2. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State
(Read) to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
2
Washington, January 30, 1969
Subject:
- Your Meeting with Iranian Ambassador Ansary, Friday, January 31, 1969, at 3:00 p.m.:
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
Ambassador Ansary is calling on you
prior to his departing on February 4 to consult with the Shah who is now
vacationing in Switzerland. Enclosed are a biography of the Ambassador
and a summary statement of our relations with Iran.
Ambassador Ansary’s primary purpose
in calling on you is undoubtedly to get an indication of the new
Administration’s attitude toward Iran which he can report to the Shah.
Before he departs for Switzerland, he is also calling on Secretary
Rogers and Under Secretary Richardson and on Secretary of Interior Hickel.
In the event that the Ambassador raises with you specific bilateral
matters, we suggest that you respond by saying that you will look into
them. He may raise the matter of our military credit program for Iran;
following receipt of necessary economic data from the Government of
Iran, we expect to be in a position to make policy recommendations in
March. He may also raise Iran’s desire to export additional oil to the
United States, a subject he will undoubtedly raise with Secretary Hickel
and which involves our import quota policy.
We suggest that you tell the Ambassador that you know of the President’s
admiration for the progress Iran has made under the Shah’s leadership
and of the President’s desire to strengthen our close ties with Iran.
You might refer with pleasure to
[Page 2]
your brief meeting with Prime Minister Hoveyda in December. If the Ambassador raises the Shah’s
desire, expressed in his letter of January 22 to the President, to meet
soon with the President, you might say we are giving the matter serious
attention and that the President hopes to reply soon.
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary
[Page 3]
Enclosure 2
U.S. RELATIONS WITH IRAN
I. U.S. Interests in Iran
The principal United States interest in Iran derives from Iran’s
strategic location on the Soviet border and athwart the air and
communications routes from Europe to South Asia and the Far East.
We have an interest in keeping this
strategic territory out of Soviet hands and in using it for our
own strategic purposes. We also have an interest in maintaining
close ties with an increasingly powerful Iran so as to influence
Iranian policies in the direction of promoting stability in the
Middle East. We also have specific commercial interests,
primarily in petroleumm, but also increasingly in other
fields as well as Iran’s economy grows.
II. Current State of U.S.-Iranian
Relations
Our relations with Iran have been for many
years and remain today close and intimate. We have
maintained this relationship through a transitional period in recent
years during which we have ended grant economic assistance to Iran
and shifted our military aid from grant to credit sales and during
which Iran had adopted a more independent foreign policy of its own,
demonstrated especially by improved relations and economic and
military deals with the Soviet Union. Iran’s
basic orientation remains with the West, and Iran continues
to rely on
[Page 4]
the United States
for its fundamental security. (Our bilateral agreement with Iran of
1959 states that we will take appropriate action, including the use
of armed forces, in accordance with our Constitution, and as may be
mutually agreed upon, to assist Iran against aggression.)
III. Iran’s Foreign and
Domestic Situation
Iran has in recent years played an increasingly active role in
regional affairs. The Shah has become concerned
about possible radical Arab penetration, perhaps with Soviet
collusion into the Persian Gulf following the withdrawal of
British forces in 1971. He has therefore moved
to protect Iran’s Gulf life-line and rich southern oil
resources through a carrot-and-stick policy toward Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf Sheikhdoms. Iran’s relations with Turkey and
Pakistan are good, and relations with Afghanistan have been
improving. While, as a Moslem country, Iran’s public stance on
Arab-Israeli matters is generally pro-Arab, Iran’s distaste for
radical Arabism as sponsored by Nasser has led to the development of
close, although informal, relations with, Israel.
Iran’s internal political situation is
stable, with the Shah in firm control and with any
potential opposition quieted by the success of the regime’s economic
development and social
[Page 5]
reform programs and by the appeal of the Shah’s nationalistic
foreign policy. Economic growth, based
primarily on burgeoning oil revenues but also on better use of
Iran’s well-trained younger generation, has
been proceeding rapidly, with annual rates of GNP growth approximating 9 per cent in
recent years.
IV. U.S. Objectives
The objectives of our Iranian policy are:
- —To support an independent, self-reliant
Iran.
- —To maintain our close ties with Iran,
especially with the Shah.
- —To assure Iranian vigilance against
Soviet long-term aims.
- —To maintain our communications and
intelligence facilities and overflight privileges in
Iran.
- —To influence Iran to promote stability
in the Middle East.
- —To maintain western access to Iranian
oil, protect and promote American investment in Iran,
and obtain for the U.S. the largest possible share of the
growing Iranian market.
V. U.S. Strategy
To achieve our objectives, we have devised a political, military and
economic strategy.
- a.
-
Political
In our dealings with Iran we respect
Iran’s independence and welcome its self-reliance while
seeking-to maintain our
[Page 6]
special security relationship.
We use all possible opportunities, for example in connection
with our military credit program, to urge upon the Shah and Iranian government leaders the
importance of concentrating financial and manpower
resources on economic development. We encourage good
relations with Saudi Arabia and the full Sheikhdoms
in the interest of maintaining stability and of keeping out
forces bent on making trouble. While expressing
understanding of the economic benefits Iran reaps from its
improved relations with the USSR, we remind the
Iranians of low-term Soviet objectives and
encourage vigilance. Of special
importance since the ending of our AID program in order to promote
close ties between us are programs
involving exchanges of persons between our two
countries, whether under public (Peace Corps, Fulbright
program) or private auspices, and programs of cooperation in
scientific and other areas where Iran is in need of advanced
technological or management assistance.
- b.
-
Military
The key to our relations with the Shah
and his regime is our assistance for the modernization
of Iran’s armed forces. Beginning in FY 1970, except for training and
MAAG support, all of
this assistance will be in the form of credits. The Shah’s
demands for military equipment from us are insistent
[Page 7]
and large, and have
increased since theg annoncement of the British withdrawal
from the Gulf. We have to examine these
requests carefully, from the standpoint of their
effect on area stability and on Iran’s economic development,
but it is also clear that unless we
remain Iran’s principal military supplier our interests
in Iran, including our ability to maintain our own
strategic interests there and to influence the Shah in the
direction of constructive foreign and domestic policies, will be seriously weakened.
C. Economic
Although our grant economic aid has ended, we continue to do all we can to encourage
Iran’s economic growth and a balanced allocation of resources
between military and economic. Our military credit program
gives us our best opportunity to pursue these goals, but others also
exist, including private American resources. Of
vital importance to Iran’s development is the maintenance of
constructive relations between Iran and the major oil companies
operating there. Our diplomatic efforts are aimed at
preserving the good relations that now exist: Finally, our own commercial interests are promoted through
the Export-Import Bank, private American-investment, trade fairs and
the like which assist the export of American products to Iran.
