52. Editorial Note
On February 3, 1970, Polish Ambassador Michalowski met Henry Kissinger at the White House to review the status of East-West negotiations, in particular the upcoming first round of the Warsaw talks. The discussion included an exchange on formal recognition of the Polish-East German border, the so-called Oder-Neisse line:
“He [Michalowski] said that the US could contribute by telling the FRG that we wanted an agreement settling the border. Mr. Kissinger said that we had made clear that we want reconciliation between Poland and the FRG. Michalowski said this was not enough. Mr. Kissinger said that we would present no obstacle to Polish-German understanding.”
Michalowski told Kissinger he considered the latter remark an “important” statement of U.S. policy. (Memorandum for the record by Sonnenfeldt, February 9; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I)
One week later the West German Foreign Office instructed its Embassy in Washington to confirm a report from the Polish delegation in Warsaw that a White House “personality,” although not the President himself, recently told Michalowski that the United States would not object if West Germany recognized the Oder-Neisse line. On February 12 Dirk Oncken, the German Minister in Washington, accordingly raised the issue with Helmut Sonnenfeldt who admitted that Kissinger had remarked that the United States would “present no obstacles to German-Polish understanding” but denied any implication on the border issue. (Memorandum for the record by Sonnenfeldt, February 12; ibid., Box 683, Germany, Vol. IV)
In a meeting with Counselor Frackiewicz of the Polish Embassy on March 17, Sonnenfeldt suggested that such Polish behavior might present an obstacle for bilateral relations. When Frackiewicz stressed “how important it was for the US and other allies to encourage the Germans to settle the Oder-Neisse,” Sonnenfeldt was blunt in his reply:
“I took occasion to tell him that the Poles would make a bad mistake if they tried to play the Western allies off against each other on this question. I had been very disturbed to learn that Mr. Kissinger’s general comments to the Polish Ambassador about our support for German-Polish reconciliation had been passed on to the Germans by Polish officials in a version that had us supporting the Polish interpretation of Potsdam. I also noted that an American journalist in Washington had told me that Mr. Kissinger’s alleged comments had also been passed to newspapermen by the Poles. I said this sort of thing made private conversations very difficult and could not help the cause of Polish-German agreement.”
Frackiewicz was “shocked” by the news, refusing to believe that “any Polish official could have been guilty of an indiscretion.” After [Page 144] expressing the need to avoid further incident, Sonnenfeldt reiterated U.S. support for reconciliation between Poland and West Germany but doubted that “maximum Polish demands provided a suitable basis” for agreement. (Memorandum for the record by Sonnenfeldt, March 18; ibid., Box 834, Name Files, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut)
In a February 25 letter to Hillenbrand, Ambassador to Poland Stoessel also addressed the U.S. position on the Oder-Neisse line. Stoessel believed that the United States should not emphasize the legal aspect of the dispute while ignoring the prospect for a political solution of “this long-standing and important issue.” Although it was “essential” to maintain the American position in Berlin, he argued that “the status of the Oder-Neisse line does not appear to be of such vital importance to the U.S. interest.” U.S. interests would be served by the successful conclusion of the Warsaw talks; failure, on the other hand, would have an “adverse impact” on Ostpolitik with repercussions for the political leadership in Poland as well as in West Germany. Stoessel, therefore, advocated adopting a more flexible approach on the Oder-Neisse line, including the possibility of diplomatic support for the Polish position. “[I]f it comes to a point of impasse between Poland and the FRG over the form of an accord on the Oder-Neisse,” he suggested, “we should be prepared in advance to use our influence with the FRG to help find a way out of the impasse.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 32–3 GER–POL)
In a March 9 letter to Stoessel, Hillenbrand agreed that the United States should not stress legal over political considerations on the Oder-Neisse line. He disagreed, however, that the United States should pressure West Germany to compromise in the Warsaw talks. “I do not believe we should volunteer unsolicited advice,” Hillenbrand argued. “The effect of such advice on German domestic political considerations, once it became publicly known, could do serious harm to U.S.-German relations.” (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Correspondence, 1968–72)
Fessenden echoed this argument in a letter to Stoessel on March 16. As the leading proponent of reconciliation with Poland, Chancellor Brandt would concede as much as his “fragile parliamentary majority” would allow. “I don’t think, therefore, that there is any practical necessity for us to try to bring influence to bear on Brandt in this matter,” Fessenden commented. “For us to intervene could even run the risk of getting us involved in the middle of a hot German internal political issue.” (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, Chrons (1969)—Letters (Outgoing)) Stoessel later concluded that, on the basis of the exchange of views on the Oder-Neisse line, “our official position is open-minded and flexible.” (Letter from Stoessel to Hillenbrand, March 21; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Correspondence 1968–72)