Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

97. Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Ellsworth) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Undated.

THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF OSTPOLITIK

Despite the rather general public euphoria over the FRG’s Ostpolitik, there are a number of substantial reasons for concern about that policy and its effects in Europe and the United States. The following is a brief examination of some of those reasons for concern.

I. Imprecision.

The lack of any clear definition of either means or ends is perhaps the most striking—and dangerous—aspect of Ostpolitik. The Germans tell us they want to “fuzz the line” between the FRG and the GDR, and that they want to “improve the East-West atmosphere,” all presumably in the hope that at some future time conditions will have improved to the point where the two Germanys can be reunited. But what they seem incapable of explaining is how means relate to ends, and how present concessions on their part will even encourage (much less [elicit)] future Eastern generosity.

This lack of precision has led to several unfortunate—and potentially serious—results.

First, there is a growing sense of Western European unease. Right or wrong, long suppressed but still present fears and suspicions of Germany are being revived by the FRG’s inability to explain in detail precisely what it seeks and how far it is prepared to go to get it. Few thoughtful Europeans are yet concerned about another Rapallo.² But they are worried that this latest German “Drang nach Osten”³ will lead to a weakening of Germany’s ties with the West, an increasingly independent FRG foreign policy, and rising pressure within the Federal Republic for a place in the sun more in keeping with Western European political “realities.”

The danger inherent in these rising apprehensions about Germany’s future course is that the already lagging enthusiasm for Alliance unity in East-West policy will be further undermined, while Western Europeans rush to compete with the FRG for Eastern favor and markets.

A second result of Ostpolitik is the opportunity that policy gives the Soviets to use the carrot and the stick. So long as “atmosphere” is uppermost in German minds—as opposed to a hardheaded calculation of specific tradeoffs—the FRG will be open to the most blatant forms of blackmail. (The latest Soviet statement that concessions on Berlin would be forthcoming after ratification of the FRG-Soviet Treaty is a case in point, as is Brandt’s mounting pressure on the Three Western Powers to come to a Berlin agreement.)

II. The Status Quo.

We have heard much about how German Eastern policy has recognized the “status quo” in Central Europe. What is usually meant is that the FRG has accepted:

• —the existence of the GDR;
• —the border adjustments (particularly the Oder-Neisse line) resulting from World War II.

While it can be argued that it is regrettable that the FRG saw fit to give up these bargaining points for little or no return, it can also be argued that all the Federal Republic did was recognize a reality it was powerless to change and therefore powerless to use to its advantage.

What is less often realized, but far more important, is that by proceeding as it has the FRG has, in effect, recognized Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The damage this may have done (or may do) to the West’s ability to deal with the East is twofold:

• —Much of the damage, insofar as Eastern European attitudes are concerned, may already have been done. Few are going to be sophisticated enough to recognize that Germany, in accepting the USSR’s principal role in Eastern Europe, is not doing so as the West’s surrogate.
• —German recognition of Soviet domination will make it far easier for other Western Governments, which are also anxious for better relations with the East, to take similar steps.

III. The Soviet Role in Europe.

The Soviets have long sought the status of a fully European power, with interests that reached the whole Continent rather than stopping at the Elbe. Since the last war, the Soviet claim to acceptance in the councils of Europe has rested solely on its military might; Europeans (other than De Gaulle) have never conceded the legitimacy of the Soviet argument that it should participate because it is a European power. Since this is something the U.S. clearly is not, we have consistently supported this view.

But the Soviet-FRG Treaty, by suggesting that the USSR become a participant in an era of continentwide cooperation, has undercut previous Western policy. It has opened the doors to acceptance of the legitimate right of the Soviets to participate in European affairs (and thus Western European affairs) on a basis (i.e., geography) the United States cannot claim (despite the fact that ethnically, culturally and economically the U.S. is far more a European power than is the USSR).

IV. Economic and Technological Cooperation.

The Germans have taken a major step toward permitting the Soviets increased access to badly needed Western technological and economic resources—and on terms that smack more of aid than trade. In the process they have made East-West trade more “respectable,” and have whetted the appetite of every West European Government that sees the East as a great untapped market. Few will be prepared to accept the FRG’s “privileged” position for long; and the U.S., as the last holdout against a relaxation of restrictions on trade with the East, will come under increasing pressure to change its policy.

