239. Editorial Note
On May 17 and 18, 1971, senior-level officials from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and West Germany, including Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand and German State Secretary Bahr, met in London to discuss the status of the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin. In a memorandum to Hillenbrand on May 11, James Sutterlin, Country Director for Germany, maintained that the primary American objective in the meeting was a consensus that Allied negotiators should: 1) seek “pragmatic improvements” for the city; 2) avoid a settlement that might prejudice the Western legal position; and 3) continue to negotiate on the basis of the existing draft format while considering alternatives that would not compromise matters of principle. “In pursuing these objectives, he explained, “we will wish to make clear that the US side continues to be interested in a Berlin settlement and is by no means inflexible concerning its format.” Sutterlin added:
“We are particularly anxious to see the early initiation of German discussions. At the same time the other Three Powers should understand that there are two basic limits under which we operate: we are not prepared to enter an agreement which by implication or otherwise could prejudice the Western legal position; equally we cannot accept an agreement which could prejudice control of the Western sectors or the prospects of their further social and economic development. A summary of NSDM 106 as representing the views of the highest US authority should be conveyed to the meeting.” (National Archives, RG 59, EUR/CE Files: Lot 80 D 225, General Instructions, Tactics, Scheduling)
After a review of Ostpolitik on the morning of May 17, the participants in the senior-level meeting assessed the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin. Bahr began by declaring that it was now clear “that there would be no inner-German agreement on transport before there was a Four-Power agreement on Berlin access.” In spite of some contradiction with his previous position, Bahr maintained that it was “necessary for the Four Powers to close off this subject before it could be [Page 708] taken up by the two German sides.” On the issue of access, Hillenbrand stated that the United States sought “the maximum number of practical improvements.” “We were flexible on the specifics,” he continued, “provided certain basic criteria were met. Any agreement had to be in accordance with the principle that it contain visible improvements, and that it should encourage increased confidence in the viability of West Berlin. It should also be guaranteed by the Soviet Union to the maximum extent feasible.” Bahr countered that “in the end, the Four-Power talks might not achieve very much in practical terms no matter what was agreed on the issue of how civilian traffic should actually be handled in detail.” “We might come to a result where it was in effect not possible to achieve real practical improvements on access: it was impossible to create a corridor situation, as this would exclude every right of the East Germans to control traffic.” Although “no real evaluation of the possibilities would be possible until the inner-German talks began,” Bahr reiterated that “conclusion of a Four-Power agreement would not of itself assure practical improvements in Berlin access.” Allied officials, however, endorsed Bahr’s “three-column approach,” in which the Four Power advisers would attempt to distill neutral formulations from the Western and Soviet draft agreements on access and other matters. (Airgram A–525 from Bonn, June 3; ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL GER E–GER W)
During the morning session on May 18, Hillenbrand raised an issue on which “the U.S. seemed to have the strongest views”: Soviet presence in West Berlin. Hillenbrand reported that the Nixon administration had conducted an intensive review of its Berlin policy, leading to the issuance of a “basic paper,” National Security Decision Memorandum 106 (Document 225). Under NSDM 106, he explained, the United States might support a limited increase in Soviet presence, without any implication of official representation, but only as a last resort. “There was great reluctance in Washington,” he said, “to give any sign to the Soviets that we were willing to agree to any Soviet presence in West Berlin.” As for a Soviet Consulate General, Hillenbrand insisted that “this proposal went beyond the criterion of not permitting any activities in West Berlin which implied an official Soviet status there. The U.S. side was bound by this and it would require a Presidential decision to reverse this decision.” Although the issue was not primarily a West German concern, Bahr thought there was “some logic in the Soviet position.” “In the present negotiations,” he argued, “we had reached a point where all questions involving West Berlin for a considerable time in the future were under study. If we did not settle the problem of Soviet representation now, it could be asked when we would ever settle it.” Bahr later took another tack: “We should not tell the Soviets that first the three essential points [access, Federal presence, and foreign representation] must be dealt with, and only then Soviet [Page 709] presence. We had now reached the stage where all points should be under parallel discussion at the same time.” Hillenbrand, however, refused to budge: “The time had not come to go beyond a general statement on the issue in the talks. This might change, and change quickly. It might not be a matter of three or six months, but in any case for the time being we should hold the line fully.” (Airgram A–525 from Bonn, June 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER E–GER W)