Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976

207. Memorandum of Conversation¹ ²

Washington, July 16, 1975, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT:

• Indian Ambassador’s Call on Secretary

PARTICIPANTS:

• India
  • Triloki Nath Kaul, Indian Ambassador
  • Eric Gonsalves, DCM, Embassy of India
• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Adolph Dubs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
  • Dennis Kux, NEA/INS (notetaker)

The Secretary: You’re not leaving soon, are you?

Kaul: Not as far as I know.

The Secretary: You probably will be offered the governorship of two states when you leave.

Kaul: I was offered a governorship once before. Since I last saw you many things have happened and I want to go into some of them, but let me hand over a letter from the Foreign Minister. (He hands over a letter which the Secretary then reads.)

The Secretary: This is a very positive and good letter.

Kaul: Which of the three alternative dates for the Joint Commission meeting seems most suitable for you?

The Secretary: I only see two dates.

Kaul: No, there are three. The middle of August, the end of August, or the end of September.

The Secretary: My present tentative preference would be for the latter part of September, but I am open-minded about this. Sometime toward the end of September would be good.

Kaul: What about the October 3–5 period? This would be good for the Foreign Minister since he would be making his speech at the UNGA about this time. Can you say this is tentatively acceptable?

The Secretary: Yes, that is tentatively alright. I have a number of trips to make but I think I can work this into my schedule. Chavan would come to Washington, isn’t that so?

Kaul: Yes. In the meanwhile I hope the Subcommissions continue their work.

The Secretary: Have they been lagging?

Dubs: No, not that we are aware of.

The Secretary: Make sure that we give the Subcommissions encouragement. We have no policy of going slow. I spoke with Goheen last week and understood his group (Education and Culture) was moving forward well.

Gonsalves: I think the major difficulty is with the Science and Technology group. In the agriculture and energy area things are moving along slowly, but part of the problem is that ERDA is just getting established.

Kaul: Mrs. Gandhi asked me to renew her invitation to the President to visit India. Also if he has time I would welcome an opportunity to call on him.

The Secretary: We will try to arrange that and will be back in touch with you shortly. The President’s schedule this year is getting somewhat crowded. I suppose it doesn’t make much difference to you if his visit slips into the first quarter or so of 1976.

Kaul: As long as it doesn’t conflict with the Indian elections, but we would prefer him to come before the end of the year, if possible.

The Secretary: I will look at the schedule but it’s getting somewhat crowded.

Kaul: I was also asked by the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister to talk about the reporting of Lewis Simons of the Washington Post.

The Secretary: Didn’t you expel him?

Kaul: Yes.

The Secretary: I would be delighted if we had the same right to expel Washington Post reporters here but there wouldn’t be many left.

Kaul: He wrote that the Prime Minister’s son had slapped her. This is perfectly scurrilous. He also claimed that the Prime Minister had used army troops to boost attendance at a political rally. Simons also insinuated that the Prime Minister had instigated the murder of the Railway Minister. He never took the trouble to check this out with anyone. He made these out of whole cloth.

The Secretary: Has he left the country?

Kaul: Yes, but I was asked to point out this out in view of your protest of his expulsion. This was unnecessary. We could have taken very serious action against him. He could have been sued for libel. Under the emergency he could have been locked up. We would like for you to convey to the Post that this is not the way for a correspondent to act.

The Secretary: Well, we will tell the Post that we have an answer to our protest and you have rejected this. But you should see Kay Graham yourself. I would not want to get in the middle between two formidable women like Mrs. Graham and Mrs. Gandhi. We have a standard policy of protesting the expulsion of journalists. We have made our point and consider the matter closed.

I think you are familiar with the American situation. We have tried as a Government to show restraint. We have not encouraged the press to be critical of India. I said we attach importance to our relationship with India. But it is a problem for us when the same restraint is not shown on the Indian side, especially now that you have a censored press. Demonstrations have taken place. While Mrs. Gandhi first made nice references about us, she has now obliquely made references about people who supported Yahya Khan and want good relations with China. We want reciprocity. You have to make up your mind.

