The President has directed the preparation of an “inventory” of the
international situation as of January 20, 1969. He wishes the review to
provide a current assessment of the political, economic and security
situation and the major problems relevant to U.S. security interests and
U.S. bilateral and multilateral relations. In order to put this review
into effect he wishes to consider responses to the attached set of
questions along with other material considered relevant. The review
should include a discussion, where appropriate, of the data upon which
judgments are based, uncertainties regarding the data, and alternative
possible interpretations of the data.
The responses should be forwarded to the President by February 20,
1969.
Attachment
[Omitted here are sections not related to Western Europe and NATO.]
West Europe—General Economic
1. What are the most likely courses of development of the European
Communities over the next 1–3–5 years? Identify (a) what political
and economic circumstances in individual member countries and in the
communities as a whole, (b) what policy decisions or actions on the
parts of which member governments, and (c) the possible external
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(i.e., outside the member
states) events, which will most affect these courses of
development?
2. What possible developments in the European communities over the
next 1–3–5 years would be most likely to come into conflict with the
interests and aims of the United States? With those of Japan? With
those of the various East European members of COMECON? With those of the
USSR?
3. What are the prospects for British entry into the communities over
the next 1–3–5 years? For the entry of other states? For some sort
of relationship short of full membership for the UK and/or other non-member states? How
will these various contingencies affect US interests? How will they
affect the interests of other non-European developed industrial
states?
4. What is the state of West European relations (including EEC) with the USSR and Eastern Europe?
Do these pose any problems for us? What is the state of
consultations between us and the West Europeans on these
matters?
NATO
1. What are the most likely causes of an outbreak of hostilities in
Europe between NATO and Warsaw
Pact forces? What are the circumstances that might surround an
actual outbreak? What less likely contingencies are nevertheless
planned for by NATO? How capable
are NATO forces judged to be in
meeting this spectrum of contingencies?
2. What is the state of readiness of the various national contingents
assigned to NATO? What endurance
would they have? What are their reinforcement capabilities?
3. How effectively could NATO’s
command structure cope with various likely contingencies of
hostilities? What are the areas of most significant weakness?
4. How has the Alliance been affected by the non-participation of
France in the affairs of the Military Organization? To what extent
do NATO plans assume the
participation of French Forces and the common use of French
facilities in the event of hostilities? How realistic are these
assumptions?
5. What problems does NATO face
regarding planning for, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons? In
what manner, and how seriously do these problems impair the military
efficiency or the political cohesion of the Alliance?
6. Is the Nuclear Planning Group an adequate mechanism of response to
NATO’s nuclear problems? What
are its deficiencies? What are the prospects for Anglo-French, or
Anglo-French-FRG nuclear cooperation?
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7. How weak are NATO’s flanks? What
sorts of contingencies might be affected by their weakness? Are
these likely contingencies?
8. Is the Greek junta still a divisive issue within NATO? How is the Alliance affected by
it?
9. To what extent does the Alliance retain popular political support
in its member nations? In what manner is this support likely to
change over the next five years? Which nations, if any, might
withdraw from the Alliance during this period?
10. How much agreement is there, in fact, regarding NATO’s present strategy? To what
extent does it contribute actual operational guidance and to what
extent is it primarily a general statement of desiderata?
11. What alternative modes of political organization for Western
defense have attracted significant support within the governments or
informed publics of any of the members of the Alliance?
12. What are the prospects for increased US-European cooperation in
weapons development and production? For increased inter-European
cooperation?
13. What are the prospects for effective Alliance cooperation and
coordination in the handling of extra-European crisis situations
such as (a) renewed hostilities in the Middle East, (b)
post-Vietnam-war hostilities in South or Southeast Asia, (c) racial
conflict in Southern Africa, (d) communist-supported insurgency in
tropical Africa?
14. Are major Soviet initiatives in the European security field
likely? To what extent do intra-Warsaw-Pact problems inhibit the
Soviets in this regard?
15. How much pressure is there for a European security
conference?
