311. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff,
National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
2
Washington, March 29, 1972
SUBJECT:
-
JCS Opposition to Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban
Secretary Laird has forwarded to
the President—without comment—the JCS
views opposing a comprehensive nuclear test ban (Tab B).
The JCS paper is a highly charged,
emotional document. It mixes genuine implications and uncertainties
concerning a nuclear test ban with unsubstantiated assertions,
irrelevancies and debatable assumptions.
As you know, the NSSM 128 study is
trying to cut through the emotion and rigidly-held opinions that
characterize the views both of proponents and opponents of CTB. A summary paper is currently being
completed and the tentative meeting schedule has a Verification Panel
meeting on the CTB study just prior to
the Canada trip.
Attached at Tab A is a self explanatory memorandum to the President that
presents the relevant points of the JCS position with some tempering
comments derived from the ongoing NSSM
128 analysis. If you wish to send the JCS views to the President, I believe it is important to
his understanding of the issues that they be presented objectively.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab A forwarding the JCS paper to the President.
[Page 2]
Tab B
Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird
Washington, March 14, 1972
JCSM–109–72
Subject:
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (U)
- 1.
- (TS) The current policy of the
United States regarding support for a comprehensive ban on
nuclear testing within the context of an adequately verified
agreement has recently been reiterated by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs. Also, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff recognize that official statements regarding a
comprehensive test ban must conform to the US position. However, as directed by
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 128, a review of US nuclear test ban policy continues. It is,
therefore, appropriate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit
their views and military advice on this subject as this
time.
- 2.
- (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff
are concerned that continued international and domestic demands,
plus recently publicized but misleading information regarding
the capability of the United States to detect low-yield
underground nuclear tests, may create considerable pressure for
early US acceptance of a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the absence of an
adequate verification.
- 3.
- (TS) While recognizing that
preambular treaty commitments to seek the achievement of a
comprehensive test ban have existed since signing the Limited
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that these
commmitments were made at a time when the United States was in a
position of strategic superiority. Today, US strategic missile superiority has disappeared,
and the erosion of US
technological superiority has been constrained only through the
intensive efforts of its nuclear weapon designers and
laboratories and through underground test programs.
- 4.
- (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff
have consistently emphasized the essentiality of testing all
weapon systems. The US Armed
Forces are committed to maintain a deterrent and warfighting
capability across the spectrum of warfare, ranging from
strategic nuclear offensive and defensive operations through
tactical nuclear, conventional, and unconventional operations.
Although it is highly preferred to test a system in its
anticipated operational environment, the retention of the
underground testing capability of the LTBT has provided the US Armed Forces with weapon systems upon which they
can realistically rely. Although this effort has alarmed some
elements of US society, there
have been no significant adverse ecological effects to life or
property resulting from the testing allowed under the LTBT. By retaining a strong
technological capability and maintaining a viable underground
test program, the United States has continued the development of
sophisticated, cost-effective, and reliable nuclear weapon
systems. Additionally, testing can assure the reliability of
nuclear weapons which have been stockpiled over prolonged
periods of time. Without the present underground testing
capability, the US Armed Forces
could not confidently exploit advanced nuclear weapons
technology which offers many design improvements, such as
tailored outputs, selectable yields, reduced size, reduced cost
and more efficient use of nuclear material, reduced maintenance,
increased safety and reliability, and improved command and
control devices. For the foreseeable future, underground nuclear
testing will continue to be mandatory, as weapon systems
dependability can be confirmed only through such testing.
Untested weaponry would erode confidence in US deterrent forces, thereby
seriously jeopardizing national survival.
- 5.
- [text not declassified] These weapon
systems and programs are required to meet current and forecast
military threats. Testing programs have permitted in the
past—and will permit in the future—verification of theoretical
analysis. [text not declassified]
- 6.
- (S) Lacking the challenge of
advanced design and testing opportunities, serious consequences
can be anticipated in the field of nuclear technology. The
highly talented scientists who have contributed so much to the
advanced weapons technology of the United States would displace
to more attractive and stimulating endeavors, and qualified
replacements could not be enticed to replace them in a stagnant
field; the nuclear research laboratories, such as Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory, Sandia Corporation, and Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory, would atrophy; and the US underground nuclear test
facilities would lose their capabilities even in caretaker
status. Remobilization of this expertise and materiel would be
time-consuming, expensive, and ineffective in a crisis
situation.
