198. Telegram 5606 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1 2
New Delhi, April 26, 1975,
1445Z.
Subject:
- US Response to Indian Criticism
Ref:
- State 94316; State 97347
- 1.
- I have a message from Joe Sisco telling me to speak strongly to Chavan about recent Indian criticisms of the US. I don’t believe however, that I should start this process without knowing what our strategy is. That is, what would we do if the Indians did not respond? I fear that the Indians continue to abuse us because so much of their experience indicates that we will take it and continue to give them what they want.
- 2.
- In fact, we warned them several weeks ago that if they overreacted to our arms sales policy we would be forced to take another look at our policies. At first it appeared that they had heeded this warning, but it is now obvious that they have not. At this time I feel I need a clear idea of where we are going before delivering another lecture.
- 3.
- Actions under way within the US Government will give the Indians every reason to believe that we will continue to help them despite their criticism. Very shortly the administration will go to the Hill with an aid appropriation [Page 2] which will include a seventy five million dollar aid program for India. Our presentation to the Congress will also indicate we tentatively plan on another 800,000 tons of wheat under Title I, and I have heard from visitors that US and world crop prospects are so good that thought is being given to an Indian program of up to four million tons. In the meantime we are engaged in a variety of joint projects. Of those under the auspices of the Joint Commission, some are of mutual interest but others are only of benefit to the Indians. Another project which will be particularly visible this summer is a multi-million dollar experiment in educational television for which we are providing the satellite. I might add that on this one there is every reason to believe that it will be used to further the interest of the Congress Party. Finally Secretary Simon has just renewed your invitation to Chavan to visit Washington, and a visit by the President is still scheduled sometime this year.
- 4.
- All of these are publicly known in India and will convey a message of their own if they continue while the US is used as a political scapegoat. I think you will agree that there would be little point in my speaking to Chavan as instructed if the bureaucracy in Washington plans to continue business as usual regardless of the outcome of my approach.
- 5.
- There are several alternatives. One option would be to frankly tell the Foreign Minister that unless there is a change, the climate of our relations will not support the cooperative programs in which we are engaged. If there is no response we would make some highly visible changes in the programs I have described. Under a second option I could limit myself to speaking of our concerns, as proposed, and if there is no response, react more moderately: cut back, but not off; lower our profile even more and limit our food aid to Title 2, whatever the amount; reduce or eliminate the Presidents visit. Or you could hold me in Washington after my consultation visit in June. This I do not relish. A final option would be to continue as we have with the kick me sign still on our back.
- 6.
- The point I want to make is that if we are not [Page 3] going to alter our programs there is no point in beating them over the head with a bag of wind. If I am going to express US concern I want to know how much backing I have.
- 7.
- I am aware that such decisions must be made at the highest level but I firmly believe that we should be prepared to match our actions to our rhetoric.
Saxbe
- Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams to SecState NODIS (2). Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- Ambassador Saxbe requested clarification for action. He felt that a hard line on Indian criticism of the United States could be dismissed as an empty threat in light of joint Indian-U.S. cultural programs and economic cooperation and U.S. food aid to India.↩