Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

118. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 22, 1970.

SECRETARY’S BRIEFING—SEPTEMBER 22, 1970

Mr. Hillenbrand asked the Secretary if he had read the briefing book. The Secretary said he was familiar with the material because he had been exposed to it by German officials ad nauseam. He wanted to know what maximum hopes were on Berlin. Mr. Hillenbrand explained to him the actual procedure through which civilians have to go when travelling between West Berlin and the FRG, the fees they have to pay (which are repaid to them by the FRG Government). The Secretary also asked about the procedure for trucks, on waterways and air transit. Mr. Hillenbrand said that the four allies were reluctant to put on paper, even for their own use, their minimum position on Berlin or the maximum concessions they would be willing to make to the Soviets, because nothing could be kept secret in Bonn. He was optimistic that if we got the Soviets to make an agreement with us they could be kept to it. Of course, they could break the agreement. The Secretary said “so can we.” Mr. Hillenbrand said that our experience with the Soviets on negotiated agreements in the 1950’s had been good though they tried to nibble away at the edges.

On the Moscow treaty, Mr. Hillenbrand said that Henry Kissinger took a dim view of it. He felt that the Germans had alternated between extremes at least since Bismarck’s time—and Kissinger considered himself an expert on Bismarck. Therefore, the Germans could not really be trusted. The Secretary asked whether Kissinger himself, a German, made this statement as a German. He stated that the President is the elected official and the President is quite relaxed about our German policy and intends to stay with it. I suggested that Kissinger takes a tragic and almost determinist view of German history which is unjustified by recent experience. Under Secretary Johnson asked about a certain Belgian that he had met at a recent cocktail party. Mr. Hillenbrand identified him as an official of the Banque Belge, who is a local gossip. This man had told Mr. Johnson, that he, an experienced student of German affairs, and Henry Kissinger agreed that German eastern policy was all wrong. The Secretary reaffirmed that our support of Chancellor Brandt’s policy was something to which we had committed ourselves, which was right, and which we would stick with. In any case, there was nothing else we could do. He had been impressed by Foreign Minister Scheel’s visit,² during which Scheel was asked to make certain adjustments in the treaty negotiations with the Soviets. Scheel agreed to do these things and as soon as he got back to Bonn he lived up to his promise. The Secretary also considers Chancellor Brandt very trustworthy and he asked why many people considered him untrustworthy. Mr. Hillenbrand suggested it might be because Brandt had been a communist before the war. The Secretary said that if he had lived in Germany under Hitler he would have been a communist too. Mr. Hillenbrand also mentioned the fact that Brandt had worn a Norwegian uniform during World War II and some people in Germany, therefore, considered him a traitor. Mr. Spiers suggested that there were many people in this country who mistrusted any Socialist. I said that the fragility of the Brandt Government was exaggerated in the briefing paper because under the German constitution it was very hard to overthrow a government without finding a majority in Parliament to agree on the Chancellor’s replacement. The FDP, since Scheel had negotiated the treaty, were more firmly in the coalition than before. Moreover, the CDU had been waffling in their opposition to the treaty. Mr. Hillenbrand said that the two state elections coming up in November might hurt the Government, especially the FDP, but that the Free Democrats really had no place else to go. The Secretary asked why he was being visited by so many German officials. Mr. Hillenbrand explained that the German Parliament was out of session so everybody was coming to Washington.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, EUR/CE Files: Lot 91 D 341, POL 39.1, 1970 Four Power Talks, Aug–Sep Preparations for Meetings. Secret. Drafted by H.J. Spiro (S/PC). The meeting was presumably held to brief the Secretary for his meeting with Scheel on September 23. An account of their discussion on the Moscow talks is in telegram 157941 to Bonn, September 25. (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–US.
2. Scheel had visited Washington in July, before signature of the Moscow Treaty; see Document 100.