182. Telegram SECTO 206/14537 From the Embassy in New Delhi to the Department of State, October 29, 1974, 2050Z. 1 2

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

030683

O 292050Z OCT 74

FM

  • AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO

  • SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4914

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL PEKING IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 14537

EXDIS

SECTO 206

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT:

  • SECRETARY'S TALKS WITH INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. SECRETARY MET WITH INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CHAVAN IN TWO-HOUR SESSION MORNING OCTOBER 28. ATMOSPHERE FRANK BUT VERY CORDIAL. CHAVAN SAW MUCH OF PAST US-INDIAN PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM US RELUCTANCE RECOGNIZE INDIA'S ROEL IN SOUTH ASIA AND EFFORTS TO BALANCE PAKISTAN AGAINST INDIA. THOUGH 1971 HAD CAUSED BASIC CHANGE, AND OUTLOOK NOW MUCH IMPROVED. SECRETARY DESCRIBED PROBLEMS IN PAST FLOWING FROM WHAT PROVED TO BE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS OF INDIAN STANCE IN INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AFFECTING US INTERESTS. US RECOGNIZED INDIA AS A MAJOR POWER IN WORLD AND IN SOUTH ASIA. SAID THAT WHILE THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF BALANCING PAKISTAN AGAINST INDIA, US WOULD CONTINUE TRADITIONALLY CLOSE TIES WITH PAKISTAN AND HIGHLY INTERESTED IN UNITY, INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF PAKISTAN. EMPHASIZED STRONG SUPPORT FOR SIMLA

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PROCESS. POLICIES TOWARD SOVIETS AND CHINESE ALSO

DISCUSSED. END SUMMARY.

2. CHAVAN BEGAN ATTH LONG OPENING STATEMENT IN WHICH HE REVIEWED AT LENGTH INDO-US RELATIONS. SAID HIS PURPOSE WAS NOT TO HIGHLIGHT PAST DIFFICULTIES AS SUCH BUT TO TRY TO FOCUS ON WHY SOME OF THESE AROSE. HE THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN A CERTAIN HESITANCY IN RECOGNIZING INDIA'S POSITION IN SUBCONTINENT, PARTICULARLY IN WHAT INDIA SAW AS EFFORTS IN THE PAST TO SEE THAT SOME KIND OF MILITARY PARITY BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. THE EVENTS OF 1971 HAD RESULTED IN BASIC CHANGE IN THIS SITUATION AND A RECOGNITION OF NEW REALITIES AND INDIA WANTED THIS TO CONTINUE.

3. CHAVAN THEN REVIEWED EVOLUTION IN INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, NOTING CONSISTENT POLICY SINCE 1971 TO FOSTER SIMLA PROCESS. UNFORTUNATELY TODAY, ONE HEARD RENEWED TALK OF OLD QUESTION OF MILITARY PARTIY. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT ANY FORM OF SUPPLY OF LETHAL WEAPONS TO PAKISTAN WOULD CREATE THE SAME PROBLEMS AS BEFORE. REGARDING SOVIETS, CHAVAN EMPHASIZED TRADITIONALLY CLOSE RELATIONS; 1971 TREATY NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY OTHER COUNTRIES. CHINESE POLICY UNFORTUNATELY REMAINED DIFFICULT, NOTING EVIDENCE OF SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS AMONG MIZOS AND NAGAS AND MORE RECENTLY CHINA'S “OUTBURSTS" REGARDING SIKKIM. INDIA WELCOMED US DETENTE WITH CHINA BUT HOPED INDIAN POSITION WOULD BE KEPT IN MIND AND THAT US MIGHT BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE CHINESE POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA.

4. CHAVAN COMPLETED REVIEW BY EMPHASIZING INDIAN INTEREST IN PEACE AND STABILITY AND GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL NEIGHBORS AND SAID THAT ONCE THIS APPROACH WAS UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED IT SHOULD BE EASY FOR US AND INDIA TO WORK TOGETHER IN THIS REGION, AS WELL AS IN LARGER AREA OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC ISSUES.

