Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

176. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

• SRG Meeting, NSSM 111: The Four Power Berlin Negotiations

We have had 14 meetings of the Four Power Ambassadors, stretching for almost one year. The talks have not evidenced much meeting of the minds on substance. The immediate standstill in the negotiations has been eased with the tabling of a Western draft agreement.² But, as the Soviets begin to counter-propose, the talks will soon again deadlock.

The Western side seems to have little idea of the full extent of its position: we are not sure how far the FRG will be willing (or able, given the domestic tensions) to reduce its presence in West Berlin, and we are not sure how little we can accept from the Soviets and still consider an agreement satisfactory. In short, we seem to be muddling through, without much idea of how far we can travel.

The main purpose of the SRG meeting therefore should be: to examine the scope of flexibility of our ultimate position and to set guides for the next phase of the talks. State is quite prepared to continue within the framework of the guidance they wrote for themselves in the basic position paper,³ as supplemented by NSDM 91.⁴ This meeting will consider only the first part of the NSSM (on the negotiations);⁵ the second part of the NSSM is a broader study, keyed to the alternatives of the success or failure of the talks, and will be considered later.⁶

There are several basic issues which should be treated at the meeting. (The paper contains a great host of issues and sub-issues with alternatives for each.)

I. What is it that we hope to get out of the talks?

A. First of all, of course, is improvements of access. But what does this really mean?

• —In the German view, the access for the past 20 years has generally been satisfactory (not that it could not be smoother and faster), except for the major harassments which occur periodically. To remedy this, one has to get the Soviets to accept a certain standard of Bonn/Berlin ties and Federal presence. Once that is achieved, there will be no need for harassments, and perhaps minor improvements can be worked out over time.
• —In the US view, we should obtain “pragmatic improvements” which will permit access to flow more smoothly. These should be evident and confidence-building, e.g., sealed trains, elimination of visas, etc. Yet in the negotiations we have insisted that the Soviets agree to a question of principle: that access be unhindered and preferential and on the basis of identification not control. Moreover, we have insisted that this principle be embodied in a Four Power agreement.

• —Not only have we insisted on principle, but also we have demanded that the Soviets agree with us the details of the practical improvements, and only then are we prepared to permit the FRG/GDR negotiations to begin. Thus, in our objective we seek “practical” improvement, but in our tactics we insist on Soviet concessions to our legal theory.

  One of your tasks, therefore, will be to sort out exactly what we must have on access.

• —Can we not accept a unilateral Soviet statement as long as it contains the unhindered and preferential language?
• —Is it really necessary for the Four Powers to pin down the specifics of the practical improvements, or can we let the Germans begin their talks at an earlier stage?

B. Little attention has been given to the inner-Berlin improvements, essentially access by West Berliners into East Berlin. One of our publicly stated objectives is to achieve some practical improvements here. The Soviets have implied that this issue can be resolved (by the GDR and Senat), but have offered no details. The Western side does not seem to have been pressing this, perhaps having been lulled into a false security by the Soviets.

One aim of the meeting should be to find out the pros and cons of turning over to the Germans the negotiations of this issue, on the assumption that the results will return to the Four Powers. The US paper states that there is no objection on the Western side to having the Senat negotiate with the GDR on this, and that the exact level of improvements should be left up to the German side. Thus, we should energize these negotiations, rather than leave them for the end at which point we might be faced with hard demands and be forced to accept them or to scuttle the entire agreement.

C. Perhaps the most important basic point is that we must obtain a Soviet guarantee, and not rely on a GDR guarantee or on the contractual relations between the FRG and GDR, or GDR and Senat.

• —The reason we have insisted on a Soviet commitment on access principles is to gain that Soviet guarantee. Yet, we have also insisted— though there has not been much discussion—on the Four Powers guaranteeing to each other the implementation of the entire agreement, including the inner-German agreements which will specifically be incorporated.
• —The question is whether this final guarantee (which would also cover the inner-Berlin communication agreement worked out between the GDR and Senat) is more valuable to us than the commitment on access principle, which can never match the fullness of our inherent legal theory on Four Power access responsibility and therefore must derogate from it.
• —Thus, you should probe to determine the (1) implications of reducing our demands on Soviet access “principles” and specifics, (2) getting the two sets of German negotiations under way (FRG/GDR for access, and GDR/Senat for Berlin communications) as soon as possible—as long as we (3) obtain agreement now that the Four Powers will guarantee the implementation of the entire agreement, including any German agreements.

II. What is it that we can offer the Soviets?

A. Federal Presence. We have told the Soviets right from the beginning that the Federal activities in West Berlin could be reduced in exchange for some practical improvements in access and inner-Berlin communications. The Soviets have probably expected more than we have offered them so far—and consequently may believe that we are deliberately holding back our concessions either because we are extremely tough bargainers, or because we want to deadlock the talks (they may believe we want to wreck Ostpolitik).

The Soviets have for their own part raised the ante. By staging major autobahn harassments over the last several months using as a pretext a series of Federal activities which heretofore had slipped by with the mildest routine protests, the Soviets are in effect saying that we should offer concessions in order to prevent the autobahn situation from getting worse.

The FRG has so far been willing to offer only very little (in fact, there would be little change in the physical presence or current level of Federal activities in Berlin under the proposals already made to the Soviets). We are in an awkward position: negotiating an agreement for Berlin at the original insistence of the FRG, relying on concessions offered by the FRG, and at the same time being accused sub rosa of deadlocking the negotiations.

