Parity, Safeguard, and the SS–9 Controversy


31. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 27, Safeguard. Secret. A copy was sent to Richard Helms.


32. Minutes of Review Group Meeting

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. No drafting information is provided.


33. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 845, ABMMIRV, MIRV Test Program. Top Secret. Drafted by Lynn. A stamped note on the first page reads: “The President has seen.”


34. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–22, NSC Meeting, June 13, 1969. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the paper, which is a revised summary of the interagency response to NSSM 3, submitted by Packard to Kissinger on May 12. (see footnote 2, Document 32). The paper was revised to reflect the discussion at the Review Group meeting on May 29 (see Document 32). The NSC Secretariat distributed this paper to Agnew, Rogers, and George Lincoln on June 11 with copies sent to Richardson, Wheeler, Helms, David Kennedy, Attorney General John Mitchell, Gerard Smith, and Mayo. It served as the basis for discussions at the NSC meetings held on June 13 and 18 (see Documents 35 and 36).


36. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1969. No classification marking. No drafting information is included. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting, during which participants considered SALT and continued their discussion of the U.S. strategic posture begun during the previous NSC meeting (see Document 35), was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 10:14 a.m. to 12:48 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)


38. Memorandum to Holders of National Intelligence Estimate 11–8–68

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, Box 341. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem; Talent–Keyhole–Comint; Ruff; [codeword not declassified]; Restricted Data. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside of his jurisdiction. A memorandum from Cushman to recipients of the memorandum stressing its extreme sensitivity and a table of contents are not printed. For text of NSC 11–8–68, October 3, 1968 see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume X, National Security Policy, Document 217.


39. National Security Decision Memorandum 16

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 1–50. Top Secret. Copies were sent to General Earle Wheeler, Robert Mayo, Gerard Smith, George Lincoln, Frank Shakespeare, and Lee DuBridge. In a June 23 memorandum to the President, Kissinger advised issuing a NSDM sanctioning the four criteria for strategic sufficiency, which would serve “as yardsticks not only in assessing the adequacy of U.S. strategic forces, but of immediate importance, in assessing the desirability of possible strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union.” Moreover, Kissinger wrote, “In the absence of your formal endorsement, each agency will still regard the results of the NSSM 3 study as ‘unofficial,’ and will still feel free to define the term ‘strategic sufficiency’ in its own way and design its policies according to its own view of what sufficiency implies.” (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–210, NSDM 16)


40. Memorandum From Laurence Lynn of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files—Europe—U.S.S.R., SALT and U.S. Strategic Capabilities. Top Secret; Nodis; [codeword not declassified]. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum to Attorney General Mitchell on July 1 under cover of a memorandum in which he wrote: “Attached is an analysis of the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet strategic threat prepared by a member of my staff. I am in substantial agreement with this analysis which again confirms the magnitude of the problem with which we have been dealing.” (Ibid.)


41. National Security Study Memorandum 64

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. Top Secret. Copies were sent to William Rogers, General Earle Wheeler, Richard Helms, and Robert Mayo. In a July 1 memorandum to the President, Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve a draft NSSM that examined “our strategic capabilities and force requirements under circumstances other than ‘massive retaliation.’ “According to Kissinger, “The objective will be to develop measures which are appropriate for the kinds of situations which the President might actually face in a crisis—specifically it should examine more discriminating options than the present SIOP.” Nixon indicated his approval by initialing the memorandum. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–127, NSSM 3)


42. National Security Study Memorandum 69

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. Secret. Copies were sent to General Earle Wheeler and Gerard Smith. Kissinger sent the President a memorandum on July 11 recommending that Nixon approve the draft NSSM. The President indicated his approval by initialing the memorandum. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–161, NSSM 69)


44. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rogers

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–I Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 3. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.


45. Paper Prepared by the NSSM 3 Interagency Steering Group

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–23, NSC Meeting, September 10, 1969. Secret. This study was prepared in response to NSSM 3, Document 2. According to a covering memorandum from the NSC Secretariat, the paper was sent to NSC members on September 6 for their consideration prior to the NSC meeting scheduled for September 10. A summary of the paper was also included in Nixon’s briefing materials for the NSC meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–23, NSC Meeting, September 10, 1969)


46. National Intelligence Estimate

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The full text of this NIE is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).


47. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–23, NSC Meeting, September 10, 1969. Top Secret: Nodis. A September 9 memorandum from Lynn to Kissinger indicates that this memorandum to the President was drafted by Lynn. (Ibid.)


50. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Buchanan) to President Nixon

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 79, President’s Meetings File, Beginning September 28, 1969. Confidential. The following attended the meeting, held from 8:31 to 10:20 a.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House: Nixon; Richardson; Kissinger; Senators Hugh Scott (Minority Leader), Robert P. Griffin (Minority Whip), Margaret Chase Smith, Milton Young, Gordon Allott, and John G. Tower; and Representatives Gerald R. Ford (Minority Leader), Leslie C. Arends (Minority Whip), John B. Anderson, William C. Cramer, Richard H. Poff, John J. Rhodes, H. Allen Smith, Bob Wilson, and Robert Taft, Jr. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)


51. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–101, DPRC Working Group Meeting. Top Secret; Nodis. A September 24 memorandum from Lynn to Kissinger indicates that Lynn drafted the memorandum to the President. (Ibid.)


52. National Intelligence Estimate

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; Restricted Data. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside of his jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The full text of this NIE is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov).


53. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–163, NSSM 78. No classification marking. Sent for action.


54. National Security Study Memorandum 78

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 365, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. No classification marking.


55. National Security Decision Memorandum 26

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 1–50. Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler. Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum on September 17 recommending that he sign an enclosed draft NSDM establishing the DPRC. Kissinger’s memorandum begins as follows: “Your remarks at the NSC meeting [of September 10] on the U.S. military posture, strongly underscored your view that resolution of major defense strategy and program issues must no longer be the result of ‘treaties’ negotiated between DOD and BOB or compromises struck among the military services.” Kissinger continued, “As a result of the NSC meeting, I recommend that we move to establish an interagency” DPRC. Nixon initialed his approval. (Ibid., Box 958, Haig Chronological File, September 1969) Regarding the September 10 NSC meeting, see Document 48.


56. National Security Decision Memorandum 27

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 1–50. Top Secret. Drafted by Lynn. Copies were sent to Wheeler and McCracken.


57. National Intelligence Estimate

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; [code-words not declassified]. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside of his jurisdiction. The table of contents and a map of the locations of China’s advanced weapons facilities are not printed. For the full text of this NIE see, Tracking the Dragon.