Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976

224. Telegram 40475 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹ ²

Washington, February 19, 1976, 2317Z.

Subject:

• Approach to Pakistan Concerning Sensitive Nuclear Facilities

Refs:

A.

State 38095,

B.

28854

1. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Sisco called in Pakistan Ambassador Yaqub-Khan to express US concern over proposed purchase of nuclear reprocessing plant from France and heavy water plant from FRG and urging reconsideration of purchases.

2. Under Secretary conveyed following points:

• —There is increasing apprehension in this country and elsewhere over acquisition by growing number of countries of sensitive nuclear technology such as nuclear fuel reprocessing.
• —We have welcomed and taken seriously Prime Minister Bhutto’s assurances last year here in Washington that Pakistan would not move toward development of a nuclear explosive device. We believe that you and we share a strong interest in avoiding actions which could cast doubt in the minds of others on these assurances.
• —In this regard, the efforts of the Pakistan Atomic Energy commission to acquire a reprocessing plant from France is causing us some concern.
• —It is difficult for us to find an adequate economic justification for a national reprocessing facility in your country. Pakistan’s present single power reactor runs on natural uranium fuel and thus does not utilize reprocessed fuel.
• —Even though stringent safeguards may be applied, premature establishment of such a sensitive nuclear facility inevitably would give rise to perceptions by other nations that non-peaceful uses may be contemplated. Whether justified or not, such perceptions tend to be destabilizing and therefore are of great concern to us. In saying this, Sisco emphasized that he was not in any way implying that we have doubts about assurances the Prime Minister has given us.
• —We would hope therefore that Pakistan would give thought to the postponement or cancellation of present plans to acquire a reprocessing plant until Pakistan’s future nuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish clear. Need and until other alternatives have been more thoroughly explored.
• —We are also frankly concerned that Pakistan is negotiating to acquire an indigenous heavy water production capability from FRG. We do not understand technical or economic justification for this facility, particularly in view of Pakistan’s apparent intention to build only light water reactors in future. Pakistan’s apparent effort to acquire complete, indigenous nuclear fuel cycle is open to misinterpretation and question, and specifically that heavy water plant would be open to such misinterpretation as well as the reprocessing plant.

3. Sisco concluded by saying that he wanted to speak unofficially of our concern over the attitudes that are developing in the American public and in the Congress on nuclear issues that could cause difficulties for both of us. We share with Pakistan a mutual desire to avoid anything that would affect our ability to do the things we want to do together in our bilateral programs.

4. Under Secretary also told Ambassador that US had informed France, FRG and Canada of US concern in this matter and that we would be approaching Government of Pakistan.

5. Yaqub responded that he completely understood the sensitivity of this issue and appreciated fully the Under Secretary’s observations. He expressed confidence that the GOP would give serious and immediate consideration to US views. Yaqub said that this subject would probably be discussed by Prime Minister Bhutto during his meeting with the Secretary on February 26.

6. Yaqub then offered the following information to Department concerning three objections raised by US representative to iaea concerning up-coming consideration of French/Pakistan safeguards agreement by IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna. He said that US Mission would also be informed by GOP in Vienna.

(A) US expressed concern because time to examine draft agreement had been short. GOP observes that while perhaps this is true, in other cases, such as in case of Switzerland, agreement was approved with only one day’s notice.

(B) US has noted that, in present draft agreement, period during which there would be presumption that any facilities constructed of same type were based on French technology and thus require safeguards was less than satisfactory. Yaqub said that GOP would be willing to make statement in closed session of BG agreeing to 20 year period, but not a public statement.

(C) US has questioned need for Pakistan to have reprocessing facility. Yaqub said that GOP position on this was that Pakistan lacks fossil fuels and thus must depend on nuclear energy for future power needs. In this regard, joint Pakistan/IAEA study completed last year indicated that Pakistan will need up to 8–600 mw reactors in decade to meet power needs. GOP estimates it will take at least four years to complete reprocessing plant. Yaqub added that any delay in approval of safeguards agreement will delay plant completion and thus delay Pakistani ability to become self-sufficient.

7. Embassy should draw from talking points of para 2 in responding to any follow-up clarifications on US demarche by GOP.

Ingersoll

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, NSC Staff Files for Middle East and South Asian Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 20, Pakistan (1). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. It was drafted by Nosenzo (PM/NPO); cleared by NEA/PAB; and approved by P. It was repeated immediate to Paris, Bonn, Ottawa, and IAEA Vienna.
2. In a conversation with Ambassador Yaqub Khan, Under Secretary Sisco urged the reconsideration of the Pakistan Government’s attempts to purchase nuclear processing facilities from France and West Germany.