Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

119. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 25, 1970, 1041Z.

11081. Subject: Brandt on Berlin Talks.

Summary. Brandt gave the Ambassador September 24 his views on the Berlin talks. Brandt said the time has now come to appoint working groups to get on with the negotiations. The Embassy endorses the idea of a working group approach at the appropriate moment in the near future. End Summary.

1. In a general discussion on Berlin, OstPolitik, and other matters, the Ambassador told Brandt about our concern regarding Soviet violations of the Middle East truce, which naturally raise fundamental questions of the reliability of the Soviets. Nevertheless, we hope to get on with practical solutions to questions, including the Berlin issue. The Ambassador explained to Brandt briefly the background of the senior group discussions September 18–19 and described his recent meetings with Abrasimov and Tsarapkin.

2. Brandt said he realizes the French were the significant cause of difficulties in working out a good Allied position. He said they had reason to think that Pompidou was more forthcoming on Berlin than Schumann. Brandt asked if we would have any objections to bilateral German talks with the French with a view to improving their position on Berlin. The Ambassador replied that we would not at all object to such a German effort; on the contrary, one of the President’s important objectives is to improve general relations with the French. Brandt said that the French, in their current negotiations with the Soviets on economic cooperation and building a truck factory, had not consulted at all with the Germans, even though the Germans had earlier been careful to keep the French informed of their negotiations. The French had put in a lower bid and gotten the main part of the business with the Soviets.

3. Brandt said that when he was in Moscow he was struck by the fact that Brezhnev never criticized the European Community, Germans relations with it, or Community enlargement. Furthermore, Brezhnev had expressed understanding of the fact that the US would remain German’s principal ally. Brandt said that neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin ever tried during their talks with him to split the US from its allies. In a side comment, Brandt noted that this was quite contrary to the line which Abrasimov and Tsarapkin seem to have been taking recently. Brandt also confirmed what we earlier reported that Abrasimov had tried to see Brandt “secretly” in Berlin during the latter’s visit September 6. Brandt said this is not the first time Abrasimov has tried to arrange a secret meeting with Brandt. Brandt characterized Abrasimov as a very hard-liner.

4. Brandt has talked at length with Brezhnev about ties between Berlin and the FRG. Brezhnev had reiterated the line that West Berlin is not a part of the FRG and had spoken against “provocative political ties.” Nevertheless, Brandt had never gotten from either Brezhnev or Kosygin a really clear statement of their position on political ties. Brandt said, incidentally, that Brezhnev had spoken from notes, whereas Kosygin had not. Brandt thought there was some division within the Soviet Government over Berlin and what should be done about it. Brezhnev had also twice told Brandt that the Germans knew the official position of the Soviet Union but that some compromise was possible. Brandt attached significance to this statement.

5. Brandt said that, speaking frankly, he was disappointed in the results of the September 18–19 senior group meeting. He hoped that the talks after September 30 would be more profitable. He then suggested that the time has come to use the working group approach to negotiate with the Soviets. Brandt thought that the Abrasimov paper was not too disappointing as a starter and thought it might be possible to work from it.

6. Brandt referred to the strong feelings within the German Government on the air agreement and expressed the hope that early progress would be possible. Brandt showed awareness of the problems involved. The Ambassador assured him that he would do his part to expedite the matter.

7. Comment: We endorse Brandt’s view that the time has now come for a working group approach to the Berlin talks. We will be submitting our views shortly on the timing and form of such an approach.

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, USNATO, and US Mission Brussels.