Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

229. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, April 30, 1971, 1545Z.

5157. Subject: Chancellor Brandt Comments on Berlin Negotiations. Reference: (A) Bonn 5095;² (B) Bonn 5096;³ (C) Bonn 4637.⁴

1. Summary: In a conversation with Ambassador Rush on April 30, Chancellor Brandt expressed complete agreement with the Allied approach to the Berlin negotiations (reference B). Brandt seemed quite relaxed about the status of the talks and emphasized again that the FRG felt under no time pressure with regard to Berlin. He also agreed on the need for efforts to combat actions which give the appearance that there are differences between the Allies and the FRG over Berlin. Brandt once again supported the view that no progress could be expected in the Four Power talks until the Soviets were convinced they could not split the FRG from the Allies or the Allies among each other. Ambassador Rush also mentioned his recent conversation with CDU Fraktion leader Barzel concerning parliamentary meetings in Berlin. The Chancellor said he agreed with the approach the Ambassador had taken and was pleased that Barzel had agreed to cooperate (reftel C). End summary.

2. Ambassador Rush gave the Chancellor a detailed outline of Allied tactics for upcoming sessions as reported reftel B. He noted that we would concentrate on searching for practical improvements. The three Western Ambassadors would adopt the so-called “three column approach” of comparing the Western and Soviet drafts and then giving their views on what could be done to reconcile the differences on specific practical points. Legal arguments would be left aside. The Ambassador stressed the strong belief of the Allies that no minimum Western position sould be agreed upon. The likelihood of leaks would soon transform this into the maximum the Allies could expect to achieve. He also mentioned that in the next sessions, the Allies would avoid pushing terminology embodying explicit reference to Four Power rights. This seemed to be a sore point with the Soviets, and progress on practical improvements might be made easier if we did not raise the subject too often.

3. Brandt said he agreed wholeheartedly with this approach. The “three column” method provided a good way of proceeding, and it was also clear that no minimum position should be formulated. One thing which caused the Chancellor some hesitation, however, was the question of FRG ties to Berlin. He did not want this important subject, which did involve legal arguments, to be lost among the activity surrounding practical improvements. A Berlin agreement must include a reaffirmation of these ties.

4. The Ambassador assured Brandt that the Allies also considered reaffirmation of the ties to be a key element of any possible agreement. Since the Soviets were now disputing many of the ties which did exist, an explicit Russian statement recognizing them would in itself be a practical improvement. We considered these ties to be separate from legal arguments concerning the political status question, and would treat them accordingly in the negotiations.

5. A problem which continued to bother us, the Ambassador noted, was the unfortunate impression often gained from the press that there was a difference in emphasis between the FRG and the Allies concerning the Berlin negotiations. One often got the idea that the FRG was emphasizing the search for practical improvements while the Allies were more interested in legal and political status. Not only was this not true, but it also played directly into the hands of the Soviets, who were still trying to split the FRG and the Allies as a means of achieving their goals in the negotiations. The Ambassador reiterated his belief that until the Soviets were convinced that they could not split the Allies and FRG, there would be no progress in the Four Power talks. He said he had mentioned this subject to Bahr (reftel A), who had promised to pursue it within the German Government. The Ambassador hoped the Chancellor would agree with this point of view.

6. Brandt said he did agree and would look into what could be done. He also restated his support for the Ambassador’s analysis of Soviet tactics. He reaffirmed FRG support for a closely coordinated approach to Berlin and Eastern policy.

7. Ambassador Rush told Brandt that, with the agreement of his two colleagues, he had recently spoken to Rainer Barzel about upcoming CDU Fraktion meetings in Berlin (reftel C). He had noted that we considered the meetings completely legal and did not want to forbid them. It was, however, true that the meetings do have a negative effect and it was for the CDU to decide whether it might not be in the interest of all to hold up on meetings for the next months. The Ambassador noted that Barzel had agreed to postpone the meeting scheduled for May 7, but had said he was still committed to hold one in Berlin in 1971.

8. Brandt said he agreed with this approach and was pleased that Barzel had agreed to cooperate. He noted that Bundestag President Von Hassel had recently announced publicly that the May 7 meeting had been cancelled.

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, and Paris.
2. In telegram 5095 from Bonn, April 29, the Embassy forwarded an account of a meeting between Bahr and Rush, including the following summary: “Shortly after returning to Bonn from Washington on the afternoon of April 28, State Secretary Egon Bahr contacted Ambassador Rush and asked to discuss his trip and the Berlin talks as soon as possible. The talk took place on April 29. Bahr told the Ambassador he was very satisfied with the discussions he had had in Washington and was pleased at the agreement between the FRG and US on future tactics in the Berlin negotiations. Ambassador Rush reviewed for Bahr recent discussions by the Allied Ambassadors on the subject; Bahr again agreed with the tack which had been taken. Bahr also agreed with the emphasis placed by Ambassador Rush on the need to avoid the appearance of differences between the Allies and the FRG on tactics and goals in the Berlin negotiations.” (Ibid., POL 7 GER W)
3. In telegram 5096 from Bonn, April 29, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Ambassadors Rush and Sauvagnargues and British Chargé Richards, in which “they decided that the best tactics for the next series of meetings would be to inform Abrasimov in the May 7th meeting that they are willing despite the serious shortcomings of the Soviet draft which they will again emphasize, to attempt to see if it would be possible to reach compromise wording on the operative portions of Section II, having to do with practical improvements.” (Ibid., POL 28 GER B)
4. See footnote 2, Document 220.