Nuclear Test Ban Issues; Peaceful Nuclear Explosions


307. Memorandum for the Record

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig informed the Department of State that the White House had no objection to it abstaining on all three test ban resolutions before the UN.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–4. Confidential. Prepared by Robert H. Miller.


308. Telegram 226692 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Springsteen gave Soviet Chargé Vorontsov an aide mémoire on the venting of radioactive material from a Soviet underground explosion on September 27, 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–8. Confidential. It was repeated to USUN, USMission IAEA Vienna, USDelegation to SALT, and AEC. Drafted by Kadilis (EUR/SOV); cleared by Matlock (EUR/SOV) and Davies (EUR) and in substance by Handyside (PM/AE) and Long (ACDA/ST); and approved by Davies.


309. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)

Odeen indicated his concern over AEC Chairman Schlesinger’s recent interview with U.S. News and World Report in which he commented unfavorably on U.S. test ban policy.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 203, Agency Files, Atomic Energy Commission 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The attachment is not published. Haig checked “I will call Schlesinger.” Written on the memorandum is “OBE” (overtaken by events).


310. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers

The President directed that all official statements on nuclear test ban policy be cleared through the White House.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 199, Agency Files, ACDA, Jan. 1972–Aug 1974, volume IV. Secret. The memorandum was also sent to Laird, Seaborg, and Gerard Smith. A copy was sent to Moorer.


311. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Under the cover of this memorandum, Odeen transmitted the March 14 JCS memorandum expressing its “highly-charged” opposition to a comprehensive nuclear test ban and recommended Kissinger forward it to the President.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 245, Agency Files, JCS volume II. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Sent for action. Kennedy and Sonnenfeldt concurred in the memorandum. A handwritten notation at the top indicated that Kissinger saw it, but he did not sign or forward the memorandum attached at Tab A to the President (Tab A is not published). In a March 31 memorandum to Kissinger, Kennedy said he doubted Kissinger would want to send the JCS memorandum to the President since the Verification Panel was studying the issue and an upcoming meeting would provide an opportunity to explore all views, including those of the JCS, before putting them before the President. He concluded the memorandum was “too cryptic” to give the President a full exposition of the arguments both pro and con. Kissinger wrote on Kennedy’s note, “It is a brief not an analysis.”(Ibid.)


312. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

The President’s Science Adviser recommended against making any further moves toward a Comprehensive Test Ban and forwarded a paper on the subject.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–8, Verification Panel Meeting Folders, 6/14/72 NSSM 128. Secret.


313. Executive Summary Prepared by Interagency Group

This executive summary of the study on U.S. nuclear test ban policy examines the arguments for and against a possible ban, assesses the strategic impact of the ban and of the verification issues, and analyzes those policy options set forth in NSSM 128.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–8, Verification Panel Meetings, NSSM 128, 6/14/72. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Annex A, Strategic Analysis, and Annex B, Verification Analysis, are not published.


314. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

This summary analyzes the strategic and verification issues outlined in the study on U.S. nuclear test ban policy prepared in response to NSSM 128.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–8, Verification Panel Meetings, NSSM 128, 6/14/72. Top Secret. The summary was prepared for a Verification Panel meeting scheduled for June 14 but not held.


315. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

In anticipation of the Verification Panel meeting scheduled for June 14, Odeen provided Kissinger with a 10–page briefing memorandum examining possible problems and options with the NSSM 128 study and the potential issues with verification.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 829, Phil Odeen. Top Secret. As part of the meeting book for the June 14 meeting, Odeen forwarded the memorandum and its tabs to Kissinger on July 3. In his covering memorandum, Odeen noted that although Kissinger had decided the previous week not to hold the June 14 meeting, Odeen wanted him to see the meeting book. The tabs are not published as attachments to Odeen’s June 9 memorandum; however, the JCS memorandum referred to on page one is the attachment to Document 311, the David memorandum referred to on page one is Document 312, and the Analytical Summary referred to on page 4 is Document 313.