Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

242. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Berlin Negotiations: Status Report

There has recently developed an “umbrella of good will” in the talks (the term is from the Allied Ambassadors at the May 25 session).² And there has been an increase in the tempo—advisers meetings May 13, 22, 26 and 27—as well as press speculation that a breakthrough has been achieved. In fact, there has been some progress.

A fragmentary draft agreement emerged from the May 13 and 22 advisers meetings. Most attention was focused on the access portions, and so they are the fullest; a rough composite text (not containing anything on the Final Protocol) is attached at Tab A.³ This draft shows definite improvement over the Soviet text of March 26⁴ with respect to the directness and significance of a Soviet commitment on access in Part II. It also indicates some progress on the removal of objectionable features of the Soviet draft, particularly claims of GDR competence.

While he agreed generally with its content, Abrasimov at the May 25 Ambassadorial session did take away some of the improvements. He insisted that the access portion include the concept and term “transit,” as well as “generally accepted international practice or rules” (to his credit, however, Abrasimov did not resurrect the earlier Soviet line that international transit rules per se had to be applied to the Berlin access). Finally, he insisted on the need for observance (which in part he relates to spot-check inspection by GDR authorities) of GDR laws and regulations as a condition for unimpeded transit.

On the positive side, he offered to accept the Western nomenclature “Western sectors of Berlin” in place of the Soviet version, “Berlin (West).”

A general order of procedure has developed, and Abrasimov affirmed it in the May 25 meeting. The access issue has had a detailed review, and a fairly full document has been produced. Now, attention will turn to Federal presence, about which Abrasimov currently seems to be interested in Fraktionen and committee meetings and some formula on the point that Berlin does not belong to the FRG. There may be some hope for resolution of this issue if the Soviets will limit their scope of interest to these areas. The advisers are meeting on this issue at this time. Once general agreement is reached on presence, then the Soviets would consider the questions of entry into the GDR by West Berliners and representation of West Berlin abroad. Abrasimov made it clear that he was proceeding from the assumption that the question of Soviet interests in West Berlin would be discussed and agreed upon “in a binding form” together with the other parts of the agreement. (The last NSDM precluded this.)⁵

It is difficult to judge the ultimate significance of this fairly sudden switch by the Soviets, both in atmosphere and in substance. At any rate, Ambassador Falin, almost from the first day he arrived in Bonn, has methodically called on all the leaders (including Brandt) to press his line that the Soviets are willing to commit themselves on access and to guarantee the agreement, and that a Four Power agreement can thus be achieved very quickly. Gromyko gave the same line to Schumann in Moscow. During the senior Western meeting in London,⁶ Bahr reversed himself completely on the question of the “green light” to the German sides to begin their negotiations on access; now, he urges that the Four agree on the greatest degree of detail possible, so that his efforts with the East Germans can be kept to a minimum. Evidently, Bahr assumes that more can be gained now from the Soviets than later from Honecker.

On the Western side, too, there has been some concrete expressions of intent to develop, or at least not impair, the good atmospherics. Barzel’s decision (at Allied prompting) not to hold the CDU Fraktionen meeting this month in Berlin must have telegraphed to the Soviets that we were genuinely trying to be helpful. Similarly, the Allies have just decided to prohibit a secret meeting of the NPD Landesparteitag scheduled for May 29. The main concession was on our side, since we (unlike the French and British) have traditionally refused to ban meetings in Berlin except in extremes. This decision to ban the NPD meeting will also reinforce the Western position to the Soviets that we are prepared to take some sort of action against the NPD outside the framework of an agreement.

The level of overt optimism seems to be highest among the French ever since the Schumann visit to Moscow. (Recent Washington Post stories referring to breakthrough were in part stimulated by the French.) Judging by the performance of the French Ambassador at the recent session, Ambassador Rush suggests that the French now see their role as that of a broker between the Soviets and the other allies. Some of the comments of the French Ambassador indicated that the French and Soviets have had bilateral talks, particularly on the issue of the relationship between Bonn and Berlin (the French and Soviets seem to share the same formula, i.e., “West Berlin is not a part of the Governmental structure or territory of the FRG”), although the French pressed hard in the meeting for the need to have a positive statement also on the other links between Bonn and Berlin. We have also had an unconfirmed report that the French will insist at the NATO meeting to drop the direct Brussels communiqué linkage between a CES and the Berlin talks.⁷

It is fair to say that all the Western participants as well as the Soviets for various reasons now perceive an interest in bringing the talks to a successful outcome. Of course, the definition of “success” in the several quarters involved still differs. And just how much the situation in Berlin will in fact have been improved, whatever an agreement says, is a speculative matter, since the effect of the price we will be paying and of other developments in East-West relations can only be gauged over time. But that a piece of paper is now on the horizon can hardly be doubted.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 692, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum; an attached form indicates that the memorandum was “noted by HAK” on June 1.
2. This memorandum is based in part on the following Embassy reports on the May 25 Ambassadorial meeting: telegrams 932, 935, and 936 from Berlin, all May 26. (All ibid. RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
3. Attached but not printed.
4. See Document 201.
5. Document 225.
6. See Document 239.
7. See Documents 246 and 45.