Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

123. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, October 12, 1970.

GERMAN EASTERN POLICY AND BERLIN

I. Eastern Policy

1. Background

The present period is one of important change in Europe. Patterns of political thought and organization to which we have become accustomed in the postwar period have become less firm. The Eastern policy being implemented by the Brandt Government is both the result of these changes and a major stimulus for further change. US interests are directly affected because of our continuing responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole. Equally important the future role of Germany will determine in many ways the strength of the Western Alliance and the nature of East-West relations both of which touch directly on our own security. We have made broader negotiations in a Conference on European Security directly dependent on progress in the negotiations which the FRG has been conducting and in the talks which the Three Western Powers are holding with the USSR concerning Berlin.

The Brandt Government has signed a treaty with the USSR on the renunciation of force and is seeking to complete similar agreements with Poland, the GDR and eventually Czechoslovakia and the other Eastern European countries. Previous German governments led by CDU Chancellors have sought to reach constructive understanding with the USSR. What is new in the present Government’s policy is its decision to seek to normalize relations with the East on the basis of formal acceptance of the present status quo in Europe—that is acknowledgment of the existence of two German states and recognition in all but the strictest legal sense of existing borders including its own border with the GDR.

2. Objectives of Brandt’s Eastern Policy

A. Short Term

• —A regularized modus vivendi with the GDR to permit easier communication between East and West Germany.
• —Greater political influence and trade in Eastern Europe.
• —Assurance of the indefinite continuation of the present status quo in Berlin and of more secure access arrangements. —The prestige to be derived from an active dialogue with Moscow.

B. Long Term

• —Cultural, economic and social unity for the German people even though political unity is not possible.
• —A gradual opening up of Eastern Europe and a loosening of Soviet domination which will permit a new European peace order marked by the disappearance of military and ideological confrontation in Europe.

The intention of the Brandt Government in seeking these objectives is not to change the strategic balance between East and West. The FRG’s commitment to NATO, its support of the EC and its partnership with the US are to be maintained. The extensive and ever-growing economic ties between the FRG and the US and its EC partners will, in any event, serve to bind the FRG to its Western associations.

3. The Underlying Assumptions

A decisive development in Brandt’s thinking was the Berlin Wall. The inability of the West, particularly the United States, to prevent the Soviets and East Germans from this move convinced Brandt that the United States, either alone or with its Allies, could not be expected to bring about a solution of the German problem. Brandt concluded further that strategic parity meant acceptance of the status quo in Europe by the United States. This status quo would not be changed by Western strength. His current policy is a logical extension of the policy of “little steps” he developed after the Wall was built which foresaw German initiatives for small improvements in relations with East Germany and the other Communist European countries.

Also important in Brandt’s thinking are the following assumptions:

• —The Western Alliance built on the US deterrent strength has been and remains essential to the security of the FRG and West Berlin.
• —US experience in Asia and domestic trends in America make it inadvisable, however, to rely entirely on alliance with the United States as the sole long-range basis for German security.
• —In any event only the FRG can bring about a satisfactory solution of the German question.
• —The FRG is in a better position to encourage such a solution by reaching a modus vivendi with the East while a strong American presence remains in Europe since a firm foundation of Western strength is prerequisite for negotiations with the East.

4. The Prospects

German Eastern policy offers the following attractions to the USSR and its allies:

• —Official German acceptance of the status quo in Europe.
• —Greater access to technology and economic resources in the West.
• —The prospect of greater influence in the FRG and Western Europe.
• —Reduction of a potential cause of tension at a time of conflict with Communist China.
• —An enhanced long-range prospect of loosening FRG ties with the West, weakening the Alliance and impeding the development of a politically integrated European community.

In connection with this last point it must be noted that Moscow’s flexibility is limited by its strategic requirement to maintain Soviet forces in East Germany and by its political requirement to maintain a Communist regime in power in East Berlin. The Soviet Union cannot at this time tempt the FRG with any real prospect of reunification or change in the political system in the GDR. Under the circumstances Moscow’s present objective may be not to entice the FRG away from its ties with the US and NATO but simply to reach sufficient understanding to suggest there is a slight bit of light on the horizon and that the FRG would be well advised to keep options open for the future, i.e. not become too integrated into a Western European community.