V. Troop Levels.

Perhaps the greatest Ostpolitik anomaly is that, while the Germans clearly believe their policy can only succeed if it rests on a strong NATO defense posture, including no reduction in U.S. forces, that policy may have made it even more difficult for us to avoid a force cut. At a time when there is already substantial Congressional pressure to reduce our NATO commitment, and when many are claiming that “détente” in Europe is all but an accomplished fact, the signing of the German-Soviet Treaty will be read as evidence of the speciousness of those who say that the U.S. must continue its present level of defense spending in Europe.

What Do We Do?

The United States can still have substantial influence over events, and over the Germans, should we choose to exercise it. Nor, at certain levels of involvement, need the fact that pressure has been brought to bear become public knowledge. We should not uncritically decide that the price of such publicity, should it occur, is so great that we cannot interfere under any circumstances.

The Berlin negotiations offer the most immediate tool at hand with which to influence the course of the FRG’s Ostpolitik. So long as the Four cannot arrive at an agreement, Brandt is on very shaky ground and knows it. But the minute there is an agreement, no matter how minor, his freedom to proceed—and with the apparent blessing of his three Western allies—is greatly increased.

Given the current impasse in the Berlin talks, it should not be difficult for the U.S. to use the negotiations to advantage, while avoiding public criticism. We can:

• —take a cautious position on proposals to let the working level try to hammer out an agreement;
• —refuse to agree to further modifications of our substantive position, arguing that any further compromises would adversely affect the welfare of the West Berliners;
• —even harden our demands slightly if the Soviets persist in their present hard line.

While the British would probably push us to be more forthcoming, the French would almost certainly support us, at least for a time (this claim should be looked at again after the Pompidou visit to Moscow).⁴ We would also be in a relatively good propaganda position, since we could—should it become necessary—take a strong public position against sacrificing the wellbeing of the people of Berlin for the sake of an unsatisfactory agreement.

Such delaying tactics, if carefully employed, could at least slow the pace of Ostpolitik. They could also serve as a gentle warning to Brandt.

Should the U.S. decide that a more explicit warning is necessary, Ambassador Rush or a special emissary could be sent to Brandt (or some slightly lower level in the Government). His purpose would be to explain in detail U.S. worries about the course of Brandt’s policy, and to explain our view of the limits beyond which he ought not go. Implicit in this démarche, of course, would be the threat that should Ostpolitik go too far afield the USG would have to reexamine the wisdom of continuing its public support for FRG Eastern policy.

There is, of course, always the danger that our actions would become public knowledge. The German Government is notoriously insecure, with the likelihood of leakage increasing in direct proportion to the number of lower-level people involved. But Brandt knows that his already shaky Government would be in serious trouble if there were even the slightest indication of firm U.S. opposition to his policy, and would do all he could to avoid leaks. With this in mind, a private meeting between Ambassador Rush and the Chancellor would probably be the safest way to proceed. Under any circumstances, we would have to guard against any hint to the CDU of what we were doing.⁵

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 6, Chronological File, 1969–75, 1 June–8 July 1970. Secret; Nodis. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was “handed to HAK by Ellsworth June/July 70.” Ellsworth probably gave the memorandum to Kissinger during his visit to Washington in early July. (Letter from Ellsworth to Nixon, July 16; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 259, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. VIII)
2. See footnote 5, Document 1.
3. Drive to the East.
4. Pompidou went to Moscow in October 1970 for his first state visit.
5. In October 1970 Ellsworth prepared another proposal to use U.S. leverage to influence the course of German policy. In an October 21 covering letter to Haig, Lawrence Eagleburger explained: “Ambassador Ellsworth was all primed to speak at the [October 14] NSC meeting on Berlin and Germany about our levers on the Bonn Government. The way the discussion went, however, he did not get a chance to make the pitch, so I am sending you a copy of ‘what might have been’.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 259, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. IX)