Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976

209. Telegram Secto 10198 From the Secretary’s Delegation to the Embassy in Pakistan¹ ²

Alexandria, Egypt, August 30, 1975, 0913Z.

Subject:

• Message for Prime Minister Bhutto

Ref:

• State 202508 Tosec 100162

1. Please transmit following from me to Prime Minister Bhutto.

2. Begin message:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Since I understand that you plan to visit Saudi Arabia this coming monday, I thought it might be helpful to give you a brief report on the current status of the Middle East negotiations. Since coming to the area, I have been engaged in the intensive negotiations in an effort to help Egypt and Israel achieve a further interim agreement which would, in our view, constitute a significant step toward the just and lasting peace in the Middle East which remains our overriding objective. The negotiations have been difficult. The Israelis are concerned about the military and strategic implications of withdrawal from the passes and oil fields in Sinai in circumstances where an end to belligerency and peace still lie in the future. The Egyptians, for their part, are concerned about entering political undertakings that are of significance to the Arab world generally in circumstances where much of their and other Arab territory remains occupied and the legitimate interests of the Palestinians remain unfulfilled. Despite these political constraints on both sides, I believe we have made considerable progress and that the chances for achieving this agreement are good even though a number of obstacles remain to be overcome and a successful conclusion is not yet fully assured. I want to emphasize in particular that President Sadat has approached the negotiations with genuine statesmanship, and that we have had heartening support from our Saudi friends.

I recognize that there is concern in the Arab world that this agreement, if achieved, will lead to diminished interest in further negotiations for an overall settlement of all aspects of the Arab-Israeli problem. It is our firm intention, however, that there must be on-going negotiations—however difficult they will be and however much time they may take—with respect to the Syrian and other aspects of the problem. Our national interests require nothing less. I am certain that the Saudi leaders would be assured by any encouragement you could give them. The President and I are determined to pursue this effort, and, despite some of the difficulties we are experiencing at home, I am confident that the American Congress and people will support our peace efforts and our policies of strengthening relations with our Arab friends. The very achievement of a new agreement should have a positive effect on the psychological atmosphere and, if II is scrupulously implemented and observed, can broaden the basis of confidence which is needed for both sides to take the hard political decisions that will be required as the negotiating process goes forward in the months ahead.

I would also like to take this occasion, Mr. Prime Minister, to tell you how pleased the President and I were to hear from you in your letters of June 13 regarding your concerns for Pakistan’s security. I regret that the demands of the Middle East negotiations have delayed my sending you a considered response before this. I have discussed your letters in detail with the President and he has asked me to assure you that we are sympathetic to your concerns. It was with these in mind that the President ordered the lifting of the embargo on arms sales to Pakistan last February. We are also committed to do what we can to help meet your food and economic assistance requirements in the year ahead. This is an integral part of our efforts to assure Pakistan’s continued security and well-being. I have Ambassador Byroade to convery our views on various specific points you raised in you earlier letter.

Immediately before my departure for the Middle East, the President shared with me your August 17 letter to him, re-emphasizing your concerns in the context of recent conversations between your representatives and Soviet diplomats in Kabul. Upon my return to Washington, I will discuss this subject with the President, and he will, of course, be responding to you. Meanwhile, I understand you are seeking clarification from the Soviet Government of the significance of the statements made by its officials in Kabul, and I hope you will keep Ambassador Byroade informed.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

End message

3. In conveying the above message to Prime Minister Bhutto, you should make the following points:

We were pleased to note the Prime Minister’s expression, in his June letters, of continuing support for the Simla process. We have also noted the wise policies of caution and restraint shown by the GOP during this delicate period of difficulties in India.

It is our view that continued progress under the Simla process will reduce the possibility of renewed hostilities on the subcontinent. The immediate interest of the United States, and one which we fully share with Pakistan, is to avert such an eventuality. It was with this objective in mind that the Secretary conveyed to Foreign Minister Gromyko in May the seriousness which the United States would regard an Indian attack against Pakistan. We have every reason to believe that the Soviet leadership has fully understood the position of the United States on this question.

Direct involvement by the Soviet Union and China in a South Asian conflict would, of course, have implications of the gravest nature and would be of great concern to the United States. The response of the United States would be a matter for consideration by the executive branch in close consultation with the Congress in accordance with the requirements of our constitution and our obligations under the 1959 Mutual Cooperation Agreement with Pakistan.

The President and the Secretary are hopeful that they will have the opportunity to hold talks in Peking with leaders of the People’s Republic of China later this year. These talks would provide an opportunity to discuss the full range of security issues affecting relations between our countries and Pakistan, and ways in which our government might continue to assist Pakistan in its efforts to maintain its security.

The Secretary was most appreciative that Mr. Aziz Ahmed has communicated to the Chinese our concern about the effect which their propaganda has on our ability to mobilize domestic support for the PRC’S security.

In discussing your letters in Washington, I found a deep and continuing interest in the administration in Pakistan’s security and welfare, and a strong desire to be helpful in ways that are in accordance with our own legislative and constitutional requirements.

As I know you are aware from you own discussions with American leaders, including Senators and Congressmen, the United States is not able to undertake additional formal security commitments, outside the framework of our formal treaties and executive agreements.

With regard to the recent statements made by Soviet representatives to Pakistani officials in Kabul concerning the Durand Line, if these in fact represent a change in Soviet policy toward Pakistan, we would of course view them with grave concern.

We will be interested to have your further views on the Soviet position, following your further conversations with Soviet representatives.

4. In addition to the substantive points above, you should seek to correct the differences which exist between what I said to Aziz Ahmed in Ankara on May 22 and the interpretation of these remarks contained in Bhutto’s letters of June 13. The following should be made so that the record will be clear:

During my Washington consultations, I reviewed the minutes of the conversation between Minister Aziz Ahmed and Secretary Kissinger. Our record contains some important nuances which if not precisely grasped, could lead to misunderstandings which we both want to avoid.

The secretary informed Aziz Ahmed he had told the Soviets that we would hold them responsible for the use made of their equipment anywhere, and especially in Pakistan.

(Bhutto’s letter to the President states: “Dr. Kissinger informed Mr. Ahmed that he had spoken to.... Gromyko in very strong terms to the effect that an Indian attack on Pakistan with Soviet equipment would invite a response from the United States.”)

The Secretary asked Aziz Ahmed if we could ask the Chinese what their response would be if Pakistan is attacked. The Secretary also indicated that a general war following an Indian attack on Pakistan and involving the Soviets and Chinese would have the gravest implications for the whole of Asia and for U.S. policy in the area. (Bhutto’s letter to the Secretary states: “.... I was relieved to hear from Mr. Aziz Ahmed.... what you planned to tell the Chinese about the action the United States would take if the Soviet Union attacked China for coming to Pakistan’s assistance in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan.” Bhutto’s letter to the President states: “Dr. Kissinger.... added that, if China posed the counterquestion as to what the United States would do in such an event an attack on Pakistan), it would be informed that if India attacked Pakistan and China came to its help and if in consequence the Soviet Union attacked China, the United States would not be able to stay out of that situation.)

Kissinger

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 16 Aug. 1975–12 March 1976. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. It was repeated immediate to the Department of State.
2. Secretary of State Kissinger cabled a response to Prime Minister Bhutto’s concerns about possible increased Soviet activity in South Asia and included further points for Ambassador Byroade to convey to Bhutto in person.