at all reports, an able account and also I’d like to express our thanks to the Secretary General. Our Ambassador has already expressed our view of complete support for the Secretary General’s proposals. The United States is prepared to make a contribution of $500,000 to renovate the CENTO microwave system in Pakistan, and to renovate the CENTO military communications system we will ask Congress for $5 million. We do this to indicate our support for this Organization. This is in addition to the six fellowships we will establish to commemorate the 20th anniversary of CENTO and additional budgetary support for the CENTO Secretariat budget.

Before I go into our presentation I’d like to comment on the remarks of my colleague from Pakistan. In 1971 we did not think we were doing a minor tilt, certainly in terms of the domestic price paid and the international price. And we believe we prevented an attack on West Pakistan. As I said yesterday, we consider the integrity of Pakistan an interest of the United States. I say this because I believe a country that does not stay with its friends cannot be very effective with its adversaries.

One of the principal focal points of our foreign policy is our West European allies. The President will be going to the Summit next week, to symbolize this continued American commitment to the security of Western Europe. Some recent events in Europe have been significant.

We consider events in Portugal more gravely than do some of our Western allies. Some of our allies see a Communist government leaving NATO as the greatest danger. What we see is that a government that is Communist-dominated, neutralist, a Yugoslavian-type government, remaining in NATO could have the same effect on Italy and France. And we don’t see that the way to help the moderates is to give aid to the radicals. Although in our actions we are doing the same as our European allies are doing. And in fairness, we have not put forward any concrete alternative policy. But there is no question in our mind this could have a harmful effect on Europe and the Alliance.

On the positive side, we have been making efforts to strengthen and rationalize our defense structures; and in none of our countries can we base joint action on security grounds alone. We can’t justify action in defense without cohesion in other areas of our endeavor. This is embodied in organizations like the IEA. We welcome the initiative of the British Prime Minister on commodities. Even if there are technical differences on the methods to be used, we share the attitude and the approach, and we will stay in the closest touch with our British colleague.

In NATO and CENTO, we face an infinitely more complex situation. Ten years ago, the world was neatly divided between Communist and non-Communist; we could gear ourselves to the military threat alone; the United States was dominant and the other allies could confine themselves to lobbying in our decision-making process. The Communist world is now radically split. In ten years’ time we can’t exclude a war between the Soviet Union and China. Western Europe and Japan have grown in strength. Western Europe has grown in unity, and we favor it. While we have stayed out of the British referendum, we would welcome the result that seems to be shaping up.

In our domestic situation, we have the problem that Mr. Hattersley pointed to, with less consciousness of a military threat. Our generation was perhaps traumatized by Munich, by the fear of appeasement. The present generation, in our country, has been traumatized by Vietnam and by the fear of military involvement, or are not conscious of the threat. So this is the problem of management; we have to show we made every effort to maintain the peace if we are to be strong anywhere. Some now fear excessive American military involvement and want to substitute for it military weakness. We cannot leave to the Communist powers a monopoly over the peace movement. It is easy to run foreign policy for the short term by demagogic anti-Communism. But to maintain a consistent foreign policy without fluctuations we have to show we made the effort, to prove to ourselves and to our public that we made every effort to maintain the peace. For example, if there is a crisis over Berlin, we cannot be open to charges that we missed the opportunity for the Quadripartite Agreement.

In detente with the Soviet Union, there are four areas of our relations. The first is preventing thermonuclear war. No serious Western leader can avoid this question. It’s easy to plan military operations as if nuclear weapons didn’t exist. But we know that in a general nuclear war thirty million people will die. No country has ever faced this. In four years in World War I, two million died and the political structure of Europe was severely shaken. There is no scenario for general nuclear war which involves less than ten million dead. So this is the reason for the agreements we have negotiated or are negotiating with the Soviet Union.

The second area of our relationship concerns areas where we impinge on each other directly. This is the reason for the European Security Conference and the Berlin agreement.

The third is bilateral projects, in which we are engaged for cooperation in many fields.

The fourth area is our conflicts in peripheral areas. Here the progress has not been adequate. I don’t believe the Soviet Union has à master plan for taking over the world. I don’t think they are that far-sighted. I think that in a society so bureaucratized as theirs, they’re piling up arms because it’s bureaucratically easier to just appease the vested interests.

We must never see detente as a substitute for our own efforts. A lot of places where the equilibrium has been upset, what upset the balance was our lack of effort. They kept their effort steady while we diminished ours. In Indochina, whatever one thinks of how it was conceived, the result was brought about by the reduction of American aid. Soviet arms made the North Vietnamese victory possible; our cutoff of aid made it inevitable. Nor do I think Portugal is the result of Soviet connivance. There is no law of nature that says the non-Communist parties must be ill-organized. Nor is there a law of nature that we can’t maintain adequate defenses.

