Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976

190. Telegram 2410 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹ ²

New Delhi, February 20, 1975, 1355Z.

Subject:

• Announcement of Military Supply Policy

1. I am reporting separately the calm but very strong reaction of the Foreign Secretary (the Foreign Minister is out of town) to our decision on military sales. I am conveying here the Foreign Secretary’s special request, made following consultation with the Foreign Minister and several of his cabinet colleagues, whether it might be possible for the US decision to be deferred and made after the Foreign Minister’s visit to Washington in March 13–14.

2. Kewal Singh expressed a sense of strong personal disappointment that we had made our decision so rapidly when the Foreign Minister “was scheduled” to visit the US on March 13–14, he told me that the GOI would have thought the US would not have made the decision before that. In fact, Kewal Singh said that he had been speculating only yesterday that we would not make a decision before then unless we intended to damage India-US relations. He noted immediately the unfortunate coincidence of the date of our announcement and that of the presentation of Ambassador Saxbe’s credentials (the GOI moved up the date to February 24 only two days ago so that there would the least possible delay after the Ambassador’s arrival).

3. Kewal Singh said if the date for announcement stood, he feared “a very pointed conclusion” in the minds of the Foreign Minister and his colleagues. He asked if I could get him a reply to this question overnight as he must take it up with Chavan and his colleagues first thing in the morning.

4. It seems to be a matter of considerable consequence to the Indians, involving the personal pride of the Foreign Minister, that we have gone ahead before the Foreign Minister could talk further with you. Indian reaction to our decision is certain to be strong—it already is. If we proceed on our schedule it will be colored by this further personal element. On the other hand, a delay until after the Chavan visit would give us a better opportunity to explain why this decision need not harm Indian interests or India-US relations and would be a gesture of respect to Chavan, who was personally extremely proud of his discussions with you last October, and his government.

5. I recognize this is very much an eleventh hour request and that the decision process has already begun. It would be of great value, however, if there could be a delay.

6. Ambassador Saxbe’s presentation of credentials on the same day as the announcement is an additional complication. Even if we cannot wait for the Foreign Minister, might the announcement be delayed a day or two?

Schneider

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams to SecState NODIS (2). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. Chargé d’Affaires Schneider reported that Indian Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh requested that the U.S. defer its announcement to resume arms sales to Pakistan until after Foreign Minister Chavan’s visit to Washington in March.