Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

381. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 30, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Four-Power Talks in Berlin: Problems with the Allies

Ambassador Hillenbrand made little progress in trying to persuade the Allies and Bonn to accept the text you worked out with Gromyko and Dobrynin.² Indeed, Egon Bahr has now indicated that he needs to gain some concessions in the four-power talks that he failed to gain in his negotiations with Kohl.

Moreover, Bahr claims that his talks with Kohl are virtually completed and in order to make a deadline for a West German cabinet review of the inner-German treaty on November 7, he needs a four-power text by Monday³ at the latest.

The French and British showed no enthusiasm for our text. The British, at least in Bonn, believe it falls below a tolerable minimum. The French are more relaxed, but are resisting the use of the one phrase the question of “quadripartite rights and responsibilities…”

Bahr made the following points in a discussion on Saturday:⁴

• —A reference to “Berlin and Germany as a whole” would be highly desirable, but probably unattainable; a fallback could be a reference to rights and responsibilities “concerning Germany”; a second fallback, which he described as “tolerable if necessary,” would be to mention the locale of the negotiations as the building of the former Allied Control Council “for Germany.”
• —This last position may not be too difficult since part of it has been used in the communiqué of each meeting. However, the addition of “for Germany” will not easily slip by the Soviets.

Bahr’s second point: Bonn would prefer a reference to the fact that a “peace settlement” is still outstanding, but realizes that this too may not be possible. He would settle for a clear description of four-power rights and responsibilities.

—Such a clear description means that the phrase “the question of …” would have to be dropped so that the declaration would affirm “rights and responsibilities of the four powers,” rather than “the question of rights and responsibilities.”

Bahr wants a reference to the “peace treaty,” but again realizes that this is difficult, and would therefore settle for its use in the exchange between Bonn and the Allies.

Finally, Bahr wants a formulation that indicates the FRG and the GDR would notify the four powers of their intention to apply for UN membership, and mention in the four-power declaration of “simultaneous admission.”

The French stressed two points: dropping “the question of …” and some reference to “Germany,” the latter being “vital.”

The British indicated they wanted to work from maximum positions, and depart from them very gradually.

In sum, we are faced with a difficult road in order to reach the outcome we already agreed on with the Soviets. Bahr’s position is, upon close examination, fairly flexible but boils down to the three essentials:

1. Some reference to Germany in the text.

2. Elimination of the phrase the “question of…”

3. A substitution of “their” for “such” in the phrase “such UN memberships does not affect…”

Assuming Bahr knows or senses the real status of the text that Hillenbrand introduced, he may be posturing in front of the other Allies since his real requirements do not seem all that difficult. At the same time, he has already alerted you to his probable need for help in the next few days in regard to the Four-Power Declaration.⁵

The net effect of Bahr’s discussion was to confirm the British and French in their desire to obtain better terms. Meetings are continuing to devise bracketed texts. Completing an agreed text by Bahr’s deadline, however, would seem highly unlikely, unless you reopen the disputed points with Dobrynin.

As I understand the various positions, the following would be a text that might get by the Allies (changes from your text are underlined⁶ or bracketed):

“The Governments of the US, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, represented by their Ambassadors, who met in the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control Council for Germany,⁷ have agreed to support the application for UN membership when submitted by the FRG and the GDR and affirm in this connection that their⁸ membership shall in no way affect [the question of the four-power]⁹ rights and responsibilities of the four powers and the related quadripartite agreements, decisions and practices.”

I am not recommending that you reopen this with Dobrynin but this is how it looks today.¹⁰

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 692, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. V. Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. Urgent; sent for information. Kissinger and Haig both initialed the memorandum indicating that they had seen it. The memorandum is largely based on the reporting in telegrams 14751 and 14756 from Bonn, October 28 and 30, respectively. (Both National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
2. See Document 379.
3. November 6.
4. October 28.
5. Bahr alerted Kissinger by special channel on October 26 that he might still need some help over the next several days in negotiating the four-power declaration. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany–Egon Bahr Communications) In a special channel message to Bahr on November 11, Kissinger regretted the delay in his response but remarked that “the acute problems relating to your agreement with the GDR and the four power declaration have all been satisfactorily settled.” (Ibid.)
6. Printed here in italics.
7. This is in place of “…” in the present US/Soviet text; the addition of “for Germany” is the key. The current Western text uses “American Sector of Berlin” at this point. [Footnote in the original.]
8. In place of “such.” [Footnote in the original.]
9. This alters the meaning by affirming that four power rights and responsibilities are not affected, whereas the Soviet text literally says that the question is not affected. Moreover, the Russian text could be translated “the problem of,” since the word for question and problem is the same. [Footnote in the original.]
10. Kissinger met Dobrynin at the White House from 10:20 to 11:58 a.m. on November 3 (except from 11:16 to 11:28 when he saw the President in the Oval Office); Kissinger then met Cromer from 12:02 to 12:12 p.m. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No other record of their meeting has been found.