228. Editorial Note
On April 26, 1971, Assistant to the President Kissinger met Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in the Map Room at the White House from 12:14 to 1:05 p.m. to discuss several issues, including the Berlin negotiations. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) The memorandum of conversation notes that Kissinger requested the meeting, which was “conducted in a deliberately businesslike and aloof manner,” and records the following discussion on Berlin:
“I then turned the conversation to Berlin and mentioned to Dobrynin my conversation with Bahr over the weekend. I said that the only way we could see of breaking the deadlock would be to redraft both documents and to remove the juridical claims from both versions. The documents would then retain the existing form, but would simply state the obligations and responsibilities of both sides but not the legal justification for it.
“If this approach was acceptable to the Soviet Union, we would introduce it at the Western Consultative Meeting on May 17th and, after that, draft a document accordingly. Falin and Rush could meet [Page 680] secretly to work out the details and possible compromises of the drafts, and Bahr would be prepared to join these meetings. This seemed to me the best way of making progress. Dobrynin said it seemed to him a reasonable procedure but, of course, he could not tell until he had seen some formulations. I said that Bahr would be prepared to give him the formulations on May 4th after consultations with Rush and Brandt. Bahr would give the formulations to Falin.
“Dobrynin asked whether Falin should take the initiative for a meeting or whether Bahr would. I said Bahr would take the initiative. Dobrynin, nevertheless, wondered whether I could give him on an informal basis some ideas of what we had in mind. I said I would try on a thinking-out-loud basis.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 1])
According to a handwritten note, Kissinger had with him the first paragraph of Rush’s message of April 25 (Document 227) on Abrasimov’s failure to request a private meeting with Rush. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1) Although the memorandum of conversation does not indicate discussion of the subject, Kissinger later reported (see the message to Rush below) that he gave “Dobrynin hell about Abrasimov.”
Kissinger briefed President Nixon on the Berlin negotiations during a meeting in the Oval Office that afternoon.
Kissinger: “I have worked out with Bahr, who was up at Woodstock—
Nixon: “Good.
Kissinger: “—and with Rush, a very intricate way of handling the Berlin problem, which I don’t want to bore you with, but which I really think now has a chance, and which has the other advantage of putting the control in our hands. It’s to take out all legal phrases and just talk about the facts, who will do what but not on what basis.”
Nixon: “Good.”
Kissinger: “And this has the great advantage that if they don’t play ball, we just tell Rush not to come to any meetings.”
Nixon: “Yeah.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation Between Nixon and Kissinger, April 26, 1971, 3:56–4:12 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation 489–17) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
On April 27 Kissinger and Dobrynin continued their discussion of Berlin at 3:30 p.m., meeting this time in the office of the President’s Military Assistant, Brigadier General James D. Hughes, USAF. According to the memorandum of conversation, Kissinger scheduled the meeting “to put before Dobrynin the general outline of our approach [Page 681] as it was developed between Bahr and me at Woodstock the previous weekend.”
“I told Dobrynin that if the Soviet Government agreed to the general approach, we would try to find juridically neutral formulations to introduce the substance of each section and to confine the negotiations on Berlin to the practicalities of access, Federal presence, and similar matters.
“Dobrynin said that he would have to transmit this to Moscow but, in principle, it seemed to him like a fruitful approach. I handed Dobrynin the German formulations since I was afraid that, if I undertook the translation, I would miss some words of art and because the draft had been prepared by Bahr. Dobrynin took the formulations, and there was some discussion as to whether they could be transmitted in the clear without indicating what they were, or whether there was some other way of transmitting them. I told him I would check and later called him to say that it would be better if they went in code.
“We then discussed general subjects. I told Dobrynin that our approach to Berlin should indicate our good faith in attempting to come to some understanding with the Soviets. However, we were struck by the rapidity of their responses on Berlin and the slowness of their responses on SALT. I said I understood that they had a great interest in Berlin, but our interest as a nation was relatively less. Dobrynin said this was true—that the Soviet Government would appreciate it very much if there were some progress on Berlin, and they would take it as a sign of our good will.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 2])
According to a copy of the “German formulations,” Kissinger did not give Dobrynin the full text, leaving out, for instance, specific provisions from both the Western letter on Federal presence and the Soviet letter on access. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [2 of 3]) For the full text, see Document 230.
On April 28 Kissinger sent the following special channel message to Rush on his recent meetings with Dobrynin:
“Because of many pressures, I have been slow in answering your telegram of April 25th [Document 227] and providing you with a résumé of my conversation with Dobrynin on April 26th.
“I agreed with Bahr that he go over with you the draft of the approach which meets the juridical formulations. If you agree, Bahr would then take up the neutral formulations with Falin as an illustrative approach. If the Soviets indicate to us that this is a possible approach, we then introduce it in the Western Four. Falin and you can then meet privately with the occasional assistance of Bahr. You would conduct most of the negotiations with Falin, while Dobrynin and I backstop on big issues. I outlined this general approach to Dobrynin and [Page 682] he agreed, subject to looking at the formulation. I also gave Dobrynin hell about Abrasimov.
“Can you tell me your reaction?” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1)
Rush replied by special channel on April 29:
“The procedure you outlined in your message of April 28 is, in my opinion, excellent and will enable us to operate effectively. I shall see Bahr this afternoon and discuss the matter fully with him. Your recent meeting with him has been helpful in ensuring that we three are in complete accord.
“Falin’s arrival in Bonn has been repeatedly postponed. Bahr informed me in early April that Falin would be here by April 15 at the latest, but he still has not arrived. Each week I receive word that he is expected the following week.
“I expect no major difficulties with the British or French in implementing our program of concentrating on practical improvements and bypassing to the fullest extent possible the questions of legal status and political position. As I mentioned in my last message, these practical improvements in themselves involve substantial issues of legal status and political position, but if the Russians really want an agreement we can, I feel sure, arrive at neutral language to cover this problem.
“I will keep you informed of any noteworthy developments.” (Ibid.)