Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

135. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 4, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Status of the Berlin Talks as of November 5, 1970

The Four Ambassadors met November 4 in Berlin.² The meeting was held against the background of increased Berlin-related activity: Gromyko’s visit to Frankfurt, the East German approach on October 29 in Bonn, and a fairly intense meeting of the four advisers on October 30.³

At today’s meeting there was a predictable improvement in atmosphere (Abrasimov went out of his way to be affable), but little advance on substance. The Allied side presented the Soviets with a suggested text outlining views on access (Tab A) and on the Bonn-Berlin relationship (Tab B), while the Soviets gave us their paper on Federal presence in West Berlin (Tab C).⁴ Serious consideration of the three papers was put off until the next advisers meeting and ambassadorial meeting, November 14 and 16 respectively. Abrasimov again observed that the Four Powers should concern themselves only with general principles and leave the details to the Germans. Fortunately, the Allies (the French in the lead) insisted that any intra-German discussions on practical measures had to be handled within the framework of the Four Power responsibilities and under their auspices, and that Four Power commitments on access had to be precise and unequivocal with the general principles directly tied to the details.⁵

With respect to inter-German talks, Bahr on November 3 sent a telegram to East Berlin noting that he is ready to begin an exchange of views (as Brandt had told Bertsch, the GDR emissary), as soon as he learns who has been appointed head of the GDR delegation.⁶ The FRG has made it clear to us that at least initially Bahr intends only to exchange views rather than conduct negotiations, and that any talks relating to Berlin must be under the auspices of the Four Power talks. When Berlin access issues are discussed they will be geared to culmination in one single FRG–GDR agreement, despite the Soviet notion that there should be two sets of discussions and agreements, one between the FRG and the GDR, and the other between the Berlin Senat and the GDR. The Western Allies have taken the view that any Senat GDR discussions can be only on the questions relating to inner-Berlin traffic (West Berlin access to East Berlin), and then only as experts of the Four Powers.

During the coming weeks we will probably see Soviet efforts to have the German access discussions begin without adequate Four Power cover (complicating Allied/FRG relations), continued insistence that two sets of German access talks be undertaken (complicating FRG/Berlin Senat relations), and demands that the Four reach agreement on Federal presence in West Berlin prior to any detailed agreement on access matters. At the moment, the Western side seems fully aware of these potential difficulties, and firm in opposition to them.

In a related development, on November 3 Barzel issued a press statement which spelled out his view of the ingredients of a “satisfactory” Berlin solution (Tab D).⁷ These include

• —access safe from disturbance under Allied responsibility;
• —guarantee that West Berlin will continue to belong to the FRG in accordance with the existing ties (including political ties), Federal presence in Berlin, and foreign representation of Berlin by the FRG; and
• —removal of discriminating measures against West Berliners in intercity movement.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 690, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. II. Secret. Urgent; sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum indicating that he had seen it. According to another copy, Downey drafted the memorandum. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 9, Chronological File, 1969–75, 11 Oct–20 Nov. 1970)
2. A detailed account of the Ambassadors’ meeting is in telegrams 1663, November 4, and 1668 and 1669, both November 5, from Berlin. (All in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
3. A detailed account of the advisers’ meeting is in telegrams 1637 and 1638 from Berlin, October 30, and telegrams 1640 and 1641 from Berlin, October 31. (All ibid.)
4. Tabs A, B, and C, attached but not printed, are telegrams 1664, 1665, 1666 from Berlin, respectively, all November 4. Other copies are ibid.
5. In a memorandum to Kissinger on November 5, Sonnenfeldt also reported on the Soviet proposal to issue a positive communiqué after the Ambassadors’ meeting, “expressly to be of help to Brandt in connection with the Hesse elections on November 8.” Rush argued that “communiqués should only follow definite progress and not anticipate it, and that this session had not made definite progress.” According to Sonnenfeldt, since the British and French Ambassadors agreed to a positive text, “Rush felt he had to give in.” In a marginal comment, Kissinger wrote: “Why—let’s ask [British Ambassador John] Freeman informally. Maybe I better do it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 690, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. II) In a telephone conversation on November 14, Kissinger told Freeman: “John, as long as I have you on the phone. This is not an urgent matter. In the meeting of the Berlin Ambassadors they were discussing two texts. One you favored and the other was favored by the Soviets. While I do not pay much attention to the Berlin talks I was interested in knowing why you felt the way you did. The Soviet position and text seemed to me to more moderate that the one you supported. I am interested simply for my education.” After Freeman promised to “do some backreading” of the relevant cables, Kissinger continued: “We have no displeasure or anything. I am just curious how you felt obliged to do it. Our and your analysis seem to be the same on these things.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 364, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
6. For an excerpt from the telegram, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 3, p. 1901, footnote 3.
7. Tab D is telegram 12844 from Bonn, November 3, attached but not printed. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)