16. What is the political role of NATO; what is the state of consultations within NATO on political questions?
France
1. What are the prospects for significant economic and political
instability in France? What are the primary sources of likely
instability? What are the implications of various kinds of
instability for French foreign and defense policies?
2. What is the present status (size, effectiveness, patterns of
deployment, doctrines for employment) of French nuclear forces? What
is their likely course of development over the next 1–3–5–10
years?
3. What sorts of US assistance for the development of French nuclear
forces are desired by various groups within France? What would be
the effect on the French military nuclear program of US assistance
comparable to that which we have given the UK?
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4. What Western defense arrangements would be likely to receive what
sorts and what degrees of French cooperation? What are the prospects
over the next five years for greater French participation in
existing NATO military
arrangements?
5. What measures to ease the international monetary situation would
be most acceptable to the French government and public? Less
acceptable? Unacceptable?
6. What is the present state of French relations with the USSR? With
the CPR? With the various communist
states of Eastern Europe? How are these relations likely to develop
over the next five years?
7. To what degree were de Gaulle’s world-view—and French
policy—affected by the events of May 1968 in France and those of
August 1968 in Czechoslovakia?
8. How strong is the commitment of the French Government to a
pro-Arab, anti-Israeli Middle-Eastern policy? Is such a policy
likely to survive de Gaulle?
9. What will be the effect on US–French relations of various possible
outcomes of the Vietnam war?
United Kingdom
1. What is the present status of US–UK military nuclear cooperation? What forms does it
take?
2. What is the present status (size, effectiveness, patterns of
deployment, doctrines for employment) of UK nuclear forces? What is their likely course of
development over the next 1–3–5–10 years, assuming (a) continuation
of present levels and types of US–UK
military nuclear cooperation, (b) increased cooperation, and (c)
reduced, or discontinued, cooperation?
3. What are present deployments of UK
military forces outside Europe and the UK itself? What are they likely to be over the next
five years? Are they likely to be affected by a change of government
in the UK? What actions or policies
on the part of the US might induce the UK to alter these deployments? Is it likely that the
UK will develop an effective
strategic mobility capability? What role is the UK likely to play over the next five
years in extra-European security arrangements?
4. What are the prospects over the next 1–3–5–10 years for the UK economy? What are the implications
of these prospects for UK foreign
and defense policies?
Spain
1. What are the prospects for significant political and/or economic
instability in Spain over the next 1–3–5 years? What would be the
most
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likely sources of
instability? In what manner might US interests be affected?
2. Are changes in the regime likely to affect U.S. base tenure?
3. What is the current status of negotiations on renewal of the base
agreement?
4. What is the status of Spanish-UK
negotiations regarding Gibraltar?
Portugal
1. What is the Portuguese goal in re-opening the question of US base
rights in the Azores in December 1968? Is there any evidence that
the Portuguese wish to transfer US air bases to the mainland (Beja)
and phase out the US presence in the Azores? Should the Portuguese
initiative be viewed as an attempt to capitalize on the current
unsettled status of US-Spanish base negotiations?
Canada
1. What are the prospects for significant political or economic
instability in Canada over the next 1–3–5 years?
2. What is the present strength of the Quebec separatist movement? Is
it likely to increase over the above time spans? What factors will
affect its strength?
3. Over the next 1–3–5 years will Canada (a) withdraw from the
Atlantic Alliance? (b) cease participating in its military
organization?
4. What are the most salient problems in present US-Canadian
relations? What additional matters of contention are likely to arise
over the next 1–3–5 years?
Greece
1. What is the likely course of Greek political development over the
next 1–3–5 years? Is it likely that Greece will experience serious
political and/or economic instability? Civil War?
2. What are the likely trends in Greek foreign policy over the above
time span?
3. Can the U.S. count on unimpeded use of its bases in Greece to
respond to non-NATO
contingencies?
4. What are the prospects for Greece’s full-scale economic
integration into the Western European economic community?
Turkey
1. What are the prospects for U.S.-Turkish relations in the next four
years?
2. What are the prospects for continued democratic government in
Turkey?
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3. What are the prospects for economic growth?
[Omitted here are sections not related to Western Europe and NATO.]
