Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria¹

Washington, October 17, 1971, 1917Z.

190285. From the Secretary.

1. You should seek an early meeting with the Chancellor for the purpose of delivering an oral message of the greatest importance. It is essential that you see the Chancellor prior to the Cabinet meeting at which the Chinese Representation issue is to be decided. At the meeting you should read to the Chancellor the following message, and leave with him an aide-mémoire consisting of the text which you have delivered orally.

“I have been instructed to express to you, with the frankness appropriate between friends, the great importance which the United States Government attaches to the forthcoming votes in the United Nations on the issue of Chinese Representation.

“My government is aware, of course, that you recently established diplomatic relations with the Peopleʼs Republic of China and that your government would not wish to take a position in the United Nations inconsistent with that fact. We are also appreciative of the care you took, when establishing those relations, not to commit yourself on voting in the United Nations.

“The President of the United States, too, is vitally interested in better relations between the United States and the Peopleʼs Republic of China. At the same time he is not prepared to sacrifice basic principles to that end. He also is convinced that continued representation of the Republic of China in the UN would be helpful in achieving a more secure and more peaceful Asia. The United States Government cannot, therefore, be indifferent to the expulsion of representatives of the Republic of China from the United Nations. Indeed, we believe such action will cause, in the United States, widespread popular and Congressional resentment and even anger. Such an action would, therefore, greatly harm our own ability to make the United Nations a more effective institution.

“My government is certain that it is not incompatible for a country to work for improved relations with the Peopleʼs Republic of China and yet to vote for the Important Question and Dual Representation resolutions. That is what we are doing.

“If Austria could join with other countries to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China, my government has no doubt that you would thereby contribute significantly to the development of a sounder and more realistic world community.

“The United States Government is aware of the concerns that Foreign Minister Kirschlaeger expressed to the Secretary of State about the name of the ‘Republic of China.’² We had carefully considered this matter and concluded that this was the best course to follow. Any other terminology would clearly have tended to create ‘Two Chinas,’ which we did not wish to do. On the other hand the texts were carefully phrased so that no one who supported them would have to commit themselves to the claims of the Republic of China. Indeed the decisive fact is that our proposal gives the seat in the Security Council to the Peopleʼs Republic of China.

“In view of the special considerations which make this issue one of particular concern to the United States Government, and to the future of the United Nations, we ask for your support of our proposals. My government particularly expresses the hope that you will vote yes on the Important Question resolution, which is designed solely to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China.”³

2. At the conclusion of your oral presentation (but not to be included in the aide-mémoire which you will leave with the Chancellor), you should add the following: “I have been instructed to inform you that these views have the full support of the President of the United States and that he places great stress upon your attitude on this issue.”⁴

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 668, Country Files, Europe, Austria, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Herz, Feldman (IO) and Richard F. Pedersen (C); cleared by Charles K. Johnson (EUR/AIS), Hillenbrand (in substance), Armitage, and Haig; and approved by Richard D. Christiansen (S/S–O).
2. Reported in telegram Secto 79 from USUN, October 6. (Ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, 1969–1972: Lot 73 D323, Entry 3051B, CF 540)
3. For text of the U.S. resolution, see UN doc. A/L 632 and Add. 1 and 2. The motion was rejected in the General Assembly by a vote of 55–59 on October 25.
4. In telegram 6753 from Vienna, October 22, Humes reported that despite assurances from the Chancellorʼs office that no decision on Chinese representation would be made before he met with Kreisky, the Foreign Minister had announced Austriaʼs decision to vote for the Albanian resolution and abstain on the Important Question resolution. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 668, Country Files—Europe, Austria, Vol. I)