Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

122. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State¹

Berlin, October 1, 1970, 1646Z.

1443. From Ambassador Rush. Subject: Berlin Talks: Next Phase. Ref: Berlin 1437, Berlin 1435,² Berlin 1434.³

1. I consider it important that we make a determined effort to make real progress in the current Four Power talks, and that urgent consideration be given to steps we on the Western side might now take to accomplish this.

2. In view of our discussions yesterday with Ambassador Abrasimov, and particularly his definition of the three principal Soviet interests in Berlin—the banning of NPD; the cessation of Bundestag meetings; and the elimination of FRG offices, I would like to have the Bonn Group consider the following possibilities: (a) banning the NPD in Berlin (In the past, while the French, the British and the Germans were prepared to ban the party in Berlin, we on the American side were not. However, in the present context, it would, in my opinion, be desirable to reverse the American position, particularly if by so doing, we could produce sensible progress in Berlin.); (b) surfacing our proposal for the cessation of constitutional functions in Berlin by Federal Republic constitutional organs; (c) dealing with issue of the Federal offices in a way that protects them but also eliminates them as a point of contention. One way to do this may be to state that the Western powers remain supreme in the Western sectors; that they have the right to determine the ties of the Western sectors with the Federal Republic; that while the FRG does not govern the Western sectors, it continues to have important social, economic, cultural and other ties with them; that while Federal offices do not have governing responsibilities, they carry out essential functions connected with the Allied responsibility for assuring the viability of the Western sectors of Berlin. It may also be desirable to tell the Soviets that we remain prepared to give serious consideration to any reasonable Soviet grievances connected with these offices.

3. If we can do this at our next meeting, we will not have given away anything fundamental, but we will have demonstrated to the Soviets our readiness to deal fairly and equitably with their legitimate problems. In turn, we will put the burden on them to begin to meet our requirements. I therefore would like to have these propositions discussed urgently and in depth by the Bonn Group to be able to move the talks along at the October 9 meeting.

4. I would also appreciate Department’s approval ASAP.⁴

Morris

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn and to Belgrade for Hillenbrand.
2. Both dated October 1. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 1434 from Berlin, September 30, the Mission reported: “The main development was an unexpected request by Abrasimov who had earlier explained that his absence at the UNGA in New York would make it impossible to meet again before October 30, to meet instead on October 9 on the basis of intensive preparation by subordinates.” The Mission further commented that the change in schedule “indicates that Abrasimov feels himself under some pressure to move towards more rapid development of the negotiations and represents an important procedural shift on his part.” (Ibid.) For a German summary of the September 30 meeting, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 3, pp. 1671–1675.
4. The Department and Hillenbrand, who was in London, subsequently approved these recommendations. (Telegram 163300 to Bonn and telegram 8102 from London, October 3; both in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) In telegram 1519 from Berlin, October 9, the Mission reported that Abrasimov, who served as chairman for the Ambassadorial meeting that day, adopted an uncompromising stance. “This, without doubt, was the toughest and tensest session thus far. There was heated debate. Western Ambassadors held firm line.” (Ibid., POL 38–6) For a German summary of the meeting, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 3, pp. 1731–1737.