99. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
R: Reviewing for tomorrow’s meeting with Scheel. I see the President will meet with him.2 Scheel will make as much as he can of this. He has two press officers with him and they are having a reception at the Germany Embassy tonight. They invited me to dinner tomorrow [Page 277] night but I am feeling a little ill, it was a good excuse, and I declined.
K: They will make everything of this.
R: Everything that the President said except bland comments can be reconstructed.
K: I sent you a memo on this from him.3 He said he would only make two points. We go along with their policy—he wants to be bland and if you can give him anything to make it more bland—
R: I will.4 Part of the package provides that package between the Soviet Union and the FRG doesn’t become effective until signed by Poland, ——-, ——-.5 That’s the block concept. Secondly, why not make provision in the 4 power talks—then the Soviet Union says that’s a condition. I am going to point out they cannot insist on linkage and then say we cannot consider linkage. It’s a single instrument and cannot be acceptable until all are signed. He will say why he will ? ? ? [omission in the original] on the Berlin talks.
K: And we will be the fall guys on the Berlin talks.
R: I want to be sure we don’t support what they are doing exactly because they won’t go along with changes.
K: I think the President should say we are in favor of reducing tentions. He doesn’t want to get into details and you will speak for him [Page 278] on the details. The guy is a total lightweight. Say we agree with the general purpose.
R: What has happened is that the Germans have been out bargained.
K: With Bahr doing the bargaining, the lizard. I looked over that treaty and I don’t see what the Germans get except a treaty. They must now recognize E. Germany. That will make negotiations horrible because that puts Berlin in E. Germany.
R: And nothing on access.
K: They have undercut the legal position on access to Berlin.
R: Once they go through this charade it says it has a kind of sovereignty.
K: I was worried that the view in State would be more permissive and we should be bland.
R: We don’t want to be charged with torpedoeing but we must have more progress in 4 power talks. Although Russia doesn’t want linking, how can we not?
K: They are linked to getting the GDR in the U.N. When all of this is done you will have a sovereign E. Germany having renounced use of force. And a drastic situation will be envenomed. Your line is right. The President will listen and leave the details to you.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Germany and Berlin.]
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 364, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.↩
- See Document 100.↩
- In a July 16 memorandum to Rogers, Kissinger reported that Nixon would make the following points: “the U.S. supports the general policy of the FRG with respect to its relations with the East, and in particular its efforts to reach agreement with the USSR on the mutual renunciation of force,” and “the U.S. will not involve itself in the specific negotiating details and tactics of the Federal Government, for it is confident that the Federal Republic fully understands the continuing need for the protection of the Allied rights and responsibilities with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 GER W) As Kissinger explained to the President: “it would be useful to advise the bureaucracy of general guidelines to be followed during the Scheel visit—to ensure that the Scheel party does not pick up conflicting signals during its stay.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to the President, July 15; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, White House Central Files, Subject File, Confidential File, CO53 Germany 1–170 to —)↩
- In a July 16 memorandum to the President, Rogers provided the following guidance: “Normalization of the FRG’s relations with Communist Europe is compatible with American interests as long as the FRG retains strong ties with the United States and with NATO. An underlying principle of Brandt’s Eastern policy is that it must be carried out on the basis of stability and strength in the West and without impairment of the quadripartite rights and responsibilities. On this basis, we can endorse the general objectives sought by Brandt’s Government which, it should be added, accord with Kiesinger’s objectives when he was Chancellor. We wish to avoid creating the impression in the FRG that an effort to improve relations with the East is incompatible with continued cooperation with the West. Our attitude should be determined by the three principles of continued cohesion and strength within the Western Alliance, non-impairment of quadripartite rights, and continuing efforts to lessen the military and ideological confrontation in Europe.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V)↩
- The omitted references in the text here are presumably to Czechoslovakia and East Germany.↩