5. SECRETARY RESPONDED BY REVIEWING DIFFICULTIES IN PAST US-INDIAN RELATIONS, MUCH OF WHICH HE SAW GROWING OUT OF EXCESSIVELY HIGH EXPECTATION ON PART OF MANY

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AMERICANS WITH SENTIMENTAL FEELINGS TOWARDS INDIA IN EARLIER YEARS THAT INDIA WOULD ACT AS A SORT OF MORAL CONSCIENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. CONSEQUENTLY MANY AMERICANS HAD EXPECTED MORE OF INDIA THAN PERHAPS OF OTHERS AND WHEN INDIA DID NOT ACT AS AMERICANS HAD HOPED, THERE WAS UNNECESSARY DISAPPOINTMENT. AAORTUNATELY WE NOW HAVE NEW SITUATION AND IMPORVEMENT IN RELATIONS. BY MODERATING OUR CLAIMS ON EACH OTHER WE CAN HAVE A MORE REALISTIC RELATIONSHIP. US RECOGNIZED INDIA AS A MAJOR WORLD POWER AND AS THE DOMINANT POWER IN SOUTH ASIA. US HAD NO INTEREST IN ACTIONS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE BALANCE OF POWER IN SUBCONTINENT IN TERMS OF MILITARY EQUALITY.

6. SECRETARY EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR SIMLA PROCESS. NOTED PARALLEL INTERST OF US AND INDIA IN STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF BANGLADESH AND SAID US WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO COORDINATING AID POLICIES THERE WITH INDIA.

7. ON PAKISTAN SECRETARY RECALLED CLOSE AND HISTORIC TIES WITH THAT COUNTRY WHICH WOULD NOT BE ALTERED BY THE FACT OF OUR RECOGNIZING SUPERIOR STRENGTH OF INDIA. US WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN ARMS BUILD UP IN PAKISTAN DESIGNED TO CHANGE BALANCE OF POWER.

8. SECRETARY STRESSED US DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH CHINA. EVOLUTION OF US POLICY TOWARD CHINA HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH INDIA, AND US WOULD OPPOSE ANY ACTIONS ON PART OF CHINESE TO EXTEND INFLUENCE IN SOUTH ASIA IN WAYS THAT WOULD CONTRICUTE TO INSTABILITY. TO EXTENT US HAD INFLUENCE TO DO SO, IT WOULD USE IT TO ENCOURAGE BETTERN INDO-CHINESE RELATIONS.

9. WITH THE SOVIETS, US REMAINED ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TOWARD DETENTE. US HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH CLOSE INDIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS SO LONG AS INDIAN POLICY NOT SO COORDINATED WITH THAT OF THE SOVIETS AS TO LINE UP WITH THEM ON EVERY ISSUE. THAT DID NOT SEEM TO US TO BE THE CASE NOW.

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10. SECRETARY SUMMARIZED BY REAFFIRMING US INTEREST IN SOUTH ASIAN PEACE AND STABILITY AND END TO ALL OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. US POLICY TOWARD INDIA WOULD BE BASED ON OUR INTERESTS AS WE SEE THEM AND NOT IN TERMS OF DOING FAVORS. US ASSUMED INDIA WOULD DO LIKEWISE IN ITS APPROACH TO US, AND IF THIS WERE THE CASE, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO BUILD GOOD RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH ISSUES SUCH AS AID DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COULD BE TALKED ABOUT ON REALISTIC BASIS.

1. SECRETARY EXPRESSED ENDORSEMENT AND UNDERSTANDING OF INDIAN NON-ALIGNMENT BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER CURRENT EVOLUTION ON INTERNATIONAL SCENE OF A NEW AND DISTURBING PATTERN OF ALIGNMENT AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED, DIRECTED AGAINST THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND AFTEN MORE RIGID THAN EARLIER ALIGNMENTS. THOUGHT INDIA COULD BE HELPFUL IN MODERATING THIS TREND.

12. DURING MEETING KEWAL SIGH TOOK OPPORTUNITY REVIEW HIS RECENT TALKS IN ISLAMABAD. WHILE GOI APPRECIATIVE OF PROGRESS MADE, HE REGRETTED THAT PROGRESS STILL RATHER HALTING; INDIA WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT PICK UP SPEED. HIS TALKS WITH BHUTTO CAUSED HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT WAY STILL NOT CLEAR FOR SMOOTH AND STEADY RELATIONS. EXPRESSED HOPE SECRETARY COULD ENCOURAGE A MORE FORTH-COMING PAKISTANI ATTITUDE. SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS SOUTH ASIA MATTERS WITH BHUTTO, AND GOI COULD BE CERTAIN THAT US WOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE IN SUPPORT OF SIMLA PROCESS.

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KISSINGER
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. It was repeated immediate to Islamabad, Dhaka, Tehran, Moscow, Kabul, and Peking.
  2. Ambassador Moynihan reported on Secretary of Kissinger's meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan in New Delhi.