51. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Germany (Fessenden) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand)1
Dear Marty:
I know all too well that the issue of the degree to which the Federal German Republic is consulting on its Ostpolitik is a sensitive one, and I hesitate to put pen to paper on it again, so to speak. Nevertheless, I am becoming concerned.
After the Secretary’s visit, the record of consultation was excellent—better than it had ever been. But recently there have been some signs of slippage. We were not consulted on the text or timing of Brandt’s January 22 letter to Stoph.2 The decision on text and timing was reached suddenly at the highest level; neither Duckwitz nor Ruete were in on the act. One can say, of course, that the FRG considers its political dealings over East Germany to be its own affair and consultation with the Allies is not necessary. Yet, as you well know, dealings on the relationship of the two parts of Germany to each other can be of consequence to our position in Germany. I refer most specifically to the Brandt doctrine on the existence of two German states, which he also cites in his letter to Stoph. It seems quite possible that, in practice, the relationship between the two parts of Germany may cumulatively be defined by documents and statements of this type over a longer period and that there may not be a formal agreement regulating the overall relationship, complete with reservation clauses about Allied rights of the type the Germans contemplate in the event of formal negotiations with the GDR. The result may be recognized by the international community as de facto German recognition of the GDR, with consequences for the status of Berlin and Allied rights in Germany as a whole.
In those matters where we have been consulted, the Germans have given priority to their tactical considerations as regards timing over consultation. This happened most recently with regard to the German reply to Bondarenko on the Soviet complaint about recent Bundestag activities in Berlin (Bonn 631, Bonn 671, State 10221).3 In this instance, [Page 142] the Department had to take a position within an hour or two on the basis of only an outline on the text of the reply, whose exact wording could at some point turn out to be rather important for the status of Berlin. The British did the same thing, commenting on the basis of Van Well’s outline. We were given the text at 1700 hours on January 22 and were told the Foreign Office wished to make its reply to Bondarenko at 1900 hours the same day. When we objected, the time of delivery was postponed to noon the following day. With night intervening, this gave only a few hours for consultation. Of course, the fact that there was some obstruction on the autobahn might have given the Germans grounds for believing the timing to be urgent, but neither the Foreign Office nor ourselves considered at the time that the GDR harassment would be more than intermittent and limited, done largely for the record. The French were sufficiently annoyed about this incident to be considering a démarche at the Foreign Office complaining of inadequate consultation.
As of this writing, we are still awaiting consultations on the Bahr mission to Moscow. We have been promised something, but time is getting short.4
We don’t wish to interfere with the present good atmosphere on this subject or to create an opening for those here who want to make political capital from charges of poor consultations. But we feel that we need more time for real consultation and that we also should have a word to say regarding the formulation of formal communications affecting the political relations between the two German sides. Important US interests are involved.
At this point, I am not suggesting that anything be done, especially because I know how delicate a matter this is. But I did want to document the fact that there has been a recent falling off in the excellent record established after the Secretary’s visit.
With best regards,
- Source: Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, AMB/DCM Correspondence, 1970. Secret. Drafted by Dean and Fessenden. Copies were sent to Sutterlin, Rush, and Dean.↩
- For text of the letter, in which Brandt proposed “negotiations about an exchange of declarations renouncing the use of force,” see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 1068.↩
- Dated January 21, 22, and 22, respectively. (All in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–2 GER W)↩
- In a meeting on January 29 (evidently after the letter to Hillenbrand was drafted), Sahm gave an Embassy officer “some background” on the decision to send Bahr to Moscow. (Telegram 1009 from Bonn, January 29; ibid., POL 7 GER W)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