195. Telegram 5201 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1 2
Subject:
- India on the Attack
Ref:
- New Delhi 5121 and 5200
1. Two weeks ago I reported that the Indians did not seem to be working very hard at their relations with the US. I continue to get evidence which supports this conclusion. In a formal debate on foreign affairs in the Parliament on April 16 Chavan distorted our arms policy by attacking us for creating a balance of power through arms supply. He said that India’s relations with the Soviet Union and the US should not be equated because the Soviet Union stood by India in time of crisis. The future of Indo-US relations, according to Chavan, depended upon our accepting Indian sensitivities. (See New Delhi 5121 for details.)
2. At the same general time Chavan was saying this, Mrs. Gandhi, Defense Minister Swaran Singh, the Home Minister, and a couple of State Chief Ministers put the us to use for political purposes in quite an unacceptable way. They all opposed opposition demands for the end of the state of emergency in effect since the 1971 war on the grounds of US arms to Pakistan, the “feverish arms build-up” in the region, and the threat of agression from the sea from some unnamed sea power. Indicative of the state of our relations out here is that anyone hearing such remarks understands that they all refer to the US. (See New Delhi 5200.)
3. Since the Indians didn’t seem to be on the road to a mature relationship, I took advantage of the Indian dinner for Secretary Simon to speak privately to both P.N. Dhar, Mrs. Gandhi’s private secretary, and G. Parthasarathy, the senior official present from the Foreign Ministry. I noted the new official Indian line on the US and said that we certainly didn’t appreciate being classed as a belligerent, nor did we enjoy the daily abuse we were taking. What did they want, that the US get completely out of India? Dhar and Parthasarathy did not deny the GOI line (although Dhar lamely claimed that Mrs. Gandhi couldn’t have meant the US when she spoke of the naval threat) and only advised me to wait until things quieted down. They explained that I should understand the shock which our arms decision had caused in India.
4. I have not been encouraged by this latest exchange and don’t see how we can improve relations with India while we are being accused of being a threat to it. It seems obvious that the Indians have made a decision that we are more useful to them as a foe to be used in their political battles than as a friend who could help in perhaps less immediate ways. Of course, they would like to use us for both, but I have my doubts about permitting this.
5. I am saddened by all of this because I believe that this turn for the worse will endure for some time and because I am convinced it is the result of our arms decision. The Indians have misread our policy and certainly are not behaving rationally. But this has never been an issue which prompted rationality. What concerns me is that after the shock of the arms policy change, the Indians may have looked around at other aspects of our relations and found them so thin that they saw little incentive to look after their relations with us. And the prospect of more food next year will not alter the situation. We will take a lot of punishment during the coming election year.
6. I intend to continue making Indian officials aware of how we feel about their attacks and what their effect will be on our relations. I will speak to Chavan about it the next chance I get.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Exdis. Telegram 5121 from New Delhi, April 16, summarized statements of the Indian Foreign Minister and Telegram 5200, April 7, reported that Indian officials were using the arms buildup of India’s neighbors and the threat of an: “unmentioned ‘sea power’” as an excuse for the state of emergency. (Both are ibid.)↩
- Ambassador Saxbe reported high-level Indian public criticism of the United States and stated that the recent increase in anti-American rhetoric seemed directly tied to the change in U.S. arms policy toward Pakistan. He predicted that the rhetoric would grow harsher as elections in India approached.↩