Office of the Historian

377. Message From the German State Secretary for Foreign, Defense, and German Policy (Bahr) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Bonn, October 10, 1972.
1)
In the conversation with Br[ezhnev], he indicated that he would like to promote the completion of our treaty with the DDR.2 After the inevitable public speculation, he was most anxious to emphasize that we had only exchanged information and that concrete decisions could only be made in the negotiations themselves. Regarding the issues of the [German] nation and of reference to the outstanding peace treaty, he declared himself unconvinced by my arguments. Although he will still think about these issues, he believes that the material advantages of the treaty for us are so great that we would also reach an agreement without these two points. I denied this.
2)
In connection with the Soviet proposals before the United Nations, Br[ezhnev] also mentioned the subject we discussed in Munich.3 This was intended only for the Chancellor.
3)
He asked whether or not Washington also could help somehow. In this connection, I informed him about our possible meeting.4
4)
I mentioned to him the points on MBFR. He emphasized that he also wanted to make real progress there. In general he places great value on the talks.
5)
It would be helpful if you could transmit to me via the embassy an invitation for a meeting on 28. 10., perhaps in connection with the four-power declaration.5

Warm regards.

  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany–Egon Bahr Communications. Top Secret. The message, translated here from the original German by the editor, was received in Washington on October 11 at 1457Z. No time of transmission is on the message.↩
  2. In a special channel message on October 4, Bahr informed Kissinger of his plans to visit Moscow, October 8–10. “Since the negotiations with the DDR have hardened on the fundamental issues of the goal of [national] unity and of the outstanding peace treaty,” Bahr reported, “we will make an attempt to further a settlement via Moscow. If that works, we could initial the Basic Treaty around the end of the month. Otherwise, we will hardly finish the negotiations before the election. I will give the General Secretary a message from the Chancellor, in which he points out the necessity of formulating the Basic Treaty in such a way that it corresponds to our constitution and does justice to the special situation in Germany. For the public we will emphasize bilateral issues and issues related to European developments. It is clear that we must avoid any public reference to the Basic Treaty.” (Ibid.) The editor translated the foregoing excerpt from the original German. For his memoir account of the trip, see Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, pp. 416–420.↩
  3. See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 371.↩
  4. Due to their negotiations with East Germany and North Vietnam, respectively, Bahr and Kissinger were unable to meet as planned at the end of October. Messages on their efforts to arrange a meeting are in Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany–Egon Bahr Communications. See also footnote 5, Document 381.↩
  5. In a special channel message on October 5, Bahr reminded Kissinger that the four-power declaration was essential for the completion of the Basic Treaty by the end of the month. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany–Egon Bahr Communications) Kissinger replied on the same day: “We are of course quite prepared to get the four power declaration settled by the end of the month and fully understand your desire to accomplish this so that it will not delay the completion of your negotiations. The essential point is that the text is satisfactory to all concerned. I assume you will make clear to the Soviets that this is essential.” (Ibid.)↩