Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972

328. Airgram A–6 From the Interests Section in Baghdad to the Department of State¹ ²

Baghdad, December 1, 1972

SUBJECT:

• Political Assessment of Iraq-December 1, 1972

Introduction: This is a very tentative assessment of the Iraqi regime based on the only two-and-a-half months in the country and a total reliance on secondary sources and the public media. It is long only because it is the first such assessment from Baghdad in over five years. Comments from end-users, who on some subjects may have better information than available to USINT, are not just encouraged, but solicited.

I. The Internal Scene

The Baath regime, in power since July 1968, has achieved a semblance of stability. The only organized opposition appears to be the Kurds who are in physical control of a sizeable portion of territory along the Iranian border. Public order is maintained elsewhere with apparent ease. Until the June 1 nationalization, the economic growth rate was substantial (GNP in real terms rose at an annual rate of 5.4% from 1966 to 1970 and much more rapidly in 1971). Although no recent figures are available, the rigorous austerity measures do not seem to have hurt the vast majority of Iraqis. This year’s crops were very good and some grain is being exported. Travel restriction have just been lifted for the Haj and for the favored few, there are new Mercedes (although officially banned) and something of a construction boom in luxury residential housing.

The Iraqi people have, however, paid a price for the new stability. It has been achieved through the application of increasingly effective police state methods. Many able Iraqis have gone into exile and those who remain live in a state of uncertainty and sometimes fear. Baghdad is a city of whispered conversations and glances over the shoulder. A recent incident gives a inkling of what it is like for an educated Iraqi; Dr. Clement Sarkis, a prominent physician married to an Englishwoman and a frequent guest at diplomatic functions, was picked up by Ministry of Interior or Party security men on October 23 and held incommunicado for ten days. After his release he refused to discuss his incarceration except to say he had been questioned closely about his foreign friends. The warning to the few remaining non-official Iraqis who mix socially with foreigners is clear.

The Baath appears to have failed thus far to gain wide popular support and the regime rests on the twin pillars of Party and Army. Party members are still organized in secret cells and are believed to number about 100,000; i.e. 1% of the population. Many more are believed to be part of the Party’s system of informers. In addition to assassinations, the party is rumored to eliminate its dissident members or other enemies by such means as staged automobile accidents. The most recent “accident” occurred on November 14 and involved two Syrian “comrades” who were given an elaborate mourning procession and then flown with full honors to Damascus. The Army is very much in evidence and obviously well treated, but this is not a new phenomena in Iraq. The military has practically no contact with Westerners and even routine contacts with Western military attaches must go through a liaison office. The Communist attaches and advisors are also believed to be kept at arms length. Information on the role of the Baath within the Army and on attitudes within the officer corps is virtually impossible to obtain here.

A. The IPC Conflict

The major issue facing the regime at this time is the conflict with IPC resulting from the June 1 nationalization. The regime is trying to convey the impression that things are going much better than hoped: i.e. the IPC oil is being sold (without mentioning that a large percentage of it is going to CFP with IPC’s consent), the country is fully behind the nationalization (which is probably true), Iraq has many foreign friends, and if things don’t work out, there is a rapidly expanding market for oil in the USSR. The consensus of Western observers is, however, that the regime would like an early settlement that not only resolved the IPC nationalization, but also North Rumaila, BPC and in addition brought in substantial new investment. The alternative to a settlement with IPC is dismal, at least in the near term: having Iraqi oil pursued throughout the world; more barter arrangements; and a greater dependence on the USSR than desired. Yet no one here discounts this possibility. The leaders of the regime do not believe they can surrender to IPC and survive. A dangerous reorientation of the economy may be the lesser of two evils.

B. The Kurdish Problem

After a two-and-one-half year truce, rumors were wide-spread during November of possible new fighting between the Army and the Kurds. It was believed here that the tension resulted from the Kurds taking advantage of the regime’s difficulties to press their demands for implementation of the March 1970 agreement. To give weight to their demands they probably instigated the army desertions and other incidents. The regime responded by opening a public debate—one of the freest in local memory—over differing interpretations of the March agreement. The Baath accused the KDP of cooperating with Iran and Israel and the KDP accused the Baath of bad faith, covert anti-Kurdish activities, and monopolizing power. The debate did serve to redefine the issues and perhaps with the assistance of the USSR, which is active as the intermediary, progress toward a modus vivendi that excludes fighting can be made. Neither side seems to want a renewal of large scale fighting, but neither is there sufficient mutual confidence to bring about the implementation of the agreement. Outlook: continued stalemate with minor incidents.