- 7.
- (TS) It has been argued that a
comprehensive test ban serves the national security interests by
placing equal constraints upon weapons development by all
parties. These constraints are real only as long as all parties
adhere to the treaty. The opportunity exists under a CTBT for
potential enemies to gain significant and unpredictable
advantages (particularly by clandestine testing) which would be
impossible to assess if the United States were not permitted to
test.
- a.
- Should potential enemies pursue a policy of
clandestine testing, current and foreseeable technology
does not provide a positive means of detecting low-yield
nuclear detonations. The principal detection system of
the United States is dependent upon seismic disturbance.
Currently, seismic discrimination between nuclear
detonation and natural earth disturbance phenomena
cannot be achieved with high confidence below 4.0 to 4.5
seismic magnitude. Even this verification capability is
vulnerable because most of the Atomic Energy Detection
Stations are located in foreign countries and are
subject to foreign expulsion. The loss of a key station
at any time could, at least temporarily, reduce already
limited confidence levels significantly. Valuable
military gains, especially in the areas of weapons
effects test, hardness assurance, and warhead/device
development, can be achieved by tests conducted below
the seismic detection threshold.
- b.
- An assessment of the potential impact of a CTBT must
include the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Program, granted
by the Nonproliferation Treaty and monitored by the
International Atomic Energy Agency. The Peaceful Nuclear
Explosion Program obviates the usual clandestine testing
scenarios involving complex subterfuges as well as
sophisticated seismic detection schemes. For example, a
current Soviet PLOWSHARE project will require 250
nuclear detonations totaling 36 megatons, with a single
maximum yield of 500 kilotons. The problems involved in
policing such a mammoth project to insure that none of
the devices being tested represents weapons development,
e.g., the development of a “clean” atomic demolition
munition, are of staggering proportion. There seems to
be no reasonable way that the United States, by national
means, or the International Atomic Energy Agency, by
onsite inspections, could assure that a peaceful nuclear
explosion was not masking or, in some way, serving
weapons development.
- c.
- If the United States agreed to cease all nuclear
testing, public opinion and national priorities would
ultimately dictate a decrease in both funds available
for and level of effort in nuclear research and
development. On the other hand, the Soviet Union or the
PRC could sign a CTBT without making concomitant
reductions in nuclear research and development efforts.
Continuation of nuclear research and testing, even if
not for the purpose of weapon development, would provide
the Soviets or the PRC
continuity in training of personnel, handling of
devices, weapons effects, development of technical
literature and professional interest, and other
collateral benefits which would certainly enhance their
nuclear weapon development capabilities. This would be
facilitated by the closed, regimented nature of their
societies. The logical result of this situation would be
a disadvantageous imbalance of nuclear capabilities
which would undoubtedly be prejudicial to the security
of the United States.
- 8.
- (TS) Consideration must also be
given to the collateral relationship of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks. Any strategic arms limitation agreement will
reduce US strategic flexibility
and increase the importance of qualitative improvements to
weapon systems. Of particular consequence is the Soviet
advantage in missile throw-weight, which may permit the Soviets
more flexibility than the United States in further improving
their systems without requiring nuclear testing. Also, in view
of possible Soviet abrogation of proposed strategic arms
limitation agreements, ongoing weapons research and development
programs, as well as testing, would become increasingly
important. These programs are also of added significance in
light of the consistent refusal of France and the PRC to participate in any test ban
negotiations.
- 9.
- (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff
believe that the strategic situation today is significantly
different from that which existed when US current policy on a comprehensive test ban was
formulated and that fundamental US national security interests would be compromised
by such a ban on nuclear testing in view of the fact that
adequate verification behind the Iron Curtain is not achievable.
Uncertainty inherent in future military threats also dictates
that the United States should not surrender the freedom to
conduct nuclear testing. In summary, the United States will be
able to meet military threats only if it continues to test and
develop the weapon systems deemed essential to its national
survival. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their
previous views that a CTBT is not in the national security
interests of the United States.
- 10.
- (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff
request that you support their position against initiatives to
negotiate a CTBT and that you express these views to the
President, preferably as an agreed DOD position.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
T.H. Moorer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
