Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

222. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 21, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Berlin Negotiations: Ambassadorial Session of April 16

The 18th meeting of the Four Ambassadors amounted to little more than a formal presentation by the Western side of detailed criticism of the Soviet draft agreement of March 26, and predictable Soviet expressions of surprise and disappointment. There was no substantive advance. We have received no report of the Ambassadorial luncheon conversations (which typically have been livelier than the formal meetings), presumably because nothing of significance occurred.²

French Ambassador Sauvagnargues led off the Western commentary, making the following points:

• —the Soviet draft does little more than propound the Soviet thesis since it: (a) refers implicitly to a separate quadripartite status for West Berlin, (b) contests the authority of the Three Powers in West Berlin, and (c) affirms the complete sovereignty of the GDR over access and inner-Berlin communications;
• —the entire balance of the draft is distorted, with precision offered only in areas of Soviet interest and vagueness and absence of commitment on areas of Western interest;
• —the question of Soviet presence in West Berlin should not be included within the agreement itself.

The British Ambassador discussed the provisions relating to access and inner-Berlin improvements. His main point was that the text contained no commitment about access by the Four Powers, together or separately, and the FRG/GDR agreements are given priority over the Four Power agreement, thus elevating the role of the GDR above the Four.

Ambassador Rush spoke to the issue of Bonn/Berlin ties, and concluded the Western presentation:

• —the treatment in the Soviet draft of the Bonn/Berlin relationship was almost exclusively negative, and encroached on the authority of the Three Powers;
• —the Soviet proposal on representation abroad attempted to replace present valid arrangements which were unacceptable and beyond the scope of the agreement;
• —in general, the Soviet text systematically prejudiced fundamental elements of the Western position; the differences between the two sides are clearly major and substantive, not merely drafting differences.

Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov, of course, claimed that the March 26 draft contained all the elements for rapid conclusion of negotiations, and so he was surprised at the Western assertion that it contained no basis for moving forward. After quoting Brezhnev’s comment on Berlin at the party Congress,³ Abrasimov responded to the Western points by general comments, e.g., the Soviets have no intention of establishing a Four Power status for West Berlin, the West must accept the reality of the GDR sovereignty over access, etc. He alleged that the March draft included language relating to a Soviet responsibility for transit. This assertion is baffling since no such language exists and Abrasimov himself failed to point to any specific language. For some reason the Western Ambassadors did not try to determine what Abrasimov was talking about.

Abrasimov said he could accept the Western proposition that the issue of Soviet presence in West Berlin could be handled outside of the agreement—as long as it was done simultaneously and in accord with Soviet proposals.

The Ambassadors agreed to meet again May 7.⁴

The day after the Ambassadorial session, the British in Berlin met informally with the two Soviet advisers who commented that the Western failure to take note of the “positive” aspects in the Soviet draft would create a very bad impression in Moscow. The Soviet advisers claimed there seemed little point in going on with the talks since the Allies made it clear they were not willing to do anything positive about Soviet interests, particularly about a consulate general in West Berlin. (While the Soviets have stressed their desire for a consulate, they have not previously raised that issue to this central importance.)

The Soviets also privately approached some US representatives with essentially the same suggestion of an impasse. The Soviet Counselor said that the time was soon coming when the talks should be brought to an end, with or without results. He later told us that the Soviets had gone as far as they could in their March 26 draft, and that their hands were tied (implying by the GDR). He saw no way to move forward, and suggested that the Four advisers had nothing to work on.

Paralleling the private talk of stalemate by the Soviets, the Eastern side has engaged in a major propaganda effort to demonstrate the reasonableness of the Soviet/GDR proposals (in part to counter the general negative assessment of the Soviet draft which has appeared in the Western press). The Poles published portions of the Soviet draft which was immediately echoed by the GDR press. In Geneva, visiting Polish Vice Minister Winiewicz gave Leonard⁵ a hard sell on Berlin, arguing that the Poles had published the Soviet text because it was important to get on the public record the significant concessions the Soviets had made. (The Poles no doubt hope in this way to erode the Western precondition regarding Berlin for a European security conference. Undoubtedly they acted with Soviet connivance.)

It seems clear that the next sessions of the Ambassadorial talks will be increasingly rigid and sterile, with the Soviets playing hard to get— continuing their hints of an impasse and a possible break-off of the negotiations. These hard Soviet tactics are probably based on a Soviet hope of obtaining some Western concessions and cracks in unity, as well as unnerving the FRG. A slightly different motivation for the Soviet hardlining may be that they are in fact locked in with the GDR, and wish to ride out the next several months until Ulbricht cedes his party post to Honecker—as the Soviet Counselor suggested recently.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Berlin, Vol. 3. Secret. Sent for information. According to another copy, Downey drafted the memorandum. (Ibid., Box 691, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. III)
2. An account of the quadripartite meeting on April 16 was forwarded in telegrams 691, 694, and 695 from Berlin April 16, 17, and 17, respectively. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6) During the discussion at the Ambassadorial luncheon on April 16, Abrasimov insisted that, under the terms of the Soviet draft agreement, Moscow was committed to “seeing that the GDR authorities carried out their own agreements while the Western side would do likewise vis-à-vis the FRG.” (Telegram 4809 from Bonn, April 23; ibid.)
3. See footnote 5, Document 220.
4. In a May 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reported that the Ambassadorial meeting the previous day “went about as expected.” Sonnenfeldt thought the talks would remain a “fruitless exercise” until the Western side defined its advocacy of “practical improvements” more clearly. “Nevertheless,” he continued, “it appears that the opening is now there for the Bahr approach of deemphasizing legalities and concentrating on practical results. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets agree to this. Since Bahr has had some recent contact with the Soviets through his clandestine channel, and now that Falin is in Bonn, it may be that Bahr has already worked out this new approach with the Soviets. Abrasimov’s easy agreement to the three-column exercise suggests he was prepared and instructed about it in advance.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Chronological File, 1969–75, Box CL 13) The highlights of the meeting, upon which Sonnenfeldt based his account, are in telegram 827 from Berlin, May 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
5. James F. Leonard was the U.S. Representative to the U.N. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva.
6. In an April 21 memorandum to Kissinger, Fazio elaborated on this report: “In reply to a question about the significance of the change in the pecking order of the GDR delegation to the Soviet party congress, the counselor of the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin told a U.S. Mission officer that Honecker clearly would succeed Ulbricht, perhaps at the SED party congress in June. The Soviet said he would not be surprised if Honecker succeeded to Ulbricht’s job as party chief, keeping only the titular position of head of state. The Soviet counselor proceeded to laud Honecker for his intelligence, ability and good health. Honecker has gradually eased into an increasing number of daily and representational functions, and is now leading the SED delegation to the Bulgarian party congress in Sofia (to which Brezhnev is leading the Soviet delegation).” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 32, President’s Daily Briefs, April 17–30, 1971)