121. Editorial Note

On September 29, 1970, the Soviet duty controller at the Berlin Air Safety Center informed his British counterpart that an area centered on the town of Rathenow in East Germany would be closed to air traffic for 2 hours the following day, effectively closing two of the three air corridors into West Berlin. Noting that this action coincided with the next session of the Ambassadorial talks on Berlin, the U.S. Mission in Berlin argued that the “Western powers cannot afford to allow precedent of accepting such closures to be established.” The Mission recommended, therefore, that the Allies probe the affected area with military aircraft during the period of closure. (Telegram 1407 from Berlin, September 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–9)

The Department replied that “highest levels” had approved this recommendation, including issuing a “stiff démarche” to Pyotr Abrasimov, the Soviet Ambassador in East Germany, at the upcoming meeting. (Telegram 160778 to Berlin, September 30; ibid.) Abrasimov, however, refused to accept the démarche since he “knew nothing about the issue.” If such action were taken,” he insisted, “it must have been taken by middle echelon officials and certainly without his authorization.” (Telegram 1432 from Berlin, September 30; ibid.)

In a September 30 memorandum to President Nixon, Kissinger analyzed possible Soviet motives behind the incident:

“There are several angles to the Soviet announcement. First of all, the action strikes an ominous note on the very day that Berlin negotiations resume. Soviet willingness to engage in such pressure raises a question of whether they are as interested in serious negotiation as they intimated early this month to Ambassador Rush. In this connection it may be indicative that Yury Zhukov, the Soviet journalist who was recently visiting Bonn, took a strong line that the German-Soviet treaty should be ratified before Berlin agreement and would facilitate Berlin [Page 340] agreement, whereas we take the position that ratification depends on a satisfactory Berlin outcome. Thus, Soviets may be increasing various pressures to force treaty ratification without Berlin’s commitment. At the same time, harassment of sensitive air corridors, if continued beyond this minor probe, raises tensions and threatens the fate of the treaty in Bonn.

“It is possible that the meaning of this Soviet move is in a wider context. For example this could be their way of replying to publicity over the Soviet ‘base’ in Cuba. In this vein, the pinprick in Berlin is an obvious reminder of Soviet capabilities to counter any moves of ours in the Caribbean with their own pressures elsewhere.

“The Soviets gave no specific reason for the closure, though their pretext presumably is the beginning of Exercise Comrade-At-Arms. This is scheduled to last until October 20. Thus we could face an extended period of temporary closure or other harassments, depending on the Soviet reading of our response.” (Telegram WH 01947 from McManis to Haig in Naples, September 30; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 26, President’s Daily Briefs, September 18, 1970–Sept. 30, 1970)

In another memorandum to the President on September 30, Kissinger reported on the outcome of the Allied probe:

“In agreement with the British and French, four probes were scheduled in the air space over Rathenow, East Germany this morning. The first aircraft, a British plane, landed in Berlin with the pilot noting no reaction. The second aircraft, a U.S. plane, also landed in Berlin with no apparent reaction. Because of the negative reaction, a second British flight was cancelled. The French probe did not get off of the ground because of mechanical or operational problems. Communications intelligence indicated no abnormal tracking of the flights.” (Ibid.)

During a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York on October 16, Secretary of State Rogers protested Soviet harassment of the Allied air corridors to Berlin. Rogers described his protest in a telephone conversation with Kissinger 2 days later. According to a transcript, the discussion of Berlin was as follows:

“R: Interestingly enough, I don’t know whether the telegram shows this or not because I had a private meeting with him—about an hour. But on the—he got a little tough and I responded in kind and then he calmed down and I calmed down and he talked about the air corridor.

“K: That didn’t come across.

“R: He said now what did we do, what did we do? And I said you know damn well what you did. You said that the corridors were going to be closed and you don’t have any right to close the corridors and we are not about to let you. Then he again sort of said what did [Page 341] we do and I said I just told you what you did. And he said well we didn’t intend it that way. I said put yourself in our position. How would you have construed it? I said we were about to have four-power talks. You have done this in the past and then he said I can tell you that we didn’t intend it that way. And I said are you saying it was a subordinate’s decision, that it was accidental? And he said that is what I am telling you. And he said will you take my word for it. I said that if you say it in that way I’ll take your word for it. I said if you tell me that it was an accident and it was not intended, that’s all right with me, but you can well understand why we thought it had some significance because normally you don’t do things that carelessly.

“K: Of course.

“R: I said but I will take your word for it. Let’s go on to something else—so that’s the way the damn thing ended. And I think that’s probably a pretty good way to put it.

“K: I think that’s right. It gives them a face saving way out of it.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 364, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)