Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

223. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 21, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with Bahr, Thursday, April 22

Bahr comes at a difficult time. The Moscow and Warsaw treaties are in limbo, the Soviets in the Berlin talks are threatening impasse, the inner-German talks are apparently fruitless, and the Czech negotiations are just beginning but not promising. Internally, a public split has surfaced between Brandt and Berlin SPD over the characterization of the Soviet draft agreement, and the CDU opposition is gathering itself together for attacks against the coalition both on foreign and domestic policy.

To set a framework for his talk with you, Bahr will probably wish to have your comments on your conversations with Barzel and Carstens.²

Note: Barzel told Ambassador Rush that, as a result of his Washington visit, he feels he is now in a position to insist within the CDU that the party maintain the earlier line of taking no final public position on the treaties and of attempting a bipartisan approach on the Berlin negotiations. He further said that he made his recent hard-line public statements against Ostpolitik in order to protect his position within the fraktion.³

The Berlin Negotiations. (A copy of the status report on the last Ambassadorial session is at Tab A.)⁴ The Western side severely criticized the March 26 Soviet draft text, and the Soviets have begun suggesting that the talks may have to be broken off. The Soviets appear to have decided to stand pat on their text—which is virtually totally unacceptable—in hopes that cracks will develop in the Western position.

In an effort to put the best possible face on this gloomy situation, Brandt recently publicly said that the Soviet draft contained “positive points of departure for the continuation of the negotiations.” Last week, in contrast, the Berlin SPD (itself bitterly divided into factions) called the Soviet draft “a certification of capitulation,” and found comfort in the assumption that the West would find the draft so unacceptable that it would not even be discussable.

The Bahr/Kohl Talks. These have passed—as far as Bahr has revealed—into low gear following Allied intervention early last month to prevent Bahr from tabling principles of a transit treaty which might have been exploited by the GDR to undercut the Four Power negotiations on Berlin traffic. Bahr may now only talk to Kohl about reciprocal traffic (but not about transit or Berlin traffic) until the Four Powers give the Germans the “green light” to discuss Berlin access.

The Senat/GDR Talks. These resumed again following the Berlin elections and the absence of Easter passes. The GDR’s negotiating aim is to press the Senat for a general settlement on visits, thereby preempting the Four Power negotiations on this. The GDR also links this with a cessation of FRG political activities in Berlin (selling the same horse several times).

We have had virtually no reporting recently of Bahr’s comments on any of these negotiations. His silence may indicate that he has been preparing some new scheme or formulations and will wish to reveal them to you. It is possible that he will claim that the Federal Government is not able politically to be more forthcoming yet on Federal presence. (Note: Barzel told Ambassador Rush that he would postpone the CDU fraktionen meeting in Berlin from May 5 to some other date later in the year.) To prevent a total breakdown, Bahr may argue that some new arrangement must be made to permit the Germans to begin access negotiations, perhaps based only on a vague Four Power consensus that there should be “improvements” on access. He may have made some side deal with his GDR negotiating partner, Kohl, which he may feel has promise. Alternatively, Bahr may urge that the Allies offer the Soviets something on Soviet presence in West Berlin, a point on which the Soviets have placed increasing importance.

On all these issues, you may wish to

• —seek his assessment of how the various talks can move forward, and what the effects would be if they all remained stalemated;
• —ask him about the apparent split within the SPD (Berlin/Bonn) over the Berlin talks, and what the Government planning is for the Moscow treaty and handling of the CDU.

Bahr will probably wish to compare notes with you about the Soviet Party Congress, particularly Brezhnev’s comments on the Moscow treaty and Berlin.⁵ You may wish to ask him about the situation within the GDR, perhaps including the Soviet counselor’s comment that Ulbricht will step down in June.

Bahr may also wish to discuss some arrangements for the Brandt visit scheduled for June.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. IX. Secret. Urgent; sent for information. An attached form indicates that the memorandum was “noted by HAK” on April 22.
2. For an account of Kissinger’s meeting with Barzel on April 14, see Document 219. A memorandum of his conversation with Carstens on April 16 is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. IX.
3. See Document 220.
4. Document 222.
5. See footnote 5, Document 220.