Enclosed for your review is a paper outlining my general position towards
U.S. policy on a comprehensive test ban. I have arrived at this view
largely as a result of a closely held but thorough technical study of
the topic by an ad hoc OST panel of
experts, but also from close interaction with the NSSM 128 review and others throughout the
government. The panel’s study has been provided to your staff for their
use, and views expressed in the paper have also been discussed at some
length between our staffs. Briefly, the essence of my position is:
- Proceed towards upgrading our seismic verification capability and
spaceborne verification capability by developing and deploying
prototypes of the important elements.
While my position remains open to some modification following the
Verification Panel review of the subject, I believe it is sound and
appropriate. I will be prepared to discuss my views at the Verification
Panel review and will be happy to discuss them in more detail with you
and your staff if that would be helpful.
Enclosure
Paper Prepared by the President’s Science Adviser
(David)
Washington, April 5, 1972
[Page 3]
U.S. POLICY ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
Current or potential performance of the U.S. verification system is
not really a key issue in a review of policy towards CTB negotiations. It is agreed that for
about $20M we could establish in a few years a capability to
identify all but about five events per year above Mb= 4.0 with 90
percent confidence. More importantly, it is generally agreed that
under the current or future U.S.
verification system, the Soviets could, with some small risk of
discovery, clandestinely conduct numerous tests below 2 or 3 kt, and
with increasing risk, a few tests from 10–50 kt per year by
decoupling, and perhaps a test every year or so in the 50–100 kt
range by masking in or simulating earthquakes. Properly conducted,
these techniques would not be detectable by other national means
either. Decoupling and masking appear feasible even though they have
not been demonstrated at high yields. The central issue is whether
this amount of clandestine testing, coupled with the impact of our
being unable to test, poses risks or penalties sufficiently
significant to outweigh the perceived benefits of agreeing to a
CTB. The need for on-site
inspection (OSI) is tangentially
relevant; but only because it has been a publicly stated position
and the focal point of past US/USSR disagreements. While OSI would increase the costs and risks
of clandestine testing somewhat, its effectiveness could clearly be
negated by a determined evader. Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) are also a side issue because
special verification arrangements would be required to permit them
under a CTB, and because the USSR may wish to continue its PNE program strongly enough to insist
on such accommodations.
Regarding the significance of USSR
evasion, coupled with complete preclusion
of U.S. testing under a CTB, it is
unlikely that a CTB would result in
catastrophic deterioration of our strategic deterrent. The
consequences of a CTB would be felt
most severely in the event of a major Soviet ABM expansion or an ASW
breakthrough. In either event, however, there are non-nuclear
response options we could exercise which, although more expensive
(and perhaps very much so), would be adequate. Moreover, we would
probably notice the Soviet trend prior to major deployment, leaving
some time for response, and if the threat were grave enough to
require it, we could withdraw from the CTB treaty (although time would be required to justify
withdrawal and to reestablish our design and test capability).
[Page 4]
Clear penalties which would accompany a CTB that we respected and the Soviets chose to evade,
consist of the following:
- a.
- Our nuclear design capability would slowly but surely
deteriorate while, via a minimum of clandestine testing, the
USSR could maintain hers.
This would reduce our ability to remain abreast of the
technology, to maintain nuclear options for response to changing
threats (such as ABM expansions
or Soviet or PRC tactical
nuclear expansions), and to guard against technological
surprises. It is particularly important, for example, that we be
able to determine experimentally the feasibility and probable
impacts of pure fusion technology so as to better perceive
future threats. This technology also has important implications
for weapon effects simulation and advanced U.S weapons, as well
as for future clean energy sources.
- b.
- We would not be able to conduct a nuclear test to evaluate or
prove a fix for any fault found in our strategic stockpile,
while the USSR could.
Non-nuclear fixes might be possible, but we might also be faced
with to need to rebuild large segments of the stockpile, which
would be expensive and, more seriously, time consuming.
- c.
- We would not be able to modernize our low yield tactical
stockpile, should that be desired, while the Soviets (and the
PRC) could. The relevance of
maintaining this option is uncertain, since the Soviets may not
wish to modernize, but it is related to potential developments
in European and Asian nuclear forces, each of which are under
study.
