53. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Deputy Chief of Mission in Germany (Fessenden)1
Dear Russ:
I appreciated your quiet letter of January 29, 19702 concerning consultations—or the lack thereof—on the FRG’s Eastern policy initiatives. You are quite right. This is a sensitive subject here since we wish, if at all possible, to avoid the appearance of differences or distrust between us and the new German Government. This could, if carried to extremes, lead to a kind of head-in-the-sand ostrich attitude and I would not wish to have you gain the impression that this is the Department’s intention. For this reason it may be useful for me briefly to sketch out our underlying philosophy on this subject.
The first principle is a rather simple one: we wish to keep the Federal Republic in the Western camp. If this is to succeed in the future as in the past, the Federal Republic must be content to remain there. This will not be the case if circumstances suggest that continued allegiance to the West is preventing the Federal Republic from achieving a more satisfactory solution of the German problem through accommodation with the East. Thus it is in our interest to avoid the impression that Western interests and specifically American interests prevent the Federal Republic from exploring possibilities of understanding with the East.
The second principle is even simpler: we do not believe that the Soviet Union or the GDR has the flexibility to offer a change in the European situation which would be of sufficient attraction to the Federal Republic to cause it to loosen its Western ties. Thus we think that allowing the Germans a relatively free hand at this point will be the best means of ensuring their continued commitment to NATO and cooperation with the United States.
We realize that there are varying currents within the Brandt Government and that Brandt himself is capable of being impatient of Allied tutelage. He will at times act on his own and even occasionally—we must expect—through seemingly devious or covert means. Moreover, [Page 146] as the months pass the CDU and perhaps industrialist circles in Germany will be active in pursuing this line and may well warn us that Brandt is jeopardizing vital Western interests. Our task, particularly in Washington, will be to keep all of this in perspective, not just for those of us in the Department who follow German questions in detail but for those elsewhere who are less familiar with details and more inclined to be nervous.
This situation suggests two conclusions. First it will be preferable in your reporting from the field and in our analyses in the Department to avoid over-emphasis on occasional failure to consult on the part of the FRG so long as the FRG is proceeding along policy lines with which we are familiar on the basis of more general consultations. Secondly, and this is why I particularly appreciated your letter, the facts as they develop should be quietly recorded whether they are positive or negative so that a policy of restraint in reporting does not in the end lead to an inaccurate assessment and erroneous policy recommendations. We want you to be on the alert and to let us know to what extent the FRG is failing to consult; but we would like this to be done keeping in mind the general philosophy which I stated earlier and the need which this philosophy imposes to avoid premature or unnecessary alarms. This problem is bound to be with us for a good many months to come and I hope these few thoughts will be of some use to you.
With best regards.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, AMB/DCM Correspondence, 1970. Secret; Official–Informal. A handwritten note on the letter by Fessenden reads: “Thoughtful letter & makes the case well.” Rush wrote: “I agree with Marty’s comments which are well made.”↩
- Document 51.↩