We have been correct so far in not applying pressure on the FRG to reduce its presence in Berlin. Were we to do that and the talks failed, the full weight of blame would be thrown to us. But, we must know the full extent of the FRG position—else we will never be in a position to know whether we can reasonably expect the talks to fail or succeed. At the same time we must recognize that the FRG position is still probably in a very fluid state, subjected to the various pressures produced by the domestic political tensions; to that extent, the “full”FRG position may not be “knowable.”

Therefore, one purpose of the meeting will be to discover whether there is some method of impressing on the FRG that we must have knowledge of their full position, without at the same time increasing the risk that the onus will be placed on us, and that we will then be drawn into internal German politics.

B. Soviet Presence in West Berlin

For years the Soviets have desired to increase their presence in West Berlin, both for the practical reason of making it easier to extend their influence there, and for the theoretical motive of enhancing their claim of West Berlin as an independent political entity. The Western powers have always resisted, though the British have traditionally inclined to permit increased Soviet presence.

The Soviets introduced this issue into the Four Power negotiations very slowly and in a low key. But, increasingly, they have placed greater weight on it, perhaps to offset the little they now expect on Federal presence, or perhaps simply because the British have tipped them off that there is disunity on the Western side over this issue.

Of first priority is to secure a common position on the Western side.

• —We have held out for a limited Soviet increase in return for a reciprocal increase (from zero) in Allied presence in East Berlin. Our Allies have virtually laughed at us.
• —The British have gone to the other extreme, and might even be prepared to accept a Soviet consulate general in West Berlin, perhaps in exchange for some sort of Soviet acknowledgment of Federal representation abroad of Berlin.
• —The French and Germans remain in the middle.
• —Thus, you will want to ensure that we determine if there is any possibility of obtaining our position, and if not, let us get in line with the others.

Western clarity and unity on this issue is important, since it may become our main bargaining chip. It is also the only issue which is almost unencumbered by a proper German role—though it is possible that the Soviets will begin to work on the Germans to get us to agree to a sizeable expansion in return for a benefit for the Germans (FRG representation).

III. What you can hope to get out of the meeting

There is virtually no interagency divergence on the Berlin problem. Only on the question of Soviet presence will Defense and CIA have much to say (and that will be a hard line). Aside from that, Berlin has been a State show. State has resisted even a White House role in the negotiations, and prefers to rock along on their own.

Thus, the very existence of the meeting will be useful to get State in touch with your views, to get State thinking ahead, and to insert a greater White House role.

The most important single result of the meeting should be to get the IG/EUR to prepare two draft treaties, representing our intermediate position and our rock bottom positions in terms of the minimum improvements we can accept and the maximum concessions we can make. In addition, the IG/EUR should provide an assessment of the implications of each of these two drafts. Only with this knowledge can we be in a position to estimate whether there is hope for the talks, or whether we are in a pointless exercise and had better start planning to abandon it.

The SRG meeting will probably—and properly—focus on the conduct of the negotiations. Much of the discussion will necessarily have to be tactical in nature. However, you may wish to have in mind the broader context into which the negotiations rest. This will be covered in the second part of the NSSM study due soon. In the meantime, the following thoughts relate to the possible effect of a Berlin settlement on our relations with the Soviets and on the course of détente politics in Europe:

It is well within the scope of Soviet policy to make the minimal concessions on Berlin that would make an agreement attractive to many in Bonn. We cannot be sure that this is the direction the Soviets will move. There are factors concerning their position in Eastern Europe and in the GDR that may argue against moving too rapidly in the direction of a European “détente.”

If, however, the Soviets do decide to reach an agreement on Berlin, then probably they will have also decided to embark on a détente phase in Europe of some intensity. The West is virtually committed to a European conference if Berlin is resolved. Little of the substance of such a conference will have changed. The result could be some relatively meaningless agreements on nonuse of force and the establishment of some “permanent organ” to handle MBFR.

For our part we should bear in mind how this course of events in Europe may also redound on other major issues, SALT and the Middle East negotiations. If Berlin is the first of these issues to break there may well be an increased pressure in this country, and within this Administration, for a SALT agreement on whatever terms appear easiest to obtain, e.g., a separate ABM agreement.

It is for these reasons, as well as persuasive internal German factors, that I continue to feel we should remain in the background rather than in the forefront of the Berlin negotiations, at least for a while longer. Of course, we must know where we are going in these negotiations, and the SRG meeting is for this purpose. It still should be up to Bonn or the Soviets, however, to decide how to break the deadlocks. Thus, waiting until after the Soviet Party Congress before we take any initiative on our part would seem advisable.

This would be consistent with your view that the US as such has very little to gain from the Berlin negotiations, and in the end will be forced to share the burden (and potential blame) for a concession and a course of events in Europe that could be highly uncertain and, indeed, dangerous if it moves to another Czechoslovakia or competitiveness for the nationalist mantle in Germany. Since the issues are of greater immediate concern to the Germans, we should not be the ones to force the pace or the issues.

The point of all of this is that if the Soviets can make a decision to agree on Berlin, then we may enter rapidly into a period of détente politics in Europe. We should be thinking how to handle it, not only in SALT, but in relation to a possible summit meeting, which might become a more lively question following any agreement on Berlin.

1. Source: National Security Council, Senior Review Group Files, Box 96, SRG Meeting 2–10–71, Berlin Negotiations. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The NSC staff also prepared talking points for the meeting as well as an analytical summary of the discussion paper. (Both ibid.)
2. See Document 173.
3. See Document 65.
4. Document 136.
5. Document 156.
6. See Document 175.