243. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

[Omitted here is an extended discussion of foreign policy and domestic politics, including Vietnam, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty talks, and China.]

Kissinger: He’s [Rush] really got that Berlin thing moving. I’ll tell Ken to slow down a little bit, but that would be another feather. And there you might want to consider—it’s up to you, of course—whether we shouldn’t get Bahr to leak, when it’s done, what you did.

Nixon: Sure, of course.

Kissinger: Because then, in many ways—

Nixon: Yeah, I know. We did the whole thing, generally. I know.

Kissinger: And that will [unclear]—

Nixon: You know Bahr very well. Just tell him to leak it.

Kissinger: Oh sure, Bahr will leak it.

Nixon: We’re hosting a dinner for Brandt and everything. And we’re—

[Page 715]

Kissinger: Oh no, he’ll leak it all right if I tell him too. He may leak it anyway, but he’ll certainly leak it if I tell him.

Nixon: That the President personally intervened in the damn thing.

[Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam, China, and public relations.]

Nixon: Now as far as Berlin is concerned, we did it. And we’re going to—

Kissinger: We’ve got to leak that, because really that is a—

Nixon: Well

Kissinger: —if it sounds—

Nixon: When will it come?

Kissinger: It’s moving. Now we can—I’m slowing it down a little bit—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —just to get the summit.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: July, I think.

Nixon: All right. That’s got to be a presidential initiative too. I might announce it.

Kissinger: [unclear] Mr. President, I set up that procedure, on your instructions, on an airplane. I got Bahr invited to the moonshot in January—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: So that I’d have an excuse to see him—

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: I rode up on the plane with him to New York, and we worked out that whole procedure.2 And we’ve got a file this thick—

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: —of backchannel traffic to Bahr and Rush.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: And the Russians—

Nixon: That’s a hell of a job. I know.

Kissinger: And actually that was a trickier one, because we had another party involved, than—

Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: —than SALT. And that, now if that happens in July, we can say they had a Berlin crisis and we solved it.

[Page 716]

Haldeman: They had an escalating war; we brought it down. They had a missile—

Kissinger: The Berlin thing, actually, and the way it—

Nixon: The Berlin thing is really more important, really, in terms of world peace, than either the Mideast or in—in order of magnitude the least important is Vietnam. It never, never has risked world war.

Haldeman: Right.

Nixon: You know that. We all know it. I mean I’ve been making that speech for 20—for 10 years. You know it’s true. China’s going to intervene. Russia’s going to intervene. None of them will ever intervene. Second. The next is the Mideast. That has the elements that could involve the major powers, because it’s important. But compared in order of magnitude, the Mideast to Berlin, Christ, it’s light years difference. Berlin is it. Shit, if anything happens in Berlin, then you’re at it. Right?

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: That’s why Berlin is so enormous and also it’s more important to the Russians.

Kissinger: And, what we—

Nixon: The Russians would let, they’d let Egypt go down the tubes. They will never let Berlin go down—

Kissinger: And we got a number of very significant concessions out of them. For example, they had always insisted that we call—these are minor things—that we describe in the document—

Nixon: Uhhuh.

Kissinger:—Berlin as Berlin (West). We’ve insisted that they say the Western sectors of Berlin so that it shows—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —that, the Four Power responsibility. They’ve now accepted this.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: Secondly, which is more important: they had insisted all along on legal justifications that gave East Germany control over access.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: They’ve now accepted legal formulations in which they have the responsibility for access, which they never did even in the forties. That’s more than Truman or Roosevelt got out of them.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: And, under those conditions, the Berlin agreement— which I always told you we had to cut our losses—will actually be a small net plus on the ground. I would like to call Dobrynin to discourage [Page 717] him from, he’s going over to State today, from mentioning a Foreign Ministers meeting on Berlin.3

Nixon: Foreign Ministers?

Kissinger: Because it’s—

Nixon: Now, Bill did raise this point in this crazy meeting with—4

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: He can—

Kissinger: He can’t float it. It’s too cumbersome.

Nixon: Oh, it’s the silliest thing I ever heard of. Gromyko

Kissinger: I think that their high-level meetings, Mr. President, for this year and next they ought to be yours.

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the President’s prepared remarks on two occasions: to the corps of cadets at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point on May 29 and at the Annual Conference of the Associated Councils of the Arts in Washington on May 26.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation Between Nixon and Kissinger, May 28, 1971, Time Unknown, Oval Office, Conversation 505–18. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger in the Oval Office from 9:50 to 11 a.m. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. The time of the conversation, which was held in the Oval Office, is taken from Kissinger’s Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Haldeman, who briefly commented during the conversation, entered the Oval Office at 10:23 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
  2. See Document 172.
  3. Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed Berlin, the role of the Department of State and the possibility of a Foreign Ministers meeting, on May 24. According to the memorandum of conversation: “He [Dobrynin] said he had tested Hillenbrand and realized that Hillenbrand didn’t know anything about our channel. I [Kissinger] told him that it was really not very helpful to play these games—that he could trust me on giving him the correct information. Dobrynin then raised the question of whether at some point a Foreign Ministers meeting might not be helpful. I said that I thought a Foreign Ministers meeting, given the variety of channels, would be highly ineffective at this moment. If there was to be an agreement, it would be through the Falin/Bahr/Rush channel, and we should give that an opportunity to work. Dobrynin said he thought matters were going along rather well.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 2]) No record of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin on May 28 has been found. According to his Appointment Book, Rogers did not meet Dobrynin on May 28. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) Dobrynin, however, did meet Hillenbrand on May 28 to discuss Berlin and other matters but apparently did not mention the proposal for a meeting of Foreign Ministers. (Telegram 95355 to Moscow, May 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)
  4. Rogers met Nixon and Kissinger in the Oval Office on May 27 at 2:42 p.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) A tape recording of the conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Rogers, and Kissinger, May 27, 1971, 2:42–4:26 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation 504–13.