Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, July 15, 1970, 1222Z.

8145. Subj: Conversation With State Secretary Bahr on Renunciation of Force and Eastern Policy. Deliver Sutterlin at 0830 hrs.

1. In a conversation July 14 between Ambassador Rush and State Secretary Egon Bahr on the Eastern negotiations, the main subject was the Allied desire to include mention of the continuation of Allied rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole in the renunciation of force treaty with the Soviet Union.

2. Bahr expressed optimism that the present German proposals for modification in the text of the treaty would be acceptable to the Soviets. Ambassador Rush developed the line of argument outlined in Bonn’s 8036 and 8001.² He said there were two main reasons for inclusions of such language in the agreement with the Soviets, protection of the Western position in Berlin, and protection of the right of self-determination for the German people. One could not be sure of the political significance of the second point. Germany might some day be reunited and this point might in the course of time prove to have been highly important. On the other hand, its present significance was indeterminate.

3. Ambassador Rush told Bahr that on the other hand the significance of including language in the German agreement with the Soviets covering continuing Four Power responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole was however immediately and directly important in terms of maintaining the Western position in Berlin. Ambassador Rush said that the important thing in this matter was not what we think our rights are but what others think: people in third countries, potential Western investors in Berlin, Western public opinion, and above all the Soviets themselves. As nothing was said in any of the German agreements with the East about Four Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin and nothing was said of this in a possible Berlin agreement or an agreement on admitting East Germany to the UN, then we would be in a considerably worsened position. The Soviets themselves might be misled by failure to include this item in the agreements. They might conclude that the Western Powers had lost interest in maintaining their position in Berlin and themselves seek to probe Western resolve more firmly and push harder. If we failed to obtain the inclusion of a suitable formula in the first agreement, we might come under great political pressure from our own friends, including the Germans themselves not to include them in subsequent ones.

4. Ambassador Rush pointed out that if the Soviet Union were in a position where its ally East Germany was a member of the UN and none of the Eastern treaties reflected the continuing subsequent of the idea of Germany as a whole or Quadripartite rights on Berlin, then the problem of Western sectors could readily become, in the eyes of Western opinion and Third World opinion, merely an ethnic internal problem of what one group of Germans did to another group of Germans. There would be no clearly apparent grounds for involvement of either of the Big Powers and the locally superior position of the East Germans might well in time prevail.

5. Bahr argued that if the Soviets wanted some mention of Four Power agreements or were interested in this concept, they would take it up themselves in the Berlin context. He claimed the Western Powers were asking the Germans to do for them with the Soviets what they themselves could not do. Ambassador Rush pointed out that this was not the case. We were not asking that the Germans bring the Soviets to accept our version of the Four Power rights and responsibilities. We were merely asking that both participants in the agreement acknowledge that these rights and responsibilities exist and continue. We wanted a standard formula included in all agreements. But we were not asking the Germans to get something for us we couldn’t get. We had these rights and responsibilities already. We wanted participants in new agreements to acknowledge their existence. In the final analysis, it would not be in the German interest if, through failure to push for this point, they should cut the ground out from under the Western Powers on Berlin.

6. At this point, Bahr said that he could now see the reasons for the Western position far more clearly. These had not previously been reported to him. Without committing the German Government, he indicated agreement that an effort should be made to take this matter up with the Soviets in the forthcoming negotiations.³ Ambassador Rush said that if matters came to a point where the whole treaty structure was in danger of collapse, he did not think it would be right to keep pushing the point on the mention of the four point structure. But he did think for the German position and our own as well that an energetic attempt should be made to gain inclusion of appropriate language.

7. Bahr claimed that he did not know what was going on in the Quadripartite negotiations in Berlin and that the German side was not being kept fully informed. Ambassador Rush said he was most surprised to hear this. He said the German side through the Bonn Group was getting every word that Abrasimov said and that the Allies said in return. The Germans knew everything that was going on in these negotiations and had full capacity to influence formulation of the common Western position. The Germans could be sure that the Western Allies would not give anything away in Berlin without the complete agreement of the Federal Republic. Bahr then intimated that the Western side was not pushing the Soviets hard. Ambassador Rush replied that we were giving as good as we got and we left no Soviet point uncontested. Ambassador Rush pointed out that his objective in the negotiations was to frustrate the Soviet aim of final isolation of the Western sectors, leading to their eventual collapse or absorption in East Germany. Bahr agreed and said it was necessary to push hard on the Soviets. The only technique was to repeat the Western position again and again.

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin. According to another copy, the telegram was drafted by Dean and approved by Rush. (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, JDean—Telegrams, May–Jul 70 (Drafted or Co-Drafted))
2. Both dated July 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR) In telegram 112706 to Bonn, July 15, the Department agreed that a “coordinated tripartite approach should be made to the German side in Bonn” on Allied rights and responsibilities. (Ibid.)
3. At the quadripartite luncheon on July 17, Bahr raised the issue of inserting language in the text of the proposed German-Soviet treaty on the quadripartite status of Berlin and Germany as a whole; upon reflection, he now believed that “a German effort to gain Soviet agreement to inclusion of this language should be made and should be pressed as hard as possible.” Bahr, however, issued a caveat: “the effort should be made on the basis of the mutual understanding on the Western side that the Germans will make a sincere and strong effort, but that this issue would not be the make or break question of the entire negotiations.” (Telegram 8310 from Bonn, July 17; ibid.)