Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

100. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 17, 1970.

SUIBJECT

• Your Meeting with German Foreign Minister Scheel, Saturday, July 18, at 10 a.m.

You have agreed to meet for 30 minutes with Foreign Minister Scheel (pronounced SHALE) at his request.² Scheelhad talks in London en route to Washington, and will have seen Secretary Rogers on Friday afternoon. You met Scheel in Washington in June 1969, when he visited you as leader of the then-opposition FDP.

Scheel will have already seen Secretary Rogers³ and other State Department officials and they will have gone over technical points related to the FRG’s current eastern negotiations. Consequently, there should be no need for you to get drawn into this subject in detail.

We understand that, apart from the prestige element in being received by you (which is extremely important to Scheel as head of the tiny FDP, which stands to lose further ground in state elections in the fall), Scheel will be interested in your analysis of the SALT talks, the Middle East and Vietnam.

As regards SALT, you may wish to say that

• —your decision to offer new, more limited proposals has already been conveyed to the allies through NATO;
• —we think there may be a genuine Soviet interest in some standstill agreement, perhaps for economic reasons, but we can’t be sure yet;
• —in any case, we must guard against exaggerated hopes of détente, even if some agreement should prove possible because many interests will continue to clash.

This will be especially true in the Middle East, on which you may wish to say that

• —we will continue our efforts to get the parties to talk instead of fight;
• —but we are deeply disturbed by the general inroads, including military, that the Soviets have made in the area;
• —this is as much a matter for the countries of the region and for NATO as a whole as it is for us; because it outflanks the center of Europe even if certain agreements are possible with the Soviets.

On Southeast Asia, you may wish to stress

• —your appreciation of the understanding that your actions have received from the German government;
• —that you intend firmly to continue on your present course;
• —and that it is clear that the Cambodian operation has facilitated this.

The German Eastern Policy

Scheel’s rather sudden visit to Washington, insofar as it related to his meeting with Secretary Rogers, directly involves the next step in the FRG’s Eastern Policy. He is expected to lead a German delegation to Moscow on July 26 to open formal negotiations for the FRG–USSR treaty on the renunciation of force. It is probable that Scheel and Gromyko will initial a text within a relatively short time. This treaty will be the center piece in the Brandt Government’s Eastern Policy.

For domestic political reasons (to blunt the attack of the opposition CDU) and because of their continuing rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole, the Brandt Government considers it necessary to receive the concurrence of the US, UK and France prior to proceeding to Moscow. This is the main purpose of Scheel’s trip to London and Washington; the Germans consider that French support was received during the July 3–4 visit to Bonn of President Pompidou. (In fact, the French continue to have some underlying reservations.)

If he raises the Eastern Policy in his conversation with you, Scheel will probably be emphasizing the FRG’s commitment to NATO and to partnership with the US. With that as a base, he will review the objectives of the German Eastern Policy—to lessen the confrontation in Central Europe, and to establish a more “normal” relationship between the FRG and Eastern Europe, particularly with the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany. Finally, Scheel can be expected to seek your support for the FRG’s efforts (especially for their proposed treaty with the USSR), and may also urge that we press ahead in the Berlin talks with the Soviets (success there is very important, in German eyes, for the success of their efforts in the East).

(Note: We probably do not have an interest in the collapse of the SPD/FDP coalition—certainly not in being held responsible for it— since an alternative CDU/FDP coalition, assuming it could ever agree on a Chancellor, would also be extremely weak.)⁴

In this critical period of almost frenetic activity and apprehension within the FRG, it will be important for you to create the impression that the US stands behind the Germans, and that we consider, provided consultations are free and frank, their efforts with the East are not incompatible with their anchor in the West.

Thus, you should make clear to Scheel

—that the US supports the general policy of the FRG with respect to its relations with the East, and in particular its efforts to reach agreement with the USSR on the mutual renunciation of force.

At the same time we have a very real interest in ensuring that our position in Berlin, and our basis for dealing with the Soviets in matters relating to the entire German question, do not appear to be undercut by the FRG’s activity in reaching what amounts to a partial peace treaty with the Soviets. As a purely legal matter, probably nothing the Germans could do with the Soviets could destroy our rights and the Soviet responsibilities. But what appears to be is often more important than what technically is a fact of law.

After pointing this out to Scheel, you may wish to say

—that the US will not involve itself in the specific negotiating details and tactics of the FRG, for it is confident that the FRG fully understands the continuing need for the protection of the Allied rights and responsibilities with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole.

If Scheel raises the question of the Four Power talks in Berlin, you may wish to comment that

• —our prime interest is to ensure the viability and protection of the City, and we have tried to obtain pragmatic improvements through the talks in Berlin;
• —unfortunately, we have had no indication that the Soviets are willing to make any significant concession;
• —we recognize that Berlin should not remain alone as a point of confrontation as the FRG proceeds to relax tensions with the East, but at the same time it would be unwise to permit pressure to build which might force concessions from the West that would undercut Berlin’s future.

A memorandum from Secretary Rogers⁵ and additional background materials are in a separate book.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V. Secret. Sent for information. The date of the memorandum is from an attached transmittal note from Kissinger to the President.
2. On July 11 Pauls urgently requested that Nixon and Rogers meet Scheel on July 17. (Telegram 111117 to London, July 12; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 GER W) In a July 15 memorandum to the President, Kissinger explained: “For you not to receive Scheel at least briefly on July 17 would be taken as a serious affront by the Brandt/Scheel government. In their eyes it would expose the lack of genuine US support at a time when it is most needed, and at a time when the French and British are willing to stand on the German side.” Nixon approved the request but opted to receive Scheel on July 18. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Confidential File, CO53 Germany 1–170 to —) Nixon met Scheel on July 18 from 10:08 to 10:39 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Although no U.S. record has been found, Pauls forwarded an account of the discussion in a telegram to the German Foreign Office on July 19; see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 1200–1202.
3. In telegram 115580 to Berlin, July 18, the Department summarized the conversation: “During course of two and half hour meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Scheel on July 17, the Secretary stressed (a) importance of FRG using its negotiations with Moscow on behalf of Berlin; (b) possibility that enhanced status for GDR could pose new problems for West Berlin, particularly in area of access; and (c) desirability of obtaining in FRG-Soviet treaty written acknowledgment of continuing quadripartite rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany. Scheel was in general agreement and while he made no commitment on point (c) he was willing to consider it further. He thought that several alternatives, including an exchange of letters between FRG and Three Powers, might also provide satisfactory solution and proposed that consultations on question continue in Bonn Group forum early next week, with which Secretary agreed. Scheel characterized himself as on ‘tough’ side in Cabinet and said conversation with Secretary would be useful to him in further Cabinet discussions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR) For a German record of the conversation, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 1196–1198. According to a report on a meeting of the German Cabinet on July 23: “Scheel said that it was evident in his conversation with Secretary of State Rogers that there is great uncertainty in the U.S. about West German Eastern policy, and President Nixon had expressed only subdued optimism about the West German chances for success in this policy. However, after Scheel had explained the German position, the Secretary of State showed a positive interest, and Scheel thought he had overcome some objections, since the Americans then agreed to the favorable communiqué.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V)
4. The President marked this parenthetical note and wrote on the memorandum: “I do not agree. Any non socialist government would be better.”
5. See footnote 4, Document 99.