We need a decision on the general level of our civil defense effort for
the next few years to provide guidance to the agencies for 1974 budget
preparations.
Tab
Paper Prepared by the National Security Council
Staff5
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE
POLICY (NSSM 57)
US
Civil Defense Program
Our civil defense posture resulted from the Eisenhower
Administration’s National Fallout Shelter Policy initiated in 1959.
Civil defense programs were accelerated briefly during the
Kennedy Administration, but not sustained
at the accelerated level because of inadequate funding and political
support.
[Page 1004]
The program is geared to provide fallout
protection. Fallout protection for everyone is not yet
provided. The major effort today is locating and equipping shelters
(but not constructing them). The program also includes warning and
communication system development, public training programs, and
emergency hospital programs. Current annual
federal expenditures are about $80M, including $5M
HEW funds. State and local
governments spend an additional $50–60M annually. (Civil defense programs involve local
authorities and must command public support or acceptance to be
effective.)
The major deficiency in today’s program is the
maldistribution of the over 190M fallout shelter spaces, which are
mostly located in downtown urban areas. Our plans for dealing with
crises in attack or natural disaster situations are also limited and
do not include selective evacuation/relocation plans.
Blast shelter systems development is also not included in our
program. Blast shelter systems are considered
escalatory within today’s context (while increasing fallout
shelters is not) because blast shelters aim to deny one’s urban
population and industry as hostage. The study concludes that before
any decisions are made on an extensive civil defense program
including blast shelter systems, more planning and R&D are needed to resolve
uncertainties regarding relative efficiency and possible impact on
strategic objectives and force postures.
Today’s program would have some utility in the
event of nuclear attack. It is estimated that a Soviet
nuclear attack on the US without a
formal civil defense program would produce fatalities ranging from
20M in a medium counterforce attack to 150M in a heavy countervalue
attack. The current program could save an estimated 10–20M more
lives under certain heavy attack situations, with effectiveness
depending inter alia on warning times and attack intensity and
targetting.
Soviet Civil Defense
Program
It is estimated that the USSR
devotes 1–2% of its overall defense spending to civil defense (a
much higher percentage than the US)
and has been increasing its program in recent years. The USSR has extensive public training
programs and some blast shelter programs for key industries and
services. Operationally, it emphasizes evacuation of urban
areas.
On balance, the study tends to discount the seemingly impressive
Soviet civil defense effort because its reliance on evacuation makes
strategic warning critical and it is doubted that the Soviets
actually possess a rapid and orderly evacuation capability for their
large cities.
Current Situation
There is a need now for a decision on what should be the general
nature and level of our civil defense effort for the next few years.
Program [Page 1005] objectives and
budget levels must be established and Congressional interest is
growing. A special subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee has been established to conduct hearings on our civil
defense programs, possibly this fall. The existence of our study is
well known.
Options and Agency
Positions
The study presents six program options beginning with a minimal
program and adding new program elements and concomitant costs with
each successive option. Options 1 and 2 are considered low
protection options; Options 3 and 4 are improved protection options;
and Options 5 and 6 are improved protection plus investigating more
comprehensive protection.
Option 1 is a minimal program concentrating on
warning and education, including medical services and emergency
operations, discontinuing the fallout shelter program and reducing
funds for aid to states. It would cut costs in half to $40M in 2 years and still provide some
capability for dealing with natural disasters and light attack
recovery. Advantage: would reduce
expenditures. Disadvantages: would reduce
life-saving potential of current program and complicate initiation
of possible expanded or improved program later.
ACDA favors
this option and questions both the effectiveness of passive defense
measures in massive nuclear attack situations and the value of
pre-attack measures (e.g., evacuation) even in light attack
situations. Noting that the effectiveness of programs depends on
public and local authority participation and cooperation, ACDA suggests that these are not
likely to be forthcoming for more effective civil defense
programs.
Option 2, a status quo program (costs around
$80M), would keep today’s limited
fallout protection (in caretaker status) and operational capability
and not reduce aid to states. Advantages:
would keep present life-saving capability and continue support for
state and local emergency capabilities useful for natural disasters.
Disadvantages: would not remedy deficiencies in the fallout shelter program,
nor provide for increased crisis planning and R&D, nor reverse the trend of declining state and
local interest upon which effective civil defense relies
heavily.
State favors this option and opposes
initiation of any new or higher programs pending further results in
SALT and the Defense Program
Review Committee’s strategic posture review.
Option 3 would add a major
crisis planning and management program, including selected
evacuation plans and ranging from preparatory measures to rapid
shelter construction. Average annual costs over 5 years would be
$123M. Advantages: could increase life-saving potential, provide
an evacuation option to Soviet evacuation, and increase [Page 1006] our natural disaster
preparedness capability. Disadvantage:
benefits may not outweigh costs since evacuation is highly dependent
on the availability of strategic warning and expedient
sheltering.
Option 4 would add more and
better distributed fallout shelter protection. Average
annual costs over 5 years would be $161M. Advantages: same as for
Option 3, plus a greater increase in life-saving potential because
of the upgraded fallout shelter program. Disadvantages: high costs for fallout shelters which might
more usefully be spent on crisis planning, other R&D, or other missions.
