Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

191. Letter From the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Sutterlin) to the Political Counselor at the Embassy in Germany (Dean)¹

Washington, March 10, 1971.

Dear Jock:

Now that two sets of German talks have begun the question of when and how the green light can be given by the Four Powers for these talks to cover Berlin matters has become obviously more urgent. This is a subject to which you allude in your letter of March 4² and it is one with which we have been much concerned back here. It is rather difficult to send out official instructions for the moment because we are still in the process of dealing with NSSM 111.³ As I think I may have explained, the Senior Review Group met on February 10 to consider the rather lengthy paper which had been prepared setting forth the various alternatives on the major issues in the Berlin negotiations.⁴ The meeting amounted pretty much to a dialogue between Henry Kissinger and Martin Hillenbrand. Henry expressed again his general apprehensions concerning the negotiations but he did not take specific issue with any of the alternatives which we had defined. The only decision reached was that the paper should not go to the NSC but that instead a shorter memorandum should be prepared for direct submission to the President. This has now been done and I will be sending you a copy once it goes to the White House.⁵ While options have now been eliminated and the whole approach considerably simplified the question of the requirements for the initiation of German negotiations on Berlin matters is still covered. Under the circumstances we think it better to await the President’s approval of the memorandum before sending official instructions.

Meanwhile I thought it might be useful for you to have my general thinking on the subject. The following paragraphs were prepared in the event we had decided to send a telegram.⁶ They have Martin Hillenbrand’s concurrence but would no doubt be subject to consider able revision in the process of clearance in the Department. Therefore I think you should view them as simply reflecting my personal views but with some expectation that parts of them may appear later in official instructions. Needless to say your comments, and those of Brewster Morris, would be welcome and of value. I have left the numbers on the paragraphs since I thought they might provide helpful points of reference.

1. We have noted the further discussion among the Ambassadors and in the Bonn Group (Bonn 2615) and we concur with US rep’s statement reported in final para that we are seeking a Four Power or Soviet commitment with real content and believe we should be prepared to accept delays in giving signal for German talks in order to achieve it.⁷ Since, however, this places heavy responsibility on the Three Powers who must define and bring about the conditions which will permit German discussions we think it is desirable to look ahead now and reach a clearer understanding on the Western side of the minimum Soviet commitment we can accept and see if alternatives exist in the event this minimum cannot be achieved.

2. We feel that realistic account must be taken of two factors:

(a) It is unlikely that the Soviets will give us all we want, particularly in terms of Soviet commitment on details.

(b) Despite present assurances to the contrary the FRG and Senat are likely to grow restive if German talks are delayed indefinitely because Western Powers hold to maximum requirements as represented by the Western draft. In this connection we think it important that if Berlin negotiations fail, FRG and Senat should first have had an opportunity for direct discussions with GDR in order to avoid any belief that they could have done better than Three Powers if given the opportunity.

3. Four Power or Soviet commitment on access and inner-Berlin communications seems to us embodied both in Part II and in the Final Agreement of the Western draft text. If Soviets will agree in advance of German negotiations to annex German instruments to quadripartite understanding and “see to it” that measures foreseen therein are applied they would be undertaking an important commitment even if Part II is substantially reduced. From tactical point of view disadvantage of commitment largely embodied in Final Agreement is that it would leave GDR free to pursue obstructive tactics in German negotiations and would involve USSR less directly in responsibility for unhindered access.

4. If, on other hand, Soviets can be brought to agree to something close to present Part II this would constitute in itself clear Soviet commitment. Achievement of this would reduce the importance of the wording of the Final Agreement and would have the tactical advantage of tying the GDR down before the German talks begin. For this reason we believe emphasis which is being placed on Part II in quadripartite talks is wise. If, however, Soviets will not agree to present Part II we believe acceptable course would be to try for a balance between Part II and Final Agreement which would constitute adequate Soviet commitment and involvement even though it might be less than ideal from tactical point of view of keeping GDR in check. This tactical consideration rests in any event on assumption that GDR will be tougher negotiator than Soviets. We are not entirely convinced that this distinction is valid but if Germans become impatient we see no reason why they should not have opportunity to disprove it provided essential Soviet commitment is obtained.

5. Illustrative of what we have in mind as satisfactory balance between Part II and Final Agreement would be:

(a) Reduction of Part II to para A(1), B(1) and C.

(b) Retention of Annexes I, II and III.

(c) Rewording of final clause of second para of Final Agreement which now reads “will see to it that these measures are applied” to read “will use their influence to ensure that these measures are applied.” Many other combinations are conceivable which could provide the Soviet commitment which is essential and yet offer hope of Soviet acceptance. We have provided this formula only as an example of what we have in mind. This kind of approach was discussed at the last senior level meeting.⁸ We believe Bahr was not inaccurate in recalling general agreement at that time that quadripartite agreement on principle in access field could be limited to statement that access should be unhindered and on a preferential basis provided the Final Agreement incorporated the results of German negotiations into the Four Power agreement and included Soviet acceptance of responsibility for implementation.