If we don’t make the effort, we cannot use detente as a substitute for it. We cannot use detente to get Soviet restraint. Restraint follows our effort, and is not a substitute for it. There is no substitute for security. We have to get into the heads of our peoples, particularly the intellectuals, that power is not, inherently evil. Power is neutral—evil is not necessarily the only possibility—but without power there is no policy.

With regard to the People’s Republic of China, we are following essentially the same policy. Every time I go there, our press asks are we making progress on normalization regarding Taiwan. Our relationship rests on their fear of the Soviet Union and their desire for us to maintain the balance. Since we too want to restrain the Soviet Union, and since the Chinese are very able and very unsentimental, the relationship has worked very well. The Chinese have no interest in us except if we maintain the balance of power.

Some in the US say that 20 years of estrangement was unendurable for both of us. Maybe it was unendurable for us, but the Chinese existed for 2000 years without contact with us and could exist happily for 2000 more years without contact with us, unless the balance of power requires it.

With respect to Southeast Asia, four years ago I was being lectured to by an Indian leader. I said, “Be careful what you recommend, because we might take your advice. And it’s the last time we’ll fight for your interests.”

People in America can debate about the domino effect. Every event has a domino effect simply because every event has a train of consequences, and the only question is where it stops. Already it has had the obvious effect on Cambodia and Laos, and maybe soon will in Malaysia, Burma, and Indonesia. They may not go under, but it will have an effect. It will bring the Communist sphere of influence close to the Indian Subcontinent. It will be interesting to see what the Chinese reaction is. Soviet arms are on many sides. They may try to play a balancing role in Southeast Asia. Maybe they will try to join the Vietnamese in some of their aspirations. But whatever they do, they share the view that there is no security without a degree of physical equilibrium.

With respect to the Middle East, you know of course of the efforts made by the United States to promote a peaceful evolution in the Middle East. There a have been conceptually two approaches. One is an overall settlement on comprehensive basis; the other is the step-by-step. The overall settlement has an obvious attraction; the difficulty is that by bringing together all the countries it compounds the tendency in some Arab countries to forget where reality ends and epic poetry begins; and it compounds the problem of our domestic situation; and thirdly, it brings the Soviet Union in the most negative way possible by asking them to take a position on all the issues simultaneously. We have preferred to isolate the issues and tackle the soluble ones.

We are disappointed by the suspension of our efforts. We are determined not to allow a stalemate; this may not be the impression of everyone, but this is the determination of the United States. There is a lull now, and there will be no decision until the President sees Sadat, Rabin and other Arab leaders. Because we don’t believe it is possible to freeze the situation without an explosion which would jeopardize the security and economic situation.

With respect to the Persian Gulf, we welcome the agreement between Iran and Iraq. Our interests there are negative, in that we want to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving hegemonial designs there and threatening Western energy sources.

I have said that security is the central element of the international system—because the participants must not feel that they are at the mercy of hostile elements. But there is another aspect—that the parties must feel that the system is just. We have been emphasizing the elements of interdependence. We have called attention to the fact that the price of one essential commodity shouldn’t be forced to a level that threatens the well-being of the Western economy, however justified it may be historically. We also can consider the quest ion of commodities, for we recognize that we cannot complain of the prices of some commodities that are too high while ignoring their concern at the prices of other commodities that are too low. I have to say that not every Cabinet member in the United States shares this view, but it will prevail.

I want to say something about the Group of 77. It is paradoxical that the most cohesive bloc today is the alignment of the so-called non-aligned. Tactics of confrontation will lead to tests of strength and it is not the strongest powers who will suffer. We will give increasing attention to this issues in the next year.

These, Mr. Foreign Minister, are the major issues that we see. We have discussed other issues on a bilateral basis. We have discussed the conflict between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus. We believe it is not in the interest of either to push for a confrontation that weakens both. We feel that the moment is possible for a solution.

The question we face is whether free countries can understand the elements of progress and the requirements of security in the modern world and work to achieve them. The question is also whether the United States can work for this because our peace and our security depend on this.

Caglayangil: Thank you, Mr. Secretary of State, for your illuminating statement. I would like to say a few words.

Our organization was created 20 years ago to strengthen cooperation through the United States and United Kingdom and ties with the three regional members, and security and progress. It was founded in the belief that CENTO could deter aggression in this part of the world.

It is most unfair to say CENTO has not been successful.

We share the approach of seeking something better than Cold War and seeking more stable relationships. Progress so far in detente supports this evaluation. But we must recognize we are not yet at the final destination. This is the most important challenge of detente.

Solidarity and cooperation have made this progress possible, so we must maintain this solidarity and cooperation.

• Secondly, the maintenance of adequate defense and preparedness and cooperation between us is of great importance for the maintenance of détente.
• Thirdly, detente is indivisible. In fact, in our opinion, it can only be maintained if it is broadly based and not limited to a limited area. Care should be taken, while success in arms control and security in Europe are important, so that detente isn’t exploited by the Soviet Union for opportunities in other areas.