- d.
- We would be unable to develop and deploy new nuclear warheads
for new weapon systems. This would require that any necessary
improvement or expansion of our nuclear forces be accomplished
by improving only the non-nuclear portions of our systems, using
existing warhead designs. This can be done, but frequently at
greater expense (e.g., an additional submarine or improved
guidance instead of smaller warheads for a specific damage
level). The USSR would be
similarly restricted in the case of high yield warheads because
of the high risks of detection associated with the numerous
tests needed for weapon development, so this penalty is, in
fact, one of the anticipated benefits
of a CTB, e.g., slowing the arms
race. Because of the Soviets’ larger boosters, etc., however,
the added cost of non-nuclear improvements may not be as great
for them. Also, current intelligence provides no reliable indication of the actual
status of their nuclear developments, so the net slowing of the
arms race we could count on seems
small.
[Page 5]
Against these penalties must be weighed the perceived benefits of a
CTB. Environmental concerns are
just not the issue that they were when the LTBT was under consideration—no serious harmful effects
have been experienced from the underground test program nor are any
likely to be. As discussed above, there would be little significant
technical contribution to slowing the
arms race because deployment of additional or non-nuclearly improved
forces is as great an element in maintaining the race, perhaps
greater, than advances in nuclear technology, and a CTB would not restrain deployment or
non-nuclear improvements. We would realize the political advantage
of reaching a publicly stated objective, but a major increase in
progress towards NPT objectives would be unlikely without PRC and French participation. At this
time it is my judgment that the penalties to
the U.S. are not justified by the benefits. I doubt that
plausible SALT or Tactical Nuclear
Weapons review outcomes would reverse this judgment, since neither
is likely to produce a compelling basis for foreclosure of nuclear
options for the long-term future.
The contribution of OSI to our
verification capability is so minimal except perhaps as a
negotiating position, that it could be abandoned. If we want to
negotiate a CTB at this time, we
could negotiate away the OSI
requirement for some other quid pro quo. If we do not wish to move
towards a CTB at this time, we
should (a) say so on the basis of a reassessment of penalties, (b)
insist on numerous unattended stations in the USSR as an alternative (and more
credible) delaying tactic than OSI,
or (c) require PRC and French
inclusion. I would favor a combination of (b) and (c).
PNE technology can be an important
contributor to future energy resources and should be maintained as a
permissible option. Possible PNE
accommodations should be addressed separately from CTB negotiations to determine whether
an acceptable international monitoring procedure could be
established.
I believe we should proceed immediately to upgrade seismic
verification systems by developing and deploying prototypes of the
important elements in any event, because it takes time to do so and
it would be useful to have acquired some technical and operational
experience with the improved systems should we decide to move
towards a CTB later. To maintain our
verification capability against tests in space, our spaceborne
verification systems should be similarly upgraded.
[Page 6]
There is one additional matter of detail which may lead to adverse
consequences through inadvertence. This is the definition of a
“nuclear test” or “nuclear explosion.” Those terms were not defined
in the Limited Test Ban Treaty because it was written in an era when
nuclear technology supported only substantial explosions. However,
recent work in high explosive driven pure fusion devices as well as
laser initiated devices permits “explosive” (i.e., short interval)
release of small amounts of nuclear energy, even within
laboratories. This work is related to the understanding of
controlled fusion as an energy source as well as to weapon
technology. Under no circumstances should
this work be truncated. In addition, it presents impossible
verification problems.
To summarize:
- - Make no further moves toward
CTB. I conclude that benefits do
not outweigh the penalties at this
time, and that plausible SALT
or Tactical Nuclear review outcomes will not alter this
conclusion.
- - Consider replacing the OSI requirement with unattended
seismic observatories as an alternative means of ensuring
adequate verification.
- - Require PRC and French
participation in a CTB.
- - Proceed towards upgrading our seismic verification
capability and spaceborne verification capability by developing
and deploying prototypes of the important elements.
- - If a decision to proceed towards a CTB is made, take specific steps to ensure that
research on pure fusion technology can continue under the CTB.