The attractions for the Communist side and the objectives of the FRG are obviously not the same and in some cases are in direct conflict. Each side, however, probably sees enough opportunity to attain its objectives—and such disadvantages in turning back—as to make further progress likely. But in assessing the prospects that the Eastern policy will be fully implemented the following impediments need to be kept in mind:

• —The East German regime needs to isolate the GDR from the influence of West Germany rather than to encourage the improved communication between East and West which the FRG desires.
• —Brandt’s domestic political base is fragile.
• —Implementation of the policy is dependent on a satisfactory solution in Berlin and this has been extraordinarily difficult to achieve in the past.

5. What Lies Ahead

The status quo ante cannot be restored. It is possible that the total package of treaties with the USSR, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia and a quadripartite understanding on Berlin will be realized or that at some point difficulties will arise which will prevent its full accomplishment. In either event, however, the status of the GDR will have been substantially enhanced.

In the first eventuality the following corollary developments can be expected:

• —The GDR will be accepted as a full-fledged member of the international community and the Western Powers will have to take this into account in preserving their position in West Berlin.
• —The concept of Four Power responsibility for Germany as a whole will have less meaning than at the present.
• —A Conference on European Security will take place and the atmosphere of détente in Europe will increase.
• —The residual fear of the USSR will decline.
• —A thinning out of troops in Europe will be encouraged.
• —Increased German influence will be a factor for change in Eastern Europe.
• —The USSR will find it more difficult to prevent some further loosening up in that area, particularly in terms of bilateral and multilateral contacts with the West.
• —American defense and political support may seem less essential and US influence can be expected to decline.
• —Cooperation between England and France as insurance against an overly independent Germany is likely to grow.
• —For reasons other than Eastern policy, economic integration of the European community can be expected to deepen as well as the economic interdependency of the Atlantic world thus providing additional strong ties between the FRG and the West. (The latter could be weakened by a trade war or an American return to isolationism.)

The difference in Europe three to five years hence if German Eastern policy is realized only in part is likely to be primarily a matter of degree. The trends will be the same because they stem from the assumptions underlying German Eastern policy more than from the policy itself.

6. Potential Dangers

The objectives of German Eastern policy are compatible with US interests in Europe. The policy does, however, entail the following potential dangers which must be taken into account:

• —Agreements between the Federal Republic and its Eastern neighbors which seem to provide a tolerable solution of the German problem and reduce the level of tension in Europe could lessen the defense efforts of the Alliance, including US willingness to maintain a strong military presence in Europe.
• —Should this take place Western Europe would become more vulnerable to Soviet pressure with a resultant trend toward military neutralization.
• —Eastern policy may fail to produce the objectives sought by the FRG particularly insofar as a loosening up in Eastern Europe and a lessening of the ideological confrontation between the two Germanys are concerned. Increased popular frustration within the FRG might result, leading to the conclusion that progress can only be achieved through a more independent policy separate from the Western Allies and to internal instability which could prejudice the democratic system in West Germany.
• —German preoccupation with the East could deprive the EC of the German leadership and initiative needed for progress in integration and expansion.
• —An enhanced status of the GDR could weaken the Allied position in West Berlin and make more difficult the task of the Allies in resisting intensified Communist pressure, should this develop.

In short there is at least a theoretical possibility that Eastern policy, even if fully implemented, will not achieve the goals of the FRG but will nevertheless prejudice the Western defense structure, European integration and the Western position in Berlin.

7. American Options and Requirements

Given our own efforts to find areas of agreement with the USSR, including the current SALT talks, it would be extremely difficult to oppose in principle the efforts of the Brandt Government to normalize relations with the East. It could not be done without a deterioration in relations with the Brandt Government which could have lasting and far-reaching adverse effects on our ties with the FRG. This option therefore seems unrealistic. There remain two possibilities:

(a) We can continue to afford general support for the objectives of German Eastern policy, while avoiding, to the extent possible, endorsement of details and tactics, taking such restraining action as may be necessary to preserve quadripartite rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole.

(b) We can extend more comprehensive endorsement to the policy and perhaps take a more direct complementary role. We could, for example, publicly announce that the treaty with the USSR does not, in our view, remove the need for a peace settlement, thus making Bundestag approval more likely.