We certainly hope the deliberations in CSCE will be successful so that detente in Europe will have a stronger basis. We hope it will have beneficial effects on our region.

We also follow with keen interest SALT and MBFR negotiations.

While the end of war in Vietnam is important for the relaxation of tensions there, it is too early to evaluate its full implications. It is difficult also to foresee the relationship between the Soviet Union and China in Asia. The Chinese see their role as counterbalancing the Soviet Union. The region is still in flux.

In the Middle East, if Dr. Kissinger’s efforts cannot be resumed, we see the Soviet Union’s efforts to take up the initiative. In fact, their role is already resumed. If the Suez Canal were to be reopened, the whole Southwest Asian part will become more vulnerable. Soviet penetration continuing since the last Ministerial meeting in Washington has been about the same.

In the CENTO region, the agreement between Iran and Iraq is an important contribution to stability in the region. I would like to convey admiration for the Shah’s efforts.

Pakistan has made important efforts for normalization of relations on the subcontinent. We hope other countries will respond in the same spirit to this constructive attitude of Pakistan. Pakistan is a country with whom we have many ties. We welcome the recent decision of the United States Government to resume arms sales to Pakistan.

On Cyprus, the actions taken by Turkey on July 20, 1974, after the action of the Greek junta were aimed at the well-being of the Turkish minority there and territorial integrity and nonalignment of Cyprus. The talks have begun between the two communities to discuss the outstanding questions. The Turkish side showed its good will with forthcoming proposals. However, the Greek side was intransigent and added complications by trying to internationalize the issue and stimulating decisions by the U.S. Congress to cut off arms aid to Turkey. In fact this is the major difference between the approach of the two sides. Turkey always felt it should be decided by the two sides; The Greek sides have sought to bring it to the UN or internationalization. In February 1975, the Turkish side established an autonomous federal state to improve the situation there; it was purely an internal reorganization. It was aimed at creating two federal zones. However, the Greek side took it to the UN Security Council to further stimulate international public opinion. However, it is known that the Greek side long contemplated such a move. Recent talks began in Vienna. In our view, the most realistic solution reflecting the situation in the Island would be a bizonal federal state based on the geographic situation. In fact, two zones by now are fully accepted by public opinion. The world can influence Makarios and the Greek Government to recognize the realities of the situation and refrain from further internationalization.

• First, an objective evaluation of Turkish actions on Cyprus would recognize that they not only prevented a wider conflict and brought about its localization, but prevented a wider endangerment of conditions.
• Secondly, the Turkish action laid down the conditions for a just resolution of the Cyprus issue, because the problem resulted from the Greek Cypriots’ treatment of Turkish Cypriots as unimportant. Now, the existence of two communities is the basis for a just solution.

The action of the U. S. Congress had a negative effect on three counts:

• First, it hardened the Greek attitude and was based on the wrong assumption that Turkey would change its position because of such an action.
• Second, it weakened the southern flank of NATO and put in jeopardy the very objectives of the Alliance.
• Third, it strained the relations of long-standing friendship and alliance between the United States and Turkey.

We appreciate the efforts of President Ford and Dr. Kissinger to correct this situation. We find it hard to explain to the Turkish public opinion why the United States, which gives military aid to 90 countries, including Yugoslavia, has cut off aid to an ally which United States leaders call a valuable ally. This has affected confidence in the United States. I feel compelled to state with great concern that if the efforts of the Administration do not prove fruitful in the very proximate future, my Government may not be able to resist public pressures indefinitely before irrevocable damage is done.

The United Kingdom’s approach, I am afraid, is an unconstructive attitude. The recent action by the Commonwealth Conference creating a committee for implementing of the UN resolutions on Cyprus was an example. The United Kingdom, as an ally in CENTO, should have used its influence against such an action.

I say with satisfaction that relations among the regional members are excellent. There should be more cooperation among the regional members to maintain the balance. The non-regional members have always given support to the regional members. Therefore, the embargo by the United States will affect the strength of the Organization and not only in a direct military sense.

The Organization in the future I hope will work for the security of its members in the military and other spheres.

[Secretary General Bayulken suggested that the defense council should meet once a month instead of once a year.]

Aziz Ahmed: I want to say a word in explanation of what I said about the tilt in the United States. I wasn’t in the Government, I don’t know what the public pressures were in the United States. Nor do I know what plans the Administration had to help Pakistan. I was talking about the extent of public condemnation of U.S. actions trying to help an ally. I was not criticizing the U.S., but it was the public opinion that amazed me.

[There was no objection registered to the Secretary General’s recommendation, and the meeting adjourned.]

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 403, Box 23, Classified External Memoranda of Conversation, May–December 1975. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Peter Rodman (NSC). The meeting took place at CENTO headquarters.
2. The CENTO discussion centered around a review of the international situation, and specifically, the question of indirect attacks on CENTO by Soviet proxy states. Secretary of State Kissinger responded at length regarding the United States’ interests in the region.