66. Letter From the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services
(Stennis) to
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger1
2
Washington, January 29, 1974.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
According to recent press reports, and subsequently confirmed by letter
dated January 28, 1974, from Mr. John O. Marsh of your office, the
Department plans to expand the Naval Communications facility on the
Island of Diego Garcia, in order to make it a useful and effective
support facility for U.S. and British forces which may operate in the
Indian Ocean area. In order to initiate this action, the Department
proposes to request $29 million in a supplemental appropriation bill
soon to be submitted to the Congress.
As you are aware, since FY 1970 the
Congress has authorized and appropriated $20,450,000 to establish the
Naval Communication facility on Diego Garcia. I was concerned about the
establishment of such a facility in the first instance, and its possible
effect on our foreign policy. It was my understanding, however, that it
provided for a badly needed link in our communications network, and it
would be confined strictly to the purpose intended, namely
communications.
It would now appear that the Department intends to go far beyond the
original stated intention. I should like to be promptly advised exactly
what your present plans are for this installation, and your projected
planned activity in the Indian Ocean area for the next 5 to 10 year
period.
This information is essential to arriving at a determination as to what
further action this Committee may wish to take. Very frankly, I feel
that this request should have been a part of the proper authorizing
legislation for Fiscal Year 1975.
Sincerely,
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Attachment
Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to the Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Armed Services (Stennis)
Washington, February 18, 1974
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in reply to your January 29 request for additional
information on the proposed expansion of facilities at Diego
Garcia.
As you noted, the present facility on Diego Garcia was established to
provide an important link in our worldwide naval communications
system. Diego Garcia has proved its worth many times, most recently
in providing necessary communications relay during the deployment of
additional ships into the Indian Ocean area. The Diego Garcia
communications facility was not, of course, designed to provide a
capability for sustained logistics support for U.S. forces operating
in that region.
However, changing circumstances now indicate that we should—in our
interest—have the ability to operate routinely on a sustained basis
in the Indian Ocean and its environs. The principal changes are:
- —the growing Soviet naval and air presence and capability
in the region;
- —the probable opening of the Suez Canal permitting the
Soviets the opportunity to augment their forces in the
Indian Ocean from the Black Sea rather than from their
Pacific Fleet, thereby saving about 18 days transit time;
and
- —the re-emphasized importance of the concentration of
critically important oil routes both around the Horn of the
U.S. and to Europe as well as across the Indian Ocean to
Japan.
Existing operations in the Indian Ocean must now be supported through
rights obtained from littoral states or inefficiently from more
distant locations. Inadequate support facilities now limit our
ability to demonstrate national interest in this area through
routine presence and operations.
We are convinced that it is imperative for the U.S. to maintain a
balance in the Indian Ocean area vis-à-vis the Soviets. This balance
will, among
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other things,
signal the Soviets our intention to continue to play a role in the
area, to stand by our friends, and to deter any threats to the
shipping routes over which so much of the industrialized world’s oil
flows.
Regarding our projected or planned activity levels in the Indian
Ocean for the next five to ten years, the answer depends in part on
Soviet actions. At this time, we see a need to be able to augment
our naval forces there somewhat more frequently than in the past in
order to offset growing Soviet influence. Our presence is not to be
tied to a narrow military mission, but rather, it is intended as
tangible evidence of our interest—a mutual interest with our allies
and the states of the region—in security and stability in the Indian
Ocean.
In this context, we do not see expanding the Diego Garcia facilities
as an event which drives our foreign policy. A more accurate view is
that a perception of clear deficiencies in U.S. military
capabilities in the region could cause us to lose political and
diplomatic influence to the Soviets by default. Therefore, a support
facility in the Indian Ocean is in response to our actual foreign
policy needs rather than being a potential motivator of policy.
Without overstating our case, we believe the matter of developing the
Diego Garcia communications facility into a capable yet relatively
modest support complex carries a sufficient degree of urgency that
it deserves being addressed as part of the FY 1974 Budget Readiness Supplemental. Hopefully, with
prompt Congressional action we will be able to save some six to
eight months time toward completing this effort—time which could be
important, considering the likely opening soon of the Suez Canal.
Proper authorizing legislation under the Military Construction Act
will, of course, be sought.
