Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

220. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bonn, April 18, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

• Rainer Barzel, CDU Fraktion Chairman
• Ambassador Rush
• Jonathan Dean

BARZEL’S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Discussion with the President and Barzel’s Future Tactics

In addition to the points he made on the CDU Fraktion meetings in Berlin and his general tactical posture following his Washington trip reported by telegram,² Barzel described for the Ambassador his discussion of Berlin and Ostpolitik with the President.

Barzel said that, in order to place this discussion in perspective, he would first have to refer briefly to his talk with the President at San Clemente six months ago.³ At that time, the President had indicated to him that he was concerned by two possible developments in Germany in connection with Brandt’s Eastern policy. These were that there should be no fragmentation of the opposition which could have serious consequences in so important an ally as the Federal Republic, and that the polarization of German positive-negative opinion over Eastern policy should not take on such dimensions as to place in jeopardy the postwar achievement of a stable German political system. At that time, the President had thanked Barzel for his contributions in this regard. The San Clemente discussion had confirmed Barzel’s similar views on this subject and he had continued to emphasize in CDU policy the essential tactical application of these considerations embodied in his position that the CDU should not take a final position on the FRG-Soviet treaty until the whole Eastern policy could be reviewed as one package and particularly until after a Berlin agreement had been reached.

Barzel said he had maintained this position in the interim, but he had been confronted with an increasingly difficult situation from CDU moderates like Hallstein and Birrenbach to which he had felt obliged to respond by tightening up his own position. He could deal with the CSU in this regard but not so easily with more serious-minded elements in his own party. He had been concerned about his future capacity to hold the line in this matter and it was for that reason that he had, as the Ambassador knew, requested an interview with the President.⁴

Barzel said that, when he had been received by the President on April 14, the latter had mentioned Berlin at the outset of the conversation. The President said he was guided by two main principles on the Berlin negotiations, that the FRG ties with the Western Sectors should continue unimpaired and that the GDR not be given a dominant position on civilian access to Berlin. The President had said he was flexible on other points but these were major principles for him. The President had reiterated his concern about German domestic developments and had thanked Barzel for his continued constructive position. He had repeated his earlier view that the final German position on the FRG-Soviet treaty was primarily German business and that it was for the German political system to determine. But Berlin was US business.

Barzel said that as a result of this interview he felt confirmed in his earlier policy that the CDU should not take a final position on the FRG-Soviet treaty until all the returns were in.

Barzel asserted that in the week before Easter he had come close to a decision to attempt to bring down the Brandt Government on Eastern policy. He had heard authoritatively that a top leader of the SPD, who is not a member of the Federal Cabinet, (Barzel did not specify, but he obviously had in mind Herbert Wehner) had told a meeting of the top SPD leadership that Brezhnev’s remarks on a Berlin solution and treaty ratification at the 24th CPSU Congress⁵ meant that the Federal Government would have to decide to dissolve the link it had made between a Berlin agreement and a ratification of a Soviet treaty. Barzel said he had sought out Scheel on April 8 to discuss this subject. He had told Scheel that he would give him the choice between adhering with this SPD position and accepting a CDU effort to bring down the government or taking action to reaffirm the linkage, in which case Barzel would merely send up a warning rocket in the form of a newspaper interview to which the government might respond with a reaffirmation of its position. According to Barzel, Scheel had chosen the second alternative and matters took place in the way arranged. Barzel claimed this was the first CDU/FDP agreement on the matter of substance since the 1969 election.

Barzel said he believed that now that the Soviets had tabled their Berlin position in writing and deliberately leaked mention of its content, they would find it difficult for prestige reasons to change their position. In view of this fact and the firm US position he had encountered in Washington, he did not believe a Berlin agreement in the near future was probable. But he thought the Allies would wish to negotiate further and this was in his view correct. The existing situation would make it possible for him to maintain his tactical line on the Moscow treaty and on Berlin and to avoid all-out confrontation over this issue. As far as he was concerned, he preferred to conduct foreign policy aspects of the 1973 election campaign against the background of a situation where Berlin negotiations were still going on and a ratification of the Moscow treaty had not yet been accomplished than against the background of failed Berlin negotiations and a rejected ratification. This would avoid a German confrontation with the Soviets which could do harm to the Western policy.

In a discussion of Soviet-Chinese relations, Barzel said he did not adhere to the theory that one of the Soviets’ main interests in their current Western policy might be to free their rear in order to permit them to deal more effectively with the Chinese problem. Barzel thought that, to the political leadership of the Kremlin, which was after all the same leadership which had decided on the Soviet invasion of Prague in 1968, the risks and damage to the overall Soviet position of a policy of actual détente with the West would appear considerably greater and more immediate even than their grave problems with the Chinese. Ambassador Rush said he found this reasoning interesting. He thought the Soviets nonetheless might have an interest in improving their own situation within Eastern Europe through a convincing demonstration in the form of the FRG-Soviet treaty and related negotiations that Germany, the one country in the West that might really question the postwar set up in Eastern Europe, had formally accepted it.

1. Source: Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, JDean—Memos of Conversation, 1971. Secret; Limdis. Copies were sent to Hillenbrand, Sutterlin, Rush, and Fessenden. The meeting was held in the Ambassador’s Residence.
2. Telegrams 4637 and 4638 from Bonn, April 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12–3 GER W and POL 1 EUR E–GER W, respectively) As reported in telegram 4637, Barzel agreed, at the request of the Allied Ambassadors, to postpone a meeting of the CDU parliamentary party group in Berlin.
3. Barzel met Nixon at San Clemente on September 4, 1970; see footnote 7, Document 115.
4. Regarding Barzel’s request for an interview with Nixon, see Document 189.
5. For the full text of Brezhnev’s speech at the party congress on March 30, see Pravda, March 31; for excerpts from a German translation, see Meissner, ed., Moskau– Bonn, Vol. 2, pp. 1331–1332. Kissinger assessed the speech in a March 31 memorandum to the President, including the following analysis of Brezhnev’s remarks on Germany: “As expected Brezhnev defends the German treaties as a major breakthrough, ‘confirming’ the inviolability of borders. He notes the division in Germany over these treaties, but insists that they must come into force ‘more rapidly.’ He also states that ‘the problems connected with West Berlin must also be settled’ and forecasts that they will be settled if the Four Powers proceed from ‘respecting Allied agreements, which determined the special status of West Berlin,’ as well as respecting the sovereign rights of the GDR and the interests of the West Berlin population. There could be a nuance here reflecting recent talks in our channel.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XII)