120. Editorial Note
On September 27, 1970, Horst Ehmke, head of the West German Chancellery, arrived in the United States to discuss recent developments in the Berlin negotiations. According to his published account, Ehmke had come to defend Ostpolitik against two perceived threats: [Page 338] the “disruptive tactics” of the German opposition and the delaying tactics of the Department of State. He was unable to meet with Assistant to the President Kissinger and other high-ranking officials who were accompanying President Nixon on a 9-day trip to Europe. (Ehmke, Mittendrin: Von der Groben Koalition zur Deutschen Einheit, page 140) Before arriving in Washington, Ehmke stopped in New York, where he met representatives of the press, including the editors of The New York Times. On October 1, the Times published an article and an editorial, both evidently based on information provided by Ehmke, regarding the recent Soviet proposals in the ambassadorial talks. The editorial concluded that these proposals “would appear to warrant a more intensive stage now in the four-power Berlin negotiations.” (The New York Times, October 1, 1970, pages 6, 40)
The Department of State, considering the publicity “mostly inaccurate and confused,” quickly sent press guidance to the Embassy in Bonn in an effort to reduce the damage to its diplomacy. (Telegram 161763 to Bonn, October 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) Russell Fessenden, the Deputy Chief of Mission, lodged an official protest that evening in a meeting with Paul Frank, First State Secretary in the German Foreign Office. After decrying the breach of confidentiality in the negotiations, Fessenden declared: “Ehmke’s comments on differences between the US Government and the FRG and alleged differences between Embassy Bonn and Washington were equally unhelpful. The effect of all this on Allied unity, to say nothing of the Soviets, was serious. The result is just the opposite of what the FRG desires, i.e. rapid progress toward a Berlin solution.” Frank apologized for the incident, commenting on “how difficult it is to control ‘politicians’.” (Telegram 11385 from Bonn, October 2; ibid.)
Meanwhile, Ehmke met Acting Secretary of State John Irwin . In an October 6 memorandum to the President, Kissinger briefed Nixon on “important developments” during his absence, including the meeting between Ehmke and Irwin:
“On October 1 Acting Secretary Irwin met with German Minister Ehmke, a very close adviser to Brandt and general manager of the FRG Government. Ehmke expressed the conviction that Brezhnev wished to present the FRG–USSR treaty (signed in August) to the Party Congress in March. Given the public link between FRG ratification of the treaty and improvement in Berlin, Ehmke feels that the Berlin negotiations must be concluded by the end of the year. If the Soviets come to the judgment that the treaty will not be ratified by the time of the March party congress, they might be less interested in a Berlin improvement, concluded Ehmke. While in the US, Ehmke also provided several backgrounders to the press, the thrust of which was that the US was holding back in Berlin. Mr. Irwin reminded [Page 339] Ehmke that such statements were untrue and unhelpful.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1324, NSC Unfiled Material 1970, 2 of 11)
A detailed account of this meeting is in telegrams 163207, October 2, and 163305, October 3, to Bonn. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B and POL GER W–US, respectively) For a different perspective on the Ehmke visit, see Ulrich Sahm, “Diplomaten taugen nichts”, pages 277–278.