C. The National Front

The regime is having rough sledding in creating the National Front in accordance with the draft National Charter issues on November 1, 1971. The Iraqi Communist Party approved and has been rewarded with two ministers (Irrigation and without Portfolio). The KDP has refused to sign the Charter because it claims inter alia that participation in the government is meaningless as long as all executive and legislative power rests with the RCC. The USSR is actively pushing the establishment of a National Front, as evinced by the large number of foreign Communist delegations that have visited Iraq in the past few months to bestow official blessing on the Baath as a progressive party worthy of party-to-party relationships.

The KDP shows no signs of giving in on the crucial issue of meaningful participation and without the KDP a National Front would be fairly meaningless.

III. External Affairs

A. The Arabs

The regime has been more successful in breaking out of its isolation internationally than domestically. Within the Arab world, for example, Iraq is now developing new relationships with as diverse states as Algeria and the Sudan and attempting a rapproachment with Saudi Arabia. President Bakr even sent King Hussein a birthday greeting on November 14. Serious differences still exist with Syria over oil transit payments and personal rivalries among Baath leaders. In the Arabian Gulf tradition methods of diplomacy seem to be the order of the day rather than the subversive ones.

B. THE SOVIET THREAT

Relations with the Soviet Union and other COMECON countries have increased most substantially since nationalization and credits and loans now total $775 Million. The Iraqi request for observer status with COMPCON is seen here as both a bargaining gambit with the West and an indication that Iraq does not again intend to become so dependent on the West. Relations with the Soviet Union, however, go well beyond economics as demonstrated by the very active Soviet role in all three of the major domestic issues facing the regime (see above). While the French Ambassador is most eloquent on the Soviet threat, perhaps to facilitate his mission, the consensus of Western Ambassadors is that Iraq and the Gulf have become major targets for the USSR. The areas of concentration are the oil sector, the military, irrigation, and the development of an Iraqi fishing fleet to ply the Arab Gulf and the Indian Ocean (Baghdad 56). More ominous is the close Communist relationship with the Ministry of Interior and Party security apparatuses. The December 3 formal agreement between the Czech and Iraqi Ministries of Interior is, as the Iraqi Mister said, “only bringing the existing relationship into the open”.

We should not be lulled into complacency about the Soviet threat by the fact that Arab states elsewhere have proved relatively impervious to a dominant Russian presence. Iraq may be different. Few Arab countries are as culturally diverse and therefore capable of being controlled by a small, militant minority. For Russia, Iraq is geographically the closest Arab country. Its concrete interests here are substantial (oil, Indian Ocean, border security). The Soviets may not wish to gain direct control over the levers of power, but we should not discount this possibility. One could not help but be struck by the statement in a recent editorial in the official al-Jumhuriya that “Iraq and India form the foundation of the progressive front in Asia.”

C. RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

Although relations with the West are somewhat in abeyance pending the outcome of the IPC conflict, Iraq is seeking to expand these ties. France continues to be courted openly, but the French Ambassador maintains that no new commitments are being made, despite the commercial loss entailed, pending a settlement. If negotiations fail, France will be faced with a cruel choice of breaking with its IPC partners or losing its incipient “special position” here.

President al-Bakr received the new Canadian Ambassador on November 28 and insisted that the West had forced Iraq toward the Communist world. The Ambassador was later informed that Iraq had named an Ambassador to Ottawa despite the knowledge that Canada could not reciprocate. Greece and Brazil will establish Embassies here early next year, partly at Iraqi urging. Visa restriction for UK citizens were recently eased and commercial relations with Great Britain proceed about normally. The media is speaking less about “Western imperialism” and more about “American imperialism” and suggesting that the EEC countries are prepared to break with the past and establish a new relationship with the Arabs at Israel’s expense, whereas U.S. support for Israel is more determined than ever. The U.S. is vilified daily on other issues as well—from Vietnam to crime, much of it is obviously fed in from Communist sources. The GOI’s treatment of USINT has been correct, but we have not yet detected any hint of a desire for improved relations. Iraqis in general studiously avoid contact with USINT officers.

Lowrie

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 IRAQ-US. Confidential. Repeated to Abu Dhabi, Algiers, Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Bonn, Cairo, Dhahran, Jidda, Khartoum, Juwait, London, Manama, Moscow, New Delhi, Oman, Paris, Prague, Rabat, Tehran, Rome, Tripoli, and Tunis. Drafted by Lowrie on December 6; approved by Lowrie. In a letter to Thomas J. Scotes (NEA/ARN), December 18, Lowrie wrote that “it is no exaggeration to say that we are ostracized” by the Iraqis. “The main frustration is therefore, having to rely completely on diplomatic colleagues (of whom only a few are well informed) and the public media.” (NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq Affairs, Records Relating to Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, 1968–72, Lot 75D442, Box 14, POL 17, REPIR, American Personnel, Resumption Consular Relations, 1972)
2. Lowrie offered a tentative political assessment of the situation in Iraq based on secondary sources and the public media.