Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

376. Telegram From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) in Paris¹

Washington, October 10, 1972, 1620Z.

TOHAK 26. Hold Until General Haig Arrives.

Assistant Secretary Stoessel just called me deeply distressed concerning a development in the matter of the proposed quadripartite declaration on Allied rights and responsibilities in Germany. It appears that at today’s Bonn Group meeting the British Ambassador there reported to his colleagues that Dr. Kissinger had informed Lord Cromer of the fact that we have been negotiating a text with the Soviets.² Hillenbrand, who had been informed by Stoessel of the situation, declined to comment on his British colleague’s remarks or to respond to the immediate requests by the three Western members of the Bonn Group that we “come clean” on what we have been doing. Hillenbrand feels that he cannot avoid reporting the episode by telegram to the Department of State, if only because the other members of the Bonn Group will be reporting to their governments as well. Stoessel, needless to say, is deeply worried that the Secretary of State will now discover the existence of the texts that have been exchanged with the Soviets as well as the fact that Stoessel has been involved in this exercise without informing the Secretary. Stoessel called to ask advice as to whether Hillenbrand should send his reporting telegram; he personally feels there is no alternative but is pleading that he be protected as regards his own involvement vis-à-vis Secretary Rogers.

As you may be aware this is one of the matters to which I have not been privy for a week, neither as regards to the latest language that has been exchanged nor as to who knows what.

The most immediate question is the Hillenbrand reporting cable and what Stoessel should tell Hillenbrand about that. (I told Stoessel I would report my conversation with him immediately but had no advice of my own until some word could be gotten from Dr. Kissinger.) The second problem is the protection of Stoessel.

Incidentally, I do know, since I have been involved to that extent, that Dr. Kissinger has informed Bahr of the fact that a text is under negotiation and indeed asked Bahr to tell Brezhnev that it was essential that a mutually satisfactory formula be worked out.³ To their credit, the Germans, at least so far, have not divulged their knowledge but with the British statement in the Bonn Group they will be hard put to keep quiet. Unless something has been said to the French that I am not aware of, they will then be the only ones who were not be informed.⁴

Since Stoessel is deeply concerned and also owes Hillenbrand some guidance, it would be extremely helpful if you could try to get some sort of word back here on a most urgent basis.⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 23, HAK’s Secret Paris Trip, HAKTO/TOHAK, October 7–12, 1972. Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig was in Paris with Kissinger for secret peace talks with North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho.
2. See Document 375.
3. See footnote 5, Document 374.
4. In message Tohak 29 to Haig in Paris, Sonnenfeldt reported: “Further to my message on the Four Power Declaration on Germany, the French Embassy in Washington has now begun inquiring at State and here concerning the report in the Bonn Group that Dr. Kissinger has been negotiating on a text with the Soviets. No response is being made to these inquiries from here.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 13)
5. In telegram 13865 from Bonn, October 10, Hillenbrand informed the Department that there had been “some discussion of contacts between the US and the Soviets” on the quadripartite declaration. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6) On October 12 Hillenbrand reported, however, that, on the basis of information received from the British Ambassador, “Soviets have conveyed certain views in Washington with respect to language.” Hillenbrand also asked for instructions. (Telegram 13941 from Bonn; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 692, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. V) In an October 12 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt suggested that Haig provide some “useful background” in a memorandum to Eliot; the Department would then draft a reply to Hillenbrand “which if sent immediately will probably not draw any further attention, since Secretary Rogers is in New York.” Although he disapproved this suggestion, Kissinger agreed to discuss the incident with Cromer. (Ibid.) Kissinger called Cromer at 3:40 p.m. on October 14: “K: Your ambassador in Bonn has a little problem. He stated that the four power group—. C: I thought he had—. K: And, you know, things I tell you shouldn’t go into those—. C: I’m extremely sorry about this, I don’t know what the hell happened. Quite honestly. And I apologize. K: Now, could he sort of square it away? C: Yes, what is the scenario going to be? Are they going to produce—. K: Well, we will produce whatever text they’ve agreed on, and the Russians will produce something, and let’s agree on something in common. C: Yes sure. K: I mean, all I wanted from the Russians was something that was close enough to what we had so that it could be negotiated.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 374, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)