Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

181. Memorandum From Clinton E. Granger and Robert B. Oakley of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, September 4, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Arms Transfer Group

The Secretary has asked for recommendations for an effective means of handling the arms transfer problem. He has had a brief opportunity to discuss this with Joe Sisco and he will undoubtedly wish to have your views. You have indicated a willingness to talk to Sisco and Carl Maw about this. This memorandum is to give some perspective to the issues involved and possible approaches to deal with them.

Arms sales, expanding at an accelerated rate, have begun to create serious problems in several areas—adversely affecting our military capabilities where equipment for sale or grant must be drawn from U.S. inventories, creating strains in our relations with countries interested in equipment with long lead times, and focusing Congressional scrutiny on the impact of U.S. arms in sensitive world areas.

At the present time we lack two essential elements for effective control of arms transfers: —an effective mechanism for interagency coordination of policy formation and implementation; and —a dependable means for identifying troublesome issues at an early state. Over the past several months problems associated with these two areas have intensified. (State has compiled a list several pages long of significant instances of lack of interagency coordination on arms transactions over the last several months.)² The series of decisions on the Jordan Hawk issue—running from the agreement with King Hussein to provide 14 batteries through the timing of transmittal of the LOA to the uncoordinated positions taken by Administration representatives during Congressional debate—is a good case at point. The larger issue of differing positions on Israeli arms requests and deliveries is another. This trend will likely continue particularly in view of accelerated deliveries to the Middle East. Our problems are not limited to the Middle East, however. For the foreseeable future, worldwide demand for our arms will far exceed supply placing a premium on effective management and political control of our limited resources. Thus the Administration must be brought to work more as a team in making decisions on arms deliveries and defending them with Congress. If not, there will be huge foreign and domestic complications, given the amount of arms involved.

The question is how management and control can best be established. The Murphy Commission, recognizing the lack of centralized control in this area, recommended establishment of an interagency group, to be chaired by State at the Under Secretary level.³ State has informally presented a proposal for a similar, but lower-level group. However, we believe the ability to monitor arms transfer at the agency level must be combined with a facility for quick, high-level decision-making and effective interagency coordination. These criteria are best met by a group under the auspices of the NSC.

Whether there be a formal decision to establish an official body, or whether it is to be done on an informal basis, we believe the following guidelines should be applied:

The group could be chaired by you and would include the Under Secretaries of State for Political Affairs and Security Assistance, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. Its mandate would be determined by its members, but—at a minimum—should include:

I. Analysis Prior to Approving Arms Requests

• —foreign policy considerations
• —proliferation and arms-race considerations
• —U.S. ability to meet requests (including delivery dates)
• —impact on U.S. military capabilities

II. Making Good on Approved Requests

• —establishment of priorities between potential foreign consumers of items which are in short supply or will have long lead-times for delivery
• —impact on U.S. military capabilities of taking weapons from U.S. stocks or reserve or operational units
• —oversight on the timing of deliveries where political considerations warrant
• —coordination of Administration policy for dealing with Congress on arms transfers

Because of fragmentation of responsibility, we presently lack a single source of information about the broad spectrum of FMS and MAP, and commercial sales. As a result, our ability to identify potentially controversial issues of the sort which should be addressed by a high-level group is severely limited. Thus, of equal importance to the establishment of a high-level review group is the establishment of a standing working group, to monitor the day-to-day flow of arms transactions and identify those issues which should be brought to the attention of policy makers for information or action purposes. In practice, we anticipate that the working group would establish and periodically update criteria for the types of arms transactions which would be submitted for its review. This would allow the working group to focus on those aspects of the work of DSAA, Munitions Control, and State with potential political consequences. Aside from providing staffing for the high-level group, such a procedure would establish within the Administration a central information (and control) mechanism for arms transfers. Under present circumstances, we believe that such a working group should be chaired by the Director of NSC’s planning staff with DOD, DSAA, ACDA, and State participation. However, in the future, it may be desirable to transfer this responsibility to State’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.

We believe you should talk, in the first instance, to Sisco and Maw to elicit their views on how this increasingly serious problem can best be handled, including the establishment of a working group, and whether the high-level group should be established formally or not. It is certainly not necessary to adopt the formal option at the outset, but we foresee problems in establishing the kind of comprehensive management and control we need unless both the high-level and working group have clearly-defined authority and areas of responsibility.

Attached is a list of major military supply issues which we expect will require high-level attention over the next several months.⁴ You can use this for illustrative purposes in talking to Sisco and Maw.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–310, Miscellaneous Institutional Files of the Nixon Administration, IFG (Changed from NS) [1 of 4]. Secret. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum. In a covering memorandum to Scowcroft, September 6, Davis noted: “While use of the NSC may appear to be an easy answer to some of these problems of coordination, I believe we should resist the temptation to opt for this solution, particularly in what is basically an operational activity.” He continued, “I believe that all the benefits described in Clint and Bob’s memo could be achieved with a group chaired by State, in which the NSC is a participant.”
2. Not found.
3. The proposed group was designed to reshape the existing Security Assistance Program Review Committee (SAPRC), established in 1971, into a standing committee of the NSC which would serve as the “primary forum for interagency review of all issues involving arms transfers and security assistance.” Chaired by the Under Secretaries of State for Political and Security Assistance, the group was to include representatives of OMB, ACDA, State, Defense, JCS, Treasury, and the NSC staff. (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, p. 76) For more on the Murphy Commission’s report, see Documents 147 and 179.
4. Attached but not printed.