OEP, OSD and JCS favor this option to upgrade significantly
today’s program. OSD estimates that
crisis planning for selective evacuation and more and better
distributed shelters would increase the life-saving potential by
10–70M persons over today’s
program. Though the study costs this option out at $150M for FY
73, General Lincoln states
that the funding need be only $100M
because the study’s estimates are based on outdated analysis. His
and Defense’s goal now is to get a commitment to these two new
program objectives (major crisis planning program, including
evacuation plans, and an upgraded shelter program).
Option 5 would add a planning/R&D program to
explore the feasibility of augmenting a fallout/evacuation
system with extensive blast shelters. It
would double costs in FY 73 and rise
to $300M in FY 76 if deployment arose out of R&D. Advantages: same as for
Option 4, plus would provide a basis for deciding within a few years
on a more comprehensive civil defense program including blast
shelters. Disadvantages: high costs over
Option 4 while providing no additional life-saving potential unless
considerably more money were spent on blast shelter system
deployment.
AEC supports
the spending level for this option, but believes that the program
needs to be revamped to differentiate clearly between and provide
for the following new elements: (1) plans for rapid evacuation of
urban areas and temporary sheltering; (2) plans for longer-term
population dispersal in a crisis; and (3) plans laying the
groundwork for more urban area protection later and for more
consideration given to population/industry dispersal in our national
planning.
Option 6 would add prototype
development and deployment of blast shelter systems. It
would more than double costs in FY 73
and rise to $500M in FY 76 if deployment continued. Advantages: same as for Option 5, but would
provide a better foundation for deciding on a comprehensive
nationwide civil defense program. Disadvantages: would presage a new policy with high costs
causing public and Congressional opposition, and could be
interpreted by the Soviets and some Western European countries as
provocative since blast shelter systems are considered
escalatory.
[Page 1007]
Strategic Implications
Civil defense has strategic implications. Though it does not
contribute directly to the first two criteria of strategic
sufficiency6—namely, (1) high confidence in
our deterrent, and (2) sufficient assurance against an incentive to
strike the US first—civil defense
relates directly to the third criterion of denying significant
advantage to the Soviets in the event of nuclear war, as well as to
the fourth criterion of limiting damage from small attacks or
accidental launches. The Soviets would likely take counter-measures,
either in offensive weaponry or expanded civil defense, and their
views toward SALT could be affected
if a US civil defense program seemed
to jeopardize their deterrent capability.
The study concludes that undertaking a comprehensive protection
program beyond Option 6 would be imprudent and escalatory within
today’s context. Effective protection for our urban population and
industry would probably lead the USSR to question its damage inflicting capability.
My View. I agree with OEP and Defense that there could be substantial
increases in our civil defense program without likelihood of adverse
affects on strategic force postures or the SALT negotiations. This may not be the case with AEC’s recommendation because it borders
on high level urban population/industry protection.
However, even relatively small increases (e.g., $15–25M) would appear substantial in comparison
to the size of the program today. Any major new programs or
substantial upgrading of current programs would require significant
cost increases over several years. This means high political
visibility and Presidential endorsement to gain Congressional
support and funding, which would be difficult to achieve
particularly in the atmosphere of the ongoing SALT negotiations.
More importantly, our strategic posture today and for the foreseeable
future does not necessitate expanding our civil defense effort and
the benefits of the new programs presented in the study are not
clear. The effectiveness of evacuation in a nuclear attack, for
example, remains doubtful because it relies heavily on strategic
warning. (Evacuation could have some utility in natural disaster
situations, but this utility would be limited to specific geographic
areas.) Also, while more fallout shelters would increase our
life-saving potential, they would not protect either urban industry
or population (unless combined with evacuation planning and blast
shelter systems).
[Page 1008]
Development of blast shelter systems (Options 5 and 6) would not only
involve high current costs but also imply commitment to continued
deployment at higher costs and signal a new and possibly provocative
policy to the Soviets.
On the other hand, we should avoid any substantial program decreases
which would make improvements later more difficult and also result
in some flak from Congress. Today’s program provides some
life-saving potential in a nuclear attack and a capability to deal
with natural disasters. It has a valuable infrastructure extending
into 50 states. Moreover, the study presents an analysis, not
accepted by OSD and JCS, that the least cost US response to a large Soviet civil
defense program or Soviet force improvements would be a program of
direct defense of our urban population. Such unresolved issues argue
for keeping our future options open.
Therefore, I recommend maintaining the current level of effort,
including if necessary funding increases to hold the existing
program levels which would otherwise decrease because of higher
costs. This course would provide a useful program with low political
visibility and keep our options open.
The program should also include the objective of increased emphasis,
within the limitations of existing authority, on dual-use plans,
procedures and preparedness to increase our capability to deal with
natural disasters. This would include improvements in our plans for
dealing with crises without any major program reorientation or cost
increases. OEP and Defense accept
the objective of increasing emphasis on dual-use aspects. The
objective deserves Presidential endorsement.