The fact sheet enclosed with our earlier correspondence to your
Committee contained a breakout of the currently proposed military
construction task. Although not completely defined at this time, we
do not envisage a need for a very large follow-on effort. For the
most part it would be limited to some additional runway
construction, added aircraft parking area, more capable command
control communications to the facility, and other relative] austere
personnel support facilities.
We have enclosed a statement covering detailed rationale on the need
for deployments in the Indian Ocean and the expansion of Diego
Garcia for your review. In addition, we would like to repeat our
previous offer to provide you and your Committee with a detailed
briefing on our plans.
Sincerely,
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Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense
undated
RATIONALE FOR NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND
PROPOSED EXPANSION OF DIEGO GARCIA
Current U.S. naval deployments in the Indian Ocean are completely
consistent with our policy of periodically augmenting the minimal
permanent presence we have maintained in that area for over a
generation. The most recent deployments have been prompted by the
Soviet naval presence there and their ability to introduce
additional forces quickly into the area. Broadly speaking, the
Soviets have demonstrated an increased readiness to use military
assistance and shows of force to influence events where major U.S.
interests are at stake, and to project military power into distant
areas, including the Indian Ocean, as Soviet naval forces and
airlift capabilities have grown. With the probable opening of the
Suez Canal in the next two years, a still greater Soviet naval
presence in the Indian Ocean area, which includes the Red Sea and
Persian Gulf, will be both possible and probable.
In our judgment, an adequate U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean
provides a clear signal to the Soviets of our resolve to ensure a
credible military capability there. We are confident that the
continued presence of U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean will continue
to have a salutary effect on the Soviets by underscoring our
strategic mobility. We wish to emphasize that our deployments are
not a threat to any nation or group of nations. In this connection,
no specific tasks have been provided our forces except to maintain
general operational proficiency while on station in the area.
However, the presence of these forces assures us an adequate
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capability to meet
contingency situations involving friendly governments on or near the
Indian Ocean littoral, as well as offering a deterrent effect to
potential harassment of significant international straits and sea
lanes. These considerations have focused attention on the need for
security and stability in the general area.
In sum, our capability to deploy a U.S. force into the Indian Ocean
supports not only the U.S. national interest, but the interests of
our closest friends and allies as well, since such a force provides
a tangible reminder of our mutual interest in security and stability
in the Indian Ocean. However, maintaining naval forces in the Indian
Ocean is not without difficulty. The ships that have been recently
deployed have come from the western Pacific. In view of the extended
distances involved, it has been necessary to secure bunkering and
limited facility support from friendly countries in the area.
However, in looking ahead, if we wish to have the capability to move
or maintain our ships in the area, development of more practical
support facilities seems essential. An obvious solution is Diego
Garcia, with some supplemental bunkering and aircraft landing rights
elsewhere in the area.
Consequently, we intend to expand our communications facility on
Diego Garcia to make it a useful and effective support facility for
U.S. forces operating in the Indian Ocean area. This facility will
be capable of providing support for a flexible range of activities
including maintenance, bunkering, aircraft staging, and enhanced
communications. The current supplemental military appropriations
budget now being presented
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to Congress contains a request for $29 million to improve support
facilities on Diego Garcia. Specific projects we have in mind are
increased fuel storage capacity, deepening of the lagoon to provide
an anchorage, lengthening the existing 8000-foot runway, and
expanding the airfield parking area, in addition to certain
improvements to our existing communications facility and
construction of additional personnel quarters.
As you may recall, in 1965 the British constituted a number of Indian
Ocean islands under their control into what is known as the British
Indian Ocean Territory. By an exchange of notes on December 30,
1966, the U.S. and UK agreed that these islands would be available
for the defense purposes of both governments, initially for a period
of 50 years. Under the terms of this arrangement, both governments
agreed in principle in December of 1970 to the establishment of a
communications facility on Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago.
Current plans to develop expanded logistics support facilities at
Diego Garcia, available for the use of both U.S. and British forces,
are in complete accord with the intent and basic philosophy set
forth in the original 1966 Agreement. We will be operating from what
will, in fact, be a self-sustained facility on British sovereign
territory in the outer reaches of the Indian Ocean with minimal
political or military visibility. Thus we believe that to assure our
continued ability to deploy U.S. forces into the Indian Ocean area,
the facilities we now propose at Diego Garcia are essential.