Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

68. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 17, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Your Stopover in Austria

I. Background and Your Objectives

Austria regards itself as neutral by treaty but not by choice, history or inclination. By all these she is firmly pro-Western. But Austrian Constitutional Law and the State Treaty of 1955, which ended the occupation, gave Austria back its independence and calls for its “perpetual” neutrality, make it difficult for Austria to give political form to this Western orientation. The Austrians have, however, sought to put their neutrality to creative use in helping to better relations between Eastern and Western European countries. They see in the present military and political equilibrium in Central Europe the best guarantee of their neutrality and security. Austria has stoutly defended its neutrality and freedom against Soviet pressures and occasional threats, notably at the time of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, when you visited the country, and during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.²

Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, with whom you will meet in Salzburg, is a close friend of Willy Brandt. He heads the Socialist Party. Biographies of Kreisky and other Austrian leaders are at Tab A.

The Socialists which took over the government in 1970 and strengthened their position in national elections last fall, reject dogmatic Marxism and are strongly anti-Communist. Their constituency includes both workers and many white collar employees. They have stressed full employment and expanding social welfare benefits. The opposition is made up of the conservative Peopleʼs Party and a small liberal party.

The United States, as one of the four occupying powers and signatories of the State Treaty, has played a key role in Austriaʼs post-war history. Yet no American President has ever paid a state visit (although President Kennedy went to an unsuccessful Summit in Vienna with Khrushchev in 1961). Your stopover will to some extent meet Austriaʼs long-standing desire for a visit to the country as such. It will thus also balance at last state visits paid to Austria by Khrushchev (1960) and Podgorny (1966).

Your chief objectives—which are to a large degree accomplished by the fact of your visit—are to underscore our support for Austriaʼs constructive neutrality, our respect for its determined and even-handed defense of that policy, and our friendship for a small country, whose strategic geographic location and influence in the UN and potentially in Eastern Europe might one day make its support of substantial importance to us. Chancellor Kreisky carries much prestige among European socialists. Your meeting thus also presents a valuable opportunity through him to make our Vietnam policies better understood within the Socialist parties. Kreisky, who is intelligent, active and experienced in foreign affairs, may also have some helpful insights into Soviet interests and aims in Europe.

Austriaʼs objectives parallel ours. Its chief interest in your visit is to get a sympathetic hearing for the problems which its neutrality entails, in particular those increasingly troublesome ones of adjusting its relationship to the European Community (EC). The Austrians will want particularly to acquaint you with their special perspective on European security matters, including the Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CSCE).

II. Issues and Talking Points

You should:

• —review with Kreisky your expectations for the Moscow Summit and the prospects for a SALT agreement there;
• —lay our your views on European security matters, in particular our policies on the CSCE and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR);
• —note that there are no bilateral US-Austrian problems.³

In addition to these issues, Kreisky may want to:

• —discuss his efforts to give Austria a more dynamic intermediary role in East-West relations;
• —explain Austriaʼs vital interest in negotiating an industrial free trade area with the European Community and seek your support for these negotiations.

Since you will have only a brief time with Kreisky, your talks will of necessity cover only one or two of the main issues:

A. Summit

You may wish to indicate to Kreisky how you expect the Summit to be affected by the Vietnam situation and by Moscowʼs response to our military actions there. You might list for him the kinds of bilateral US-Soviet agreements that are in the making (science, space, environment). Since Austria has provided a site for the SALT negotiations, Kreisky will want to have your judgment on the importance of an agreement for Summit success and on the likelihood of follow-on negotiations.

You should note that your decision to go on with the visit was not lightly taken, in view of Moscowʼs support for the North Vietnamese invasion.⁴ However careful preparations have convinced us that the Soviets wish to come to concrete bilateral agreements that may open the way to wider understandings. For that reason we decided to proceed to the Summit—without any illusion, however, that it will transform the US-Soviet relationship or eliminate basic differences.

You should:

• —emphasize our pragmatic, case-by-case approach in dealing with the Soviets at the Summit;
• —indicate that we see improvement of relations with Moscow as a protracted process and point out the areas of difference that persist;
• —initiate discussion of the Sovietsʼ European policy, which obviously is of primary interest to the Austrians, pointing out the imponderables that stem from the status of the German treaties and the Berlin Protocol; and
• —ask for Kreiskyʼs assessment of Soviet objectives and current policies. (He is a shrewd and well-informed informer.)

B. European Security and the CSCE

We are generally sympathetic to Austrian efforts, revitalized by Kreisky, to play a more active intermediary role in relations between Eastern and Western Europe. As heir to an empire that once included parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia, Austria has a good understanding of politics in Eastern Europe and an ability to put across the Western viewpoint to the political leadership there. A working principle of Viennaʼs foreign policy is to promote Austria as a site for East-West negotiations and international conferences.

The Austrians hope that Vienna will be selected as one of the alternate sites for a European Security Conference (CSCE). They want a Conference mainly for the sake of détente atmospherics but hope that it will not weaken NATO solidarity, on which the Central European equilibrium is so dependent.

On European security generally, you should:

• —express understanding and appreciation for Austriaʼs overall contribution to the improvement of East-West relations:
• —say that we prefer to focus on specific initiatives to overcome the divisions of the continent and will judge each Austrian proposal to this end on its merits.