The advantage of option (a) is that it minimizes our involvement in German internal politics and places full responsibility on the German Government for the resolution of the German problem which it is seeking. It permits us to intervene if quadripartite rights or the status of Berlin are endangered. The disadvantage is that it permits the suspicion that the United States is doubtful about the Brandt Government’s intentions.

If the second option were chosen relations with the Brandt Government would become more cordial. Brandt’s domestic position would be strengthened and the prospects for implementation of the various treaties foreseen under the Eastern policy would be increased. The disadvantages would be: (a) our involvement in domestic German affairs would become more direct; (b) relations with the opposition would become strained and might be difficult to restore in the event the CDU won the Chancellorship; (c) greater US support would remove a restraint from the Government and could result in more precipitate and radical actions which would contribute to a polarization of political opinion in Germany; and (d) in the event that Eastern policy fails to produce the desired results part of the blame, at least within the opposition, would rest with the United States.

On the whole the first option appears more advantageous than the second. Whichever is chosen, however, the Brandt Government will continue its efforts to implement Eastern policy and we will face both the advantages and possible dangers entailed therein.

A great deal of the tragedy and failure connected with German foreign policy in the period between Bismarck and Adenauer can be traced to the inability or unwillingness of the German Government to attain a stable relationship with its neighbors. Success of German Eastern policy would be dangerous mainly if it resulted in a destabilization of Germany’s relations with the West. Paradoxically the main danger of its failure would be a feeling of frustration which could result in internal instability and more radical initiatives which could also lead to a kind of self isolation by the FRG.

To discourage the potential dangers entailed in both success and failure the main requirement is to ensure the continued existence of defense and economic communities on which the FRG can depend and where it will enjoy respect. It is not likely to sacrifice a reliable security association and any feelings of frustration in the East will be mitigated if a dynamic Western environment offers a field for more fruitful initiative. This means, in the context of present developments that we should:

• —Maintain a relationship of confidence with the FRG leadership, whether SPD or CDU, so that it will have trust in the security and political assistance we can afford. This will entail full respect for the FRG’s sovereignty and continuing evidence of our willingness to rely on the FRG to take full account of Western interests in its dealings with the East.
• —Stabilize the US presence in Western Europe over the next three to five year period. This will ensure during a period of rather fundamental change sufficient continued deterrent to discourage the Communist side from any temptation to take advantage of these changes to renew pressure on the West. It will also eliminate any underlying German assumption of early US troop withdrawals and thus decrease the need for haste on the German side in the implementation of German Eastern policy. Most importantly it will reassure the FRG’s leaders that the Alliance of which they are part will endure and remain effective.
• —Achieve a long-range and effective system of economic burden sharing within the Alliance. This should place a continued US troop presence on a sounder basis, reduce pressure in the United States for withdrawal of American forces, and thus increase European confidence in the continued effectiveness of the American commitment and of the Alliance deterrent.
• —Support the further development of the EC and encourage the further expansion of trade between the US and Western Europe.

II. Berlin

1. Relationship to Eastern Policy

The United States initiated its participation in the Berlin quadripartite talks on the assumption that the current status of the city was satisfactory but that specific improvements, primarily in civilian access to the FRG and in intersector travel and communications, could be sought from the USSR in exchange for some reduction of the FRG presence in the city. German Eastern policy initiatives have changed the situation.

The Brandt Government has stated that ratification of the treaty with the USSR must attend a successful outcome of the Berlin talks. At the same time, the West Germans have specified that Soviet acknowledgement of Bonn-Berlin ties and improved access are essential elements in a successful outcome. This nexus between the Moscow treaty and the Berlin talks has created an opportunity for the Western Powers to exploit the presumed interest of the USSR in treaty implementation to seek their objectives in Berlin. At the same time, the Western Powers have been placed in a position where lack of agreement in Berlin would open them to the charge of frustrating German Eastern policy.

A further new element is the enhancement of the status of the GDR, entailed in the FRG’s Eastern policy, which could increase Allied difficulties in maintaining the security and viability of the city. The enhancement of the GDR raises the questions whether some changed status for the Western sectors of Berlin should be sought in the negotiations and whether this is the appropriate time and place to seek additional assurance for Berlin beyond the improvements originally contemplated.