6. Above considerations suggest to Department the importance of engaging Soviets in serious negotiations on Final Agreement and giving full weight to its possible importance in discussing with German authorities when and how we can give green light for German negotiations.

7. With reference to para 3 Bonn 2516,⁹ we believe that a distinction can be made between access and inner-Berlin communications in terms of the Soviet commitment required to permit German talks to begin. The Berlin Senat for a good many years has negotiated directly with GDR on Berlin matters, most notably—but not exclusively—on pass agreements. The Three Powers specifically approved the pass agreements. The Soviets were not directly involved. In the US view this did not constitute Western acknowledgment that East Berlin is part of the GDR. We take the position that there was no other authority with which the Senat could effectively negotiate on passes than the GDR but, given the continued validity of quadripartite agreements, this did not imply that East Berlin was part of the GDR. To follow the opposite argumentation would raise the question of why we have approved the current Senat/GDR pass talks, for which, as in the past, there was no specific quadripartite authorization.

8. We see the situation as somewhat analagous to the Western position on FRG/GDR negotiations on access. We say that the FRG should conduct such negotiations even insofar as West Berlin residents and goods are involved. Our position does not imply that West Berlin is part of the FRG, but rather that the FRG is the only authority which can effectively negotiate with the GDR on this subject.

9. We conclude from this that while tactically it is desirable to obtain a Soviet commitment on inner-Berlin improvements, the initiation of Senat/GDR negotiations without a Soviet commitment or a specific quadripartite authorization would not imply anything different from previous and current Senat/GDR negotiations which we have approved. This, in the Department’s view, permits the Western side more flexibility in determining the prerequisites for such discussions than FRG/GDR discussions on access and it is preferable not to equate the two.

10. For present we believe we should continue to seek to obtain Soviet agreement on Part II and on Final Agreement sections of Western draft before authorizing Senat to enter broader discussions with GDR than on passes. If there is long delay, however, we would be prepared—in interest of achieving pragmatic improvements—to consider resort to a special communiqué which by its wording would clearly involve USSR in responsibility for Berlin (see para 3B(2) of State 180421).¹⁰

Jim

1. Source: Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, Incoming/Outgoing Letters 1971, JSSutterlin. Secret; Official–Informal. Copies were sent to Rush, Fessenden, and Boerner.
2. A copy of the letter is ibid., JD Correspondence, 1971.
3. Document 156.
4. For the SRG meeting and the “rather lengthy paper,” see Documents 176 and 175, respectively.
5. See Document 216.
6. No such telegram has been found.
7. As reported in the final paragraph of telegram 2615 from Bonn, March 5, Dean stated at the Bonn Group meeting on March 4 “that in discussing the desirability to provide a Four Power green light soon for discussion by the Senat and by Bahr it should not be overlooked that what we were primarily interested in was not merely a signal for these negotiations to begin but a Four Power or Soviet commitment with real content. If it were necessary to negotiate longer with the Soviets to achieve this, then we should be fully prepared to accept delays in giving the signal.” The German representative replied that this statement “accorded completely with the German approach.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)
8. Reference is to the meeting of senior level officials in Bonn, November 17–18, 1970. See Document 137.
9. Reference should be to telegram 2615 from Bonn, March 5, which also reported a meeting of the three Western Ambassadors on March 4. In the discussion on coordination of the Four-Power negotiations with the Bahr/Kohl and Senat-GDR negotiations, French Ambassador Sauvagnargues argued that “the Germans should not move in either field of negotiations until there were agreed four power rules covering their area of negotiation.” Paragraph 3 reads: “Ambassador Rush said he in general agreed. However, we could not cut down our requirements merely for the purpose of issuing statements intended to sanctify inner-German negotiations. It would be better to negotiate deliberately and to continue to delay the FRG as necessary. We could not abandon our position as regards the Senat-GDR negotiations that the Soviets continued responsible for East Berlin under a general four power structure. If we allowed the Senat, which was our agent, to enter into an agreement with the GDR without the cover of a four power or Soviet commitment, the Allies themselves would be accepting by implication GDR authority over East Berlin. Moreover the GDR could withdraw any concession made and we would have no redress but to accept it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)
10. In paragraph 3B(2) of telegram 180421 to Bonn, November 3, 1970, the Department stated that a “more positive communiqué” for the Ambassadorial meeting on November 4 “should be dependent on Soviet acceptance of a draft which would place the German discussions clearly within the framework of the Berlin Four Power talks.” (Ibid.) See also footnote 5, Document 135.