On the CSCE, you should:

• —explain that at present we see more advantages to the Soviets than to the West in a European Conference or in any broad effort to devise an all-European security system;
• —note that we expect Brezhnev to push hard at the Summit for an early CSCE;
• —explain that we have never been opposed to the idea of a CSCE in principle but consider that certain basic issues producing tension should be examined and resolved first;
• —reiterate our view that the Berlin agreement should be signed before we move onward toward a CSCE, recalling to Kreisky that we are ready to sign it now but the Soviets have so far stuck to the linkage with the German treaties which they earlier established;⁵
• —express our preference, assuming signature of the Berlin agreement, for exploratory discussions late in the year;
• —say that we can, under these conditions, agree to a Conference next year and preliminary discussions between East and West about it in the late fall of this year; and
• —ask Kreisky for his views on the Conference, in particular on how to bring the East Europeans to agree to the Western objective of bringing about freer movement of information, ideas, and people.

C. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

The Austrians have been carefully watching NATOʼs gropings toward a common position on this issue, for they are concerned about the effect which reductions might have on the military balance in Europe. Like other neutrals, Austria would like to play some role in MBFR negotiations and any ensuing reduction arrangements. Possibly Kreisky will suggest Vienna as an appropriate venue for negotiations.

You should:

• —point out that we have been studying this complex issue for nearly four years and so far have been unable to see a negotiating outcome that could be both manifestly acceptable to the East and also clearly in our security interest; but we are continuing our efforts;
• —say that we have concluded that MBFR negotiations and the European Conference should be separate, although we do not want to foreclose the possibility of a general discussion of MBFR at the conference;
• —add that we do not now envisage participation by the neutrals in the negotiating process;
• —add that you hope that the present procedural impasse on how to start exploratory discussions with the East can be broken and hope this can begin more or less simultaneously with CSCE preparations.

D. Vietnam

Kreisky on May 2 stated that although he opposes the war he is “not prepared to hold any single state responsible for it.” He does not endorse the views of some European Socialists who favor diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Although he supports UN membership for all divided countries, he wants to postpone establishment of relations with North Vietnam until the question of the two Germanies is resolved.

You may wish to:

• —acknowledge his generally helpful statement;
• —review our Vietnam actions since Hanoiʼs all-out invasion began.

E. Austriaʼs Relationship with the European Community (EC)

This is a vital issue for the Austrians, and it is discussed in greater detail separately (Tab B). Briefly, Austria, and the other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) are trying to negotiate an industrial free trade area with the EC. Forty percent of Austriaʼs exports go to the EC and 55% of its imports come from this area. Kreisky has been making the rounds of EC capitals to drum up support, negotiating for Austriaʼs position.

The main problem arises because the Soviets take the view, with which we agree, that the Austrian State Treaty prohibits full Austrian membership in the EC. Kreisky hopes to negotiate an economic agreement that would imply a tacit political link with the Community but one the Soviets could not protest. He argues that if Austria cannot soon negotiate such an agreement, it will be faced with progressive “Finlandization” and will have to consider an arrangement with the Soviet-dominated economic grouping, COMECON.

Kreisky may:

• —seek your support for Austriaʼs negotiations;
• —make the point that Moscowʼs tolerance level in Europe is now high because of its interest in a CSCE, so that it might acquiesce to an Austrian-EC arrangement if made soon;
• —explain that Austria wants a link with an enlarged EC as a whole to counterbalance growing German economic influence in Austria, which raises Soviet suspicions;
• —ask for withdrawal of the US objections to EC tariff reductions for exports of paper, which is a major Austrian export.

You should:

• —say that we recognize that Austria, because of the State Treaty, cannot become a full EC member and we consider it a special case;
• —express sympathy for Austriaʼs need to reach some arrangement with the EC short of full membership;
• —say that we hope that his arrangement will be compatible with the GATT and will do minimal damage to the trade interests of third countries, including the United States;
• —reaffirm, if Kreisky raises this special issue, our position that we want equal access to the EC market for US paper and pulp.

III. Secretary Rogersʼ Memorandum

A memorandum from the Secretary giving his assessment of the visit and our objectives is to be found in the attached book.⁶

IV. Additional Talking Points

A. Salzburg Consulate

Conceivably the Austrians will allude to their hope that we will reopen our Consulate in Salzburg, which was closed nine years ago as an economy move.

A set of talking points on the Salzburg Consulate is to be found at Tab C.

B. Arab-Israeli Problem in European Security Conference

Kreisky believes that the Arab-Israeli problem should be on the Conference agenda. He may mention this. Austria, traditionally alert to developments in the Balkans, believes that Soviet activities in the Eastern Mediterranean deserve close attention and discussion at a Conference.

If this comes up, you should restate our Near Eastern position, with which the Austrians may not be fully familiar. You should say that:

• —work on this crucial issue should not be postponed until the convening of a Conference, whose date is indefinite;
• —the parties directly involved should negotiate settlement;
• —the best avenue for progress lies in the “proximity talks” between Israel and Egypt, which we are ready to help arrange, on an interim agreement to reopen the Suez Canal.

V. Background Papers and Biographic Sketches

For consultation as required, background papers on the following points are to be found in the attached book:

• —Austriaʼs Role in Central Europe
• —Austrian Foreign Policy
• —Austrian Internal Situation

Biographic sketches of all key Austrians whom you are likely to encounter as well as Ambassador Humes and his deputy are also to be found in the attached book.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 478, Presidentʼs Trip Files, Briefing Book, Visit of Richard Nixon, President of the United States, to the Federal Republic of Austria, May 1972. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. For text of his public remarks in Salzburg, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 614–617.
2. Documentation relating to the Austrian response to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVII, Eastern Europe; Austria; Finland, Documents 202–204.
3. The President wrote next to this sentence: “SALT”.
4. Launched on March 30 from bases in Laos. The offensive continued into May, eventually provoking a resumption of U.S. bombing attacks on North Vietnam.
5. For text of the September 3, 1971, Four Power agreement, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1135–1143. The final Quadripartite agreement was signed in Berlin on June 3, 1972. For text, see ibid., pp. 1204–1206.
6. Attached but not printed.