2. Choices for the Outcome of the Berlin Talks

Although there are several theoretical possibilities in the outcome of the current talks, the basic choice is between concrete improvements within the framework of the current de facto status of the city and some broader solution. We could:

• —Continue to offer the USSR some limited reduction in Bonn’s political presence in Berlin in exchange for improved access arrangements, greater circulation and communication possibilities in and around Berlin, and Soviet acknowledgement of the ties between West Berlin and the FRG. This outcome, if it could be obtained, would entail no modification in our interpretation of the legal status of the entire city, as derived from wartime victory and reflected in quadripartite agreements. One detriment is that an agreement of this kind, unless the assurances on access were substantial, would provide no new Soviet or East German commitment to respect the quadripartite status of Berlin and would not greatly strengthen the Western position in the event of subsequent pressure from an enhanced GDR. Another is that it might fall short of the wishes of the Germans, particularly if overt Soviet acknowledgement of Bonn-Berlin ties is not forthcoming. The FRG might refuse to concede important elements of their presence unless this were obtained.
• —Seek a broader agreement which would accept the Soviet thesis that only West Berlin is subject to three (actually four) power authority, whereas East Berlin is the capital of the sovereign GDR. An additional element might be an enhanced Soviet or East European presence in West Berlin. Under this solution, West Berlin would receive new guarantees from the USSR (and presumably the GDR).This sort of outcome would cost us prima facie our largely barren right to demand free access to East Berlin for our military and diplomatic personnel. The degree of satisfaction to the FRG would depend on the amount of association, if any, between Bonn and West Berlin which the USSR could be led to acknowledge. Such a solution would make it easier for the FRG and the Western Powers to recognize the GDR and establish diplomatic representation in East Berlin. On the other hand, it would terminate the historical legal basis of Berlin and substitute a new contractual relationship based on Soviet (and perhaps East German) agreement. While it could be argued that a newer Soviet agreement would be a positive result, such a solution might make it psychologically more difficult to reassert Allied rights in the future if these were subsequently put to a new test. Geography would leave the Communists in a position to influence or even to determine events in West Berlin, whereas the Western concessions would be irrevocable. Lastly, such a solution would in itself further enhance the GDR.

Either type of agreement would leave our commitment to West Berlin and the responsibilities we bear for its defense unchanged.

3. Tactics

Our tactics to date have been to propose a number of specific improvements, while at the same time exploring whether any meeting of Western and Soviet positions in principle would be possible. At the most recent session (October 9) the Soviet representative responded with a formulation suggesting that the USSR is demanding an outcome along the lines of the broader settlement referred to above. He insisted that the Soviet side would not agree to discuss any practical arrangements to facilitate access or intersector relationships unless the West would agree that West Berlin alone is the subject of the negotiations.

This Soviet position had not been stated so boldly before and it may be a tactical move. We propose to probe them further, possibly in New York, to ascertain whether this is indeed a fixed demand. This can be done by proposing to discuss practical improvements which, while not requiring a specific Soviet endorsement of our principles, would improve the situation of Berlin and could implicitly confirm our general case as well.

If probing shows that the USSR intends to insist that we acknowledge that West Berlin is a separate political entity we will have to decide in consultation with the FRG, France and the UK whether we should

• —accept the Soviet option and seek as many pragmatic improvements as we can obtain in exchange for the attendant risks in an implicit change in Berlin’s status;
• —reject the Soviet option but continue in contact with the Soviets in an effort to find a mutually acceptable means of achieving improvements utilizing such possibilities as discussion between the GDR on the one hand and the FRG or Berlin Senate on the other as a supplement to quadripartite talks.

If the impasse continues, at some point the question of whether or not to break off negotiations may arise; our problem will be to do this under such circumstances as to avoid any possibility of a growth of a myth that we actually toppled Brandt’s Eastern policy by using the Berlin lever.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, EUR/CE Files: Lot 80 D 225, Bonn Group Study, Nov 23 1970. Secret. Drafted by Sutterlin and Skoug. The paper was a revision of a paper originally prepared for discussion by the NSC on September 15; the meeting, however, was postponed. On October 12 Jeanne W. Davis, NSC Staff Secretary, circulated the revised pages to serve as the basis for discussion at the NSC meeting on October 14. (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 EUR E–GER W) Copies of the original version are ibid. and ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 684, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VII.