Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972

55. National Security Decision Memorandum 26¹

Washington, October 11, 1969.

• TO
  • The Vice President
  • The Secretary of State
  • The Secretary of Defense
  • The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • The Director of Central Intelligence
  • The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness
  • The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
  • The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

• SUBJECT
  • Defense Program Review Committee

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct the formation of the Defense Program Review Committee.

This Committee will review the diplomatic, military, political and economic consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination that result from

• —proposals to change defense strategy, programs and budgets,
• —proposals to change U.S. overseas force deployments and committed forces based in the U.S.,²
• —major defense policy and program issues raised by studies prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums.

The Committee will meet as necessary and supervise the preparation of issue papers for consideration by the National Security Council. Issues will be brought to the attention of this group at the initiative of the addressee agencies or of the Chairman. Studies of defense policy and program issues undertaken in response to National Security Study Memorandums will be submitted to the Defense Program Review Committee prior to NSC consideration rather than to the NSC Review Group.

The membership of the Defense Program Review Committee shall include:

• The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman)
• The Under Secretary of State
• The Deputy Secretary of Defense
• The Director of Central Intelligence
• The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors
• The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.³

Richard Nixon

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 1–50. Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler. Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum on September 17 recommending that he sign an enclosed draft NSDM establishing the DPRC. Kissinger’s memorandum begins as follows: “Your remarks at the NSC meeting [of September 10] on the U.S. military posture, strongly underscored your view that resolution of major defense strategy and program issues must no longer be the result of ‘treaties’ negotiated between DOD and BOB or compromises struck among the military services.” Kissinger continued, “As a result of the NSC meeting, I recommend that we move to establish an interagency” DPRC. Nixon initialed his approval. (Ibid., Box 958, Haig Chronological File, September 1969) Regarding the September 10 NSC meeting, see Document 48.
2. Laird had sent a memorandum on September 15 informing the President that he had approved certain naval force reductions that, according to the JCS, would seriously degrade the U.S. worldwide naval posture. Kissinger forwarded Laird’s memorandum to Nixon on September 19, adding his belief that “these developments underscore the need for” a DPRC. The DPRC would accomplish several things, Kissinger wrote. It would “prevent you from being hit with faits accompli concerning important changes in our military posture” and “prevent our allies from being faced with unilateral U.S. decisions that affect their security without prior explanation or consultation.” In addition, it would “give State and the other affected agencies the opportunity to work out coordinated diplomatic and public relations scenarios so that the Administration can speak with one voice” and “insure that all significant military policy and program decisions are in accordance with your policies and guidance.” The President highlighted these comments and wrote in the margin, “I completely agree.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 222, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. IV)
3. On December 1, Laird sent Kissinger a letter insisting that the committee avoid “assessing the programs of individual weapons systems or alternative regional force levels.” Instead, Laird believed that the DPRC should confine its activities to “major aggregate resource allocation issues ancillary to our top-most national goals,” including balancing U.S. objectives with available national resources and defense and non-defense spending. (Ibid., Box 221, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. III) This and other resistance from the Pentagon led to a breakfast meeting about the DPRC between Kissinger and Laird on December 11. No record of the meeting was found. According to talking points prepared for Kissinger by the NSC Staff, he was advised to remind Laird that the President wanted the DPRC “to consider those issues with major doctrinal, diplomatic, or economic implications.” (Ibid.)