Kaul: I think there was some misunderstanding of Mrs. Gandhi’s remarks. She was not talking about the U.S. Government, but the U.S. press.

The Secretary: I was not aware that the press supported Yahya Khan. You know intellectuals had a love affair with India. Now there is disappointment. I am not. I have always looked on India as a major power with whom we should have good relations. What the press says is not the United States Government’s view. We are not going to comment on your internal affairs.

Kaul: I have been meeting a number of Senators on the Hill, including Javits and Gaylord Nelson.

The Secretary: What does Gaylord Nelson say. He is influential.

Kaul: He says that this is our internal affair and he is not passing judgement.

The Secretary: Let me ask you a question as a political scientist. What would happen if the Supreme Court upheld the judgement against Mrs. Gandhi?

Kaul: This could be overturned under the Constitution, but I do not think the Supreme Court will uphold the lower court’s decision. One count was that the state government put up loud speakers and built the rostrum from which Mrs. Gandhi spoke at a rally. But the state government was in the hands of the opposition. In any case the judge is inconsistent since he permitted the use of government funds for her transportation. The judge may also be wrong on the second count which revolves around the date someone legally becomes a candidate. I think the lower court was wrong on this and should have indicated that she became a candidate only on February 1 when she actually filed the papers, not earlier when she made a comment to a newspaperman. Even if the Court upholds the decision, the Election Commissioner can set aside the penalty. There has also been a proposal before Parliament to lower some of the penalties for minor election law violations.

The Secretary: I was astonished by the penalty since the charges seem very slight.

Kaul: It was like jay-walking in the U.S. But we have to wait for the Supreme Court. This starts August 11, since the opposition asked for more time. The general feeling in Delhi is that the Supreme Court is likely to upset the state court’s decision. Now about the proclamation of the emergency. As you are probably aware, it was the opposition call to the army and police not to obey orders that triggered trouble. The extremists of the left and right were planning arson, sabotage and political assassinations. Such groups have now been banned along with extremist religious groups, both Hindu and Moslem as well as one group, the Ananda Marg, which has followers in the U.S. These should have been banned long ago. My general impression is that the emergency has been widely accepted by a large part of the population, labor, business, students and lawyers. Prices are falling, the public system of distribution of food is functioning, inflation has dropped from 30 percent to 8 percent and there is much progress.

The Secretary: It is my private estimate that Mrs. Gandhi will prevail and the situation will improve.

Kaul: I agree. There is no alternative in the Congress Party. The party is solidly behind Mrs. Gandhi. Five members were expelled because they were working with the Opposition. It is unfortunate that J.P. Narayan allowed himself to be exploited by extremists of the left and right. He was not a follower of Gandhi. He was a Marxist/Leninist who went underground in 1942. A real Gandhian—Vinoba Bhave—has backed the proclamation of the emergency. I think the results will be evident in the near future. Of the people arrested, 85 percent are smugglers, black marketeers and criminals. Only 15 percent are political leaders and they are under house arrest. If the Opposition had waited until the next general elections, everything would be ok, but they took up illegal measures.

The Secretary: You know the public reaction here. We conduct our foreign policy geared to the foreign policies of other countries. We will neither endorse nor criticize what is happening in Indian. We will do nothing to add to your difficulties or embarrassment.

Kaul: In my talks on the Hill, I have been a little disappointed that some Congressmen are asking that India not be given aid. It would create an unfavorable impression if an anti-India amendment were passed.

The Secretary: We are against penalizing countries for their domestic developments. We are discouraging any punitive measures, but money for aid will be difficult to obtain this year on the Hill. I think we would be better off not to press the aid question now. We are open-minded on this and we can have private discussions on aid. Now on PL 480, which does not require the same sort of appropriation, we are ready to provide a substantial program although we have not set the final level.

Kaul: I have seen a figure of 500,000 tons of Title I for India. I am informed by New Delhi that our needs are for 2 million tons.

The Secretary: There is 300,000 tons of Title II in addition to 500,000 tons of Title I. But I understand there is a problem because you have a small aid program for North Vietnam.

Kaul: This is hardly even a program. It’s only some buffaloes and two artificial insemination kits. Is this a real basis to block aid?

The Secretary: We have no objection to your providing aid to North Vietnam. You are going to be affected by Hanoi long before we are. Let the neighbors of Hanoi enjoy the results of their loyal support. But there is a legal problem. Can we get a legal view if your program really blocks PL 480 Title I? We have no interest in looking for a pretext to prevent food aid to India. Now if our foreign policy relationship deteriorates you should not put it past me to look for a pretext not to give aid but not because of your aid for North Vietnam. Can we get a legal opinion from Monroe Leigh on this?

Kaul: I have been asked by the Prime Minister to say that India wants to improve relations and you should not pay attention to statements of minor officials or worry about small demonstrations. These demonstrations, also, I can assure you did not have the blessing of the GOI. We do not mind demonstrations here.

The Secretary: Have there been any?

Kaul: Yes, there was one small demonstration, but police protection was adequate.

The Secretary: In view of the present situation any statement by the Prime Minister gains special significance.

Kaul: Her statements were not against the U.S. Government but a reply to the U.S. press.

The Secretary: I felt there is a possibility of a definite improvement in relations. We are willing to cooperate and the basic policies I outlined in Delhi last year continue. The President knows I am seeing you and he agrees fully.

Kaul: I would also like to bring up our candidacy for the Security Council. The Paks are deliberately trying to divide the vote. We hope for your support.

The Secretary: It is our normal policy to back a candidate supported by the regional grouping.

Kaul: But there will not be a consensus.

The Secretary: Certainly we would not oppose you if you have a majority, but let me check on this.

(The Secretary calls Mr. Buffum.) Bill, I am talking to the Indian Ambassador. He asked what we would do in the Security Council if there is only a majority and not a consensus … but we wouldn’t want to start playing between the majority and minority. (Ends phone call to Buffum).

As I said, we are not taking a position between the majority and minority but it is unprecedented for there not to be a consensus and for a split vote. My inclination is to stay out of this but let me discuss this further with my colleagues.

Kaul: I have read your recent speeches with interest. Regarding India, I want to assure you we believe in true non-alignment. We are not for alignment of the Non-Aligned. On one other matter I regret to say that we are a little disappointed with the Pakistani’s reaction recently. They have been dragging their feet in our talks. They have also reacted ambiguously to the imposition of the emergency. Also we hope that arms will not be supplied to Pakistan in this difficult period as this would be very unsettling.

The Secretary: You haven’t been noticing any flood of arms to Pakistan. I am not aware that any arms discussions are going on. As I told you in February it was our intention to remove an anomaly. This was a moral problem. We are not engaging in an arms race.

Kaul: On relations with China, there has been no progress and no deterioration. The Chinese have made hostile statements about Kashmir, Sikkim, and the emergency. Perhaps when you go to Peking you might be able to take this matter up.

The Secretary: As I said, we would welcome an improvement in relations between you and China. If I have a chance, I will mention this. Please give my regards to the Foreign Minister and say I look forward to seeing him in October. We can decide later when to announce his visit. What I said in India remains our policy. There has been no change. Tell the Prime Minister that unbelievable as it may seem, we wish her well.

Kaul: Because there sometimes has been some misunderstanding in the press about our meetings, I propose that we agree to tell the press that we met to discuss matters of mutual interest. Perhaps we can say something positive about the Joint Commission.

The Secretary: Yes.

Kaul: The President’s visit?

The Secretary: I think we better not get into this. We could come under pressures not to go. This will force us to take a position. We have not cancelled. It is only that the dates might slip.

Kaul: One thing more on the President’s trip. It would be unfortunate and misunderstood if the President stopped somewhere else in South Asia this year and not in India.

The Secretary: If the President does not make it to India, he will not make other stops in South Asia.

Kaul: (Getting up to leave). Can I now assume you will be able to come to dinner?

The Secretary: In principle, yes.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–1708. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted on July 18 by Kux and approved on July 25 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
2. Indian Ambassador Kaul conveyed a letter from Foreign Minister Chavan to Secretary of State Kissinger. They discussed the U.S.-Indian Joint Commission, the state of emergency in India, and U.S